Semiotic Theory Of Information : 4

2014 Oct 08

Let us now return to the information.”  To coin a phrase.  This time around we come to Peirce’s notion of information in a critical and recurring passage that Frederik Stjernfelt takes as the next stepping stone from propositions through dicisigns to the information they convey:

This maybe surprising definition of the Dicisign is closely connected, however, to the basic function of the Dicisign, namely to convey information — to relay claims, assert statements, true or false.  Only by separately indicating an object does it become possible for a sign to convey information about that object, correctly or not:

“… the essential nature of the Dicisign, in general, that is, the kind of sign that conveys information, in contradistinction to a sign from which information may be derived.  The readiest characteristic test showing whether a sign is a Dicisign or not, is that a Dicisign is either true or false, but does not directly furnish reasons for its being so.”  (Syllabus, 1903, EP2, 276).

(Frederik Stjernfelt, Natural Propositions, 54)

In working through the argument of this series of texts I found it worth my trouble to copy out a longer excerpt from the 1903 Syllabus to my blog:

To be continued …

This entry was posted in C.S. Peirce, Frederik Stjernfelt, Information, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Kaina Stoicheia, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Mathematics, Peirce, Peirce List, Pragmatic Information, Pragmatism, Relation Theory, Semiotic Information, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Triadicity and tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , . Bookmark the permalink.

2 Responses to Semiotic Theory Of Information : 4

  1. Pingback: Survey of Semiotic Theory Of Information • 1 | Inquiry Into Inquiry

  2. Pingback: Survey of Semiotic Theory Of Information • 2 | Inquiry Into Inquiry

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in: Logo

You are commenting using your account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s