Tag Archives: Sign Relations

Let’s stay with Peirce’s example of inductive inference a little longer and try to clear up the more troublesome confusions tending to arise. Figure 2 shows the implication ordering of logical terms in the form of a lattice diagram. Figure … Continue reading →

Returning to Peirce’s example of inductive inference in Comment 2, let’s try to get a clearer picture of why he connects it with disjunctive terms and indicial signs. At this point in time I can’t say I’m entirely satisfied with … Continue reading →

Let’s stay with Peirce’s example of abductive inference a little longer and try to clear up the more troublesome confusions tending to arise. Figure 1 shows the implication ordering of logical terms in the form of a lattice diagram. Figure … Continue reading →

Reflecting further on Comment 3, many things still puzzle me about Peirce’s account at this point.  The question marks I added to the Figures of that post indicate the node labels I have remaining doubts about.  For example, in Figure 3, … Continue reading →

Peirce identifies inference with a process he describes as symbolization.  Let us consider what that might imply. I am going, next, to show that inference is symbolization and that the puzzle of the validity of scientific inference lies merely in … Continue reading →

Let’s examine Peirce’s second example of a disjunctive term — neat, swine, sheep, deer — within the style of lattice framework we used before. Hence if we find out that neat are herbivorous, swine are herbivorous, sheep are herbivorous, and … Continue reading →

Selection 1 ends with Peirce drawing the following conclusion about the links between information, comprehension, inference, and symbolization. Thus information measures the superfluous comprehension.  And, hence, whenever we make a symbol to express any thing or any attribute we cannot … Continue reading →

Selection 1 opens with Peirce proposing, “The information of a term is the measure of its superfluous comprehension”, and it closes with his offering the following promise. I am going, next, to show that inference is symbolization and that the … Continue reading →

Peirce now turns to his example of a conjunctive term, which he uses to show the connection between iconic reference and abductive inference. A similar line of thought may be gone through in reference to hypothesis.  In this case we … Continue reading →