“Let us now return to the information.” To coin a phrase. This time around we come to Peirce’s notion of information in a critical and recurring passage that Frederik Stjernfelt takes as the next stepping stone from propositions through dicisigns to the information they convey:
This maybe surprising definition of the Dicisign is closely connected, however, to the basic function of the Dicisign, namely to convey information — to relay claims, assert statements, true or false. Only by separately indicating an object does it become possible for a sign to convey information about that object, correctly or not:
“… the essential nature of the Dicisign, in general, that is, the kind of sign that conveys information, in contradistinction to a sign from which information may be derived. The readiest characteristic test showing whether a sign is a Dicisign or not, is that a Dicisign is either true or false, but does not directly furnish reasons for its being so.” (Syllabus, 1903, EP2, 276).
(Frederik Stjernfelt, Natural Propositions, 54)
In working through the argument of this series of texts I found it worth my trouble to copy out a longer excerpt from the 1903 Syllabus to my blog:
To be continued …