Icon Index Symbol • 6

Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed For Signs

Re: Peirce List (1) (2) (3) • HR • JAS • HR

I think it would be a good idea to continue reviewing basic concepts and get better acquainted with the relational context needed to ground the higher level functions, properties, and structures we might wish to think about.  Once we understand what relations are, then we can drill down to triadic relations, and then sign relations will fall more readily within our grasp.

I’ve written up introductions to these topics on a number of occasions and the latest editions can be found on the OEIS Wiki site, though in this case it may be better to take them up in order from special to general.

The related question of Relational Reducibility, in its Compositional and Projective aspects, is treated in the following article.

To be continued …

Resources

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Icon Index Symbol • 5

Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed For Signs

Re: Peirce List (1) (2) (3) • Helmut Raulien

Given that sign relations are special cases of triadic relations, we can get significant insight into the structures of both cases by examining a few simple examples of triadic relations, without getting distracted by all the extra features that come into play with sign relations.

When I’m talking about a k-place relation L I’ll always be thinking about a set of k-tuples.  Each k-tuple has the form:

(x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_{k-1}, x_k),

or, as Peirce often wrote them:

x_1\!:\!x_2\!:\!\ldots\!:\!x_{k-1}\!:\!x_k.

Of course, L could be a set of one k-tuple but that would be counted a trivial case.

That sums up the extensional view of k-place relations, so far as we need it for now.

Using a single letter like ``L" to refer to a set of k-tuples is already the genesis of an intensional view, since we now think of the elements of L as having some property in common, even if it’s only their membership in L.  When we turn to devising a formalism for working with relations in general, whether it’s an algebra, logical calculus, or graph-theoretic notation, it’s in the nature of the task to “unify the manifold”, to represent a many as a one, to express a set of many tuples by means of a single sign.  That can be a great convenience, producing formalisms of significant power, but failing to discern the many in the one leads to no end of confusion.

To be continued …

Resources

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Icon Index Symbol • 4

Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed For Signs

Re: Peirce List (1) (2) (3) • Helmut Raulien

One thing I always say at these junctures is that people really ought to take Peirce’s advice and study his logic of relative terms and its relation to what mathematicians and computer scientists these days would call the mathematical theory of relations.  Personally I find his 1870 Logic of Relatives very instructive, partly because he gives such concrete and simple examples of every abstract abstrusity and partly because he maintains a healthy balance between the extensional and intensional views of things, drawing on both our empiricist and rationalist ways of thinking.

Thereby hangs another hang up, a problem people often encounter in trying to understand Peirce’s logic and semiotics.  We have what might be called different “cognitive styles” or “intellectual inclinations” ranging or swinging between the respective poles.  I doubt if there’s anything like pure types in the human arena, but thinkers do tend to lean in one direction or the other, at least, at any given moment.  As a rule, though, we are almost always operating at two different levels of abstraction, whether we are aware of it or not, and our task is to get better at doing that, through increased awareness of how thought works.  There is the level of intension, or rational concepts, and there is the level of extension, or empirical cases.

To be continued …

Resources

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Icon Index Symbol • 3

Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed For Signs

Re: Peirce List (1) (2) (3) • Kirsti Määttänen

KM:  Seems valid to me.  But it does not answer the quest for understanding.

The setup described in the previous post is the barest of beginnings.  It is the grounds from which our understanding must grow, if it is to be sustained by the following two provisions:

  • MAT.  We take the Methods and Tools Peirce provides us seriously.
  • COR.  We take the Context of Research in scientific inquiry seriously.

In practice, of course, we do not take the whole actual universe U as our starting point but begin by constructing concrete examples of systems, say, a system defined by its state space X, and we try to determine what sorts of conditions X must satisfy in order for X to possess any sort of representation at all of its own structure.

Questions like that have been thoroughly investigated in the case of axiom systems and computational systems, where people speak of a system having a “reflective property”, but there is room to do a lot more work on reflection in full-fledged semiotic systems, those built on triadic sign relations and taking full advantage of their power.

Resources

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Icon Index Symbol • 2

Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed For Signs

Re: Peirce List (1) (2) (3) • Jon Alan Schmidt

JAS:  What class of Sign is a law of nature?

I’ve mentioned the following possibility several times before, but maybe not too recently.

A sign relation L is a subset of a cartesian product O \times S \times I, where O, S, I are the object, sign, interpretant domains, respectively.  In a systems‑theoretic framework we may think of those domains as dynamical systems.

We often work with sign relations where S = I but it is entirely possible to consider sign relations where all three domains are one and the same.  Indeed, it could be the case that O = S = I = U, where the system U is the entire universe.  That would make the entire universe a sign of itself to itself.

A general way to understand a system‑theoretic law is in terms of a constraint — the fact that not everything which might happen actually does.  And that is nothing but a subset relation.

So the law embodying how the universe represents itself to itself could be nothing other than a sign relation L \subseteq U \times U \times U.

Resources

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Icon Index Symbol • 1

Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed For Signs

Re: Peirce List • Jerry Rhee

With regard to the main three types of signs — Icons, Indices, Symbols — Jerry Rhee asks:

How best do you distinguish between these terms?  What settles it?

Those very questions arose at the outset of my venture into Inquiry Driven Systems, obliging me to undertake a parallel “Inquiry Into Inquiry”.  Here’s a few links on how I began to get a handle on the issues, with an eye as always to real-world practical applications:

To get the spirit of what is going on here, imagine yourself designing a software application for assisting with inquiry, one able to begin with the earliest stages of qualitative research and continue helping with the most complex quantitative analyses and statistical inferences.

One of the first things you’ll discover is that you can’t really decide ahead of time all the sorts of things you’ll need to refer to over time.  You’ll need a dynamic database, able to evolve as the need arises, to track the growing collection of objects you’ll need to reference as inquiry progresses, plus the inventory of instances you’ll need to analyze and connect the objects, and last but not least the assortment of properties you’ll need to collect and describe the objects, as time goes by.

I began discussing one sort of organizational structure flexible enough to handle these tasks, introducing the concept of an Objective Framework (OF), at this point:

In accounting for the special characters of icons and indices that arose in previous discussions, it was necessary to open the domain of objects coming under formal consideration to include unspecified numbers of properties and instances of whatever objects were initially set down.  This is a general phenomenon, affecting every motion toward explanation whether pursued by analytic or synthetic means.  What it calls for in practice is a way of organizing growing domains of objects, without having to specify in advance all the objects there are.

The next several sections discuss how we might apply these very general principles of organization to the more specific task of analyzing iconic and indexical sign relations:

Resources

An earlier version of this material can be found at the Arisbe Gateway.

There’s a bit more discussion of the Objective Framework architecture here:

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Pragmatic Truth • Discussion 12

Re: Peirce List Discussion • JFS • JFS • JAS • GF • JAS • GF

I realize that iconolatry — just one of many forms of dyadic reductionism — runs too deep at present for most folks to appreciate this, but it happens to be one of the consequences of Triadic Relation Irreducibility (TRI) that symbols — signs that denote their objects solely by virtue of being interpreted to do so — are the genus of all signs, while icons and indices are species under that genus.  An icon is an icon only because interpreted as an icon, by dint of a property singled out from all possible properties shared with its object.

Thus symbols are the fons et origo of all other signs — they do not in the first instance grow from icons so much as icons crystallize from the primordial matrix of symbols.

Resources

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Pragmatic Truth • Discussion 11

Re: Peirce List Discussion • CG • JA • CG • JA • CG • JA • CG

One of the points I’ve been trying to make all along is that a person doesn’t normally need to make a working assumption explicit when it’s understood by all practitioners in a given practical setting as being implicit in that practice.  It becomes necessary and pertinent to do so only when a working assumption stops working or when one needs to lay out the rationales of that practice to others who may not be familiar with it.

As long as Peirce was writing for readers with relevant backgrounds in the practice of math and science it wasn’t really necessary and would’ve even been considered impertinent for him to waste words on points that everyone in that audience would regard as routine.

Does that have any bearing on questions about the reality of generals?  It’s hard to say.  I guess it’s bound up with the reasons I think the only real realists I know and the only practicing pragmatists I know are all mathematicians, or at least scientists who use mathematics, for the moments they are immersed in doing so.

Referring again to the figure I drew for Peirce’s classification of sciences, many if not most of our theories on the mathematical side will have both individual terms and general terms, categorized not absolutely but in relation to each other in a given context.  So the distinction between individual and general does not align with the distinction between phenomena and theory.  The whole theory is judged (by us arbiters) according to how well it guides our transactions with the whole phenomenal domain in question.


Peirce Syllabus

We do not know whether anything like predicates and subjects, generals and particulars, waves and particles, or whatever, exists in the reality that generates the phenomenal world.  It is entirely conceivable that none of those terms will appear in the final account of things.  All we have to decide, as Gandalf says, is what to do with the time that is given to us.

Resources

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Pragmatic Truth • Discussion 10

A paragraph from Kant and associated discussion I added to the Wikipedia article on the Correspondence Theory of Truth in June 2006 is useful at this point, and it serves to set up a corresponding statement from Peirce that we’ll take up in due course.  A version of this material survives on the InterSciWiki site:

Immanuel Kant discussed the correspondence theory of truth in the following manner:

Truth is said to consist in the agreement of knowledge with the object.  According to this mere verbal definition, then, my knowledge, in order to be true, must agree with the object.  Now, I can only compare the object with my knowledge by this means, namely, by taking knowledge of it.  My knowledge, then, is to be verified by itself, which is far from being sufficient for truth.  For as the object is external to me, and the knowledge is in me, I can only judge whether my knowledge of the object agrees with my knowledge of the object.  Such a circle in explanation was called by the ancients Diallelos.  And the logicians were accused of this fallacy by the sceptics, who remarked that this account of truth was as if a man before a judicial tribunal should make a statement, and appeal in support of it to a witness whom no one knows, but who defends his own credibility by saying that the man who had called him as a witness is an honourable man.  (Kant, 45).

According to Kant, the definition of truth as correspondence is a “mere verbal definition”, here making use of Aristotle’s distinction between a nominal definition, a definition in name only, and a real definition, a definition that shows the true cause or essence of the thing whose term is being defined.  From Kant’s account of the history, the definition of truth as correspondence was already in dispute from classical times, the “skeptics” criticizing the “logicians” for a form of circular reasoning, though the extent to which the “logicians” actually held such a theory is not evaluated in this account.

A careful analysis of what Kant is saying here can help to explain why there are so many theories of truth on the contemporary scene.  In other words, why would thinkers who examine the question of truth not be satisfied to rest with this very first theory that usually comes to mind?

Reference

  • Kant, Immanuel (1800), Introduction to Logic.  Reprinted, Thomas Kingsmill Abbott (trans.), Dennis Sweet (intro.), Barnes and Noble, New York, NY, 2005.

Resources

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Pragmatic Truth • Discussion 9

Re: Peirce List • Clark Goble • Jon Awbrey • Clark Goble • Jon Awbrey • Clark Goble

To put things more plainly, it’s a routine observation we have no need for moods and tenses in actually doing mathematics, that is, in developing the consequences of given axioms, constructing formal models, or applying models and theories to the applicable phenomena.  Theories of change, intention, and possibility can all be stated in present tense indicative mood.  Regarding change, intention, and possibilities as real or not is independent of the linguistic forms we happen to use in their description.

Audiences, interpreters, receivers are neither right nor wrong.  It simply happens that one audience may require us to articulate what goes without saying, what is taken for granted, “understood” in another context.  It may be useful exercise to unfold the implicatures and presuppositions taken for granted in a particular discourse situation, but giving a name to one’s habitual position is not the same thing as a change of address.

So, yes, I’d say Peirce is a realist about possibilities, and patterns of possibilities, from the start.  That much is simply implicit in his mathematical approach to logic, probability, and information.

Resources

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