Category Archives: Philosophy of Science

Pragmatic Traction • 5

☯  TAO  ☯ Trials And Outcomes Expression | Impression Effectors | Receptors Exertion | Reaction Conduct | Bearing Control | Observe Effect | Detect Poke | Peek Note | Note Pat | Apt | Tap Just a few notes to … Continue reading

Posted in Abduction, C.S. Peirce, Control, Cybernetics, Deduction, Error, Error-Controlled Regulation, Feedback, Fixation of Belief, Hypothesis, Induction, Inference, Information, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Knowledge, Knowledge Representation, Learning, Learning Theory, Likelihood, Logic, Logic of Science, Logical Graphs, Peirce, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Pragmatic Information, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Scientific Inquiry, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Statistical Inference, Statistics, Uncertainty, Volition | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Pragmatic Traction • 4

Re: Oliver Maclaren • Statistics Without True Models Or Hypothesis Testing I once wrote a “pure empiricist” sequential learning program that took this sort of approach to the data in its input stream. Here is the manual, that will give … Continue reading

Posted in Abduction, C.S. Peirce, Control, Cybernetics, Deduction, Error, Error-Controlled Regulation, Feedback, Fixation of Belief, Hypothesis, Induction, Inference, Information, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Knowledge, Knowledge Representation, Learning, Learning Theory, Likelihood, Logic, Logic of Science, Logical Graphs, Peirce, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Pragmatic Information, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Scientific Inquiry, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Statistical Inference, Statistics, Uncertainty | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Pragmatic Traction • 3

Re: Deborah G. Mayo • Revisiting Popper’s Demarcation of Science I think Peirce would say that any struggle to pass from the irritation of doubt toward the settlement of belief is a form of inquiry — it’s just that some … Continue reading

Posted in Abduction, C.S. Peirce, Control, Cybernetics, Deborah G. Mayo, Deduction, Error, Error-Controlled Regulation, Feedback, Fixation of Belief, Hypothesis, Induction, Inference, Information, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Knowledge, Knowledge Representation, Learning, Learning Theory, Likelihood, Logic, Logic of Science, Peirce, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Pragmatic Information, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Scientific Inquiry, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Statistical Inference, Statistics, Uncertainty | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Pragmatic Traction • 2

Re: Facebook Discussion • Richard Saunders I’m about to be diverted for a couple of weeks but this is an ever-ongoing question so I know I’ll be coming back to it again.  The short shrift goes a bit like this … Continue reading

Posted in Abduction, C.S. Peirce, Control, Cybernetics, Deborah G. Mayo, Deduction, Error, Error-Controlled Regulation, Feedback, Fixation of Belief, Hypothesis, Induction, Inference, Information, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Knowledge, Knowledge Representation, Learning, Learning Theory, Likelihood, Logic, Logic of Science, Peirce, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Pragmatic Information, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Scientific Inquiry, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Statistical Inference, Statistics, Uncertainty | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Pragmatic Traction • 1

Re: Deborah G. Mayo • Peircean Induction and the Error-Correcting Thesis C.S. Peirce’s pragmatic maxim marks the place where the tire of theory meets the test track of experience — it tells us how general ideas are impacted by practical … Continue reading

Posted in Abduction, C.S. Peirce, Control, Cybernetics, Deborah G. Mayo, Deduction, Error, Error-Controlled Regulation, Feedback, Fixation of Belief, Hypothesis, Induction, Inference, Information, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Knowledge, Knowledge Representation, Learning, Learning Theory, Likelihood, Logic, Logic of Science, Peirce, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Pragmatic Information, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Scientific Inquiry, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Statistical Inference, Statistics, Uncertainty | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Survey of Semiotic Theory Of Information • 2

This is a Survey of previous blog and wiki posts on the Semiotic Theory Of Information.  All my projects are exploratory in essence but this line of inquiry is more open-ended than most.  The question is: What is information and how … Continue reading

Posted in Abduction, C.S. Peirce, Communication, Control, Cybernetics, Deduction, Determination, Discovery, Doubt, Entropy, Epistemology, Fixation of Belief, Ignorance, Illusion, Induction, Information, Information = Comprehension × Extension, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Inquiry Into Inquiry, Interpretation, Interpretive Frameworks, Invention, Knowledge, Learning Theory, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Logic of Science, Mathematics, Mental Models, Objective Frameworks, Peirce, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Pragmatic Information, Probable Reasoning, Process, Process Thinking, Relation Theory, Scientific Inquiry, Scientific Method, Semeiosis, Semiosis, Semiotic Information, Semiotics, Sign Relational Manifolds, Sign Relations, Surveys, Thirdness, Triadic Relations, Triadicity, Uncertainty | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

Inquiry, Signs, Relations • 1

Re: Michael Harris • A Non-Logical Cognitive Phenomenon Human spontaneous non-demonstrative inference is not, overall, a logical process.  Hypothesis formation involves the use of deductive rules, but is not totally governed by them;  hypothesis confirmation is a non-logical cognitive phenomenon:  … Continue reading

Posted in Abduction, Action, Analogy, C.S. Peirce, Cognition, Cognitive Science, Communication, Deduction, Foundations of Mathematics, Induction, Information, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Into Inquiry, Interpretation, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Logic of Science, Mathematics, Michael Harris, Peirce, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mathematics, Philosophy of Science, Pragmatism, Relation Theory, Relevance, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Triadic Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment