Category Archives: Recursion

Inquiry Driven Systems • Comment 6

Re: Peter Cameron • Publication : An Author’s View Dear Peter, It’s funny you should mention Tennyson’s poem in the context of an author’s view of publication as I once laid out a detailed interpretation of the poem as a … Continue reading

Posted in Analogy, C.S. Peirce, Cybernetics, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Inquiry Into Inquiry, Logic, Medium = Message, Metaphor, Peirce, Poetry, Quotation, Recursion, Reflection, Semiosis, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Visualization | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 3 Comments

Pragmatic Traction • 7

Re: Peirce List • John Sowa It’s good to remember that observation, perception itself, has an abductive character in Peirce’s analysis and induction for him is more a final testing than initial conception stage.  Yes, it’s wheels upon wheels but … Continue reading

Posted in Abduction, Action, C.S. Peirce, Control, Cybernetics, Deduction, Definition, Determination, Fixation of Belief, Induction, Inference, Information, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Learning, Learning Theory, Logic, Logic of Science, Mathematics, Metaphysics, Normative Science, Observation, Peirce, Peirce's Categories, Perception, Phenomenology, Philosophy, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Recursion, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Volition | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Signs Of Signs • 4

Re: Michael Harris • Language About Language But then inevitably I find myself wondering whether a proof assistant, or even a formal system, can make the distinction between “technical” and “fundamental” questions.  There seems to be no logical distinction.  The … Continue reading

Posted in Aesthetics, C.S. Peirce, Category Theory, Coherentism, Communication, Connotation, Form, Formal Languages, Foundations of Mathematics, Higher Order Propositions, Illusion, Information, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Into Inquiry, Interpretation, Interpretive Frameworks, Intuition, Language, Logic, Mathematics, Music, Objective Frameworks, Objectivism, Peirce, Philosophy of Mathematics, Pragmata, Pragmatics, Pragmatism, Recursion, Reflection, Riffs and Rotes, Semantics, Semiotics, Set Theory, Sign Relations, Syntax, Translation, Triadic Relations, Type Theory | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 2 Comments

Signs Of Signs • 3

Re: Michael Harris • Language About Language And if we don’t, who puts us away? One’s answer, or at least one’s initial response to that question will turn on how one feels about formal realities.  As I understand it, reality … Continue reading

Posted in Aesthetics, Category Theory, Coherentism, Communication, Connotation, Form, Formal Languages, Foundations of Mathematics, Higher Order Propositions, Illusion, Information, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Into Inquiry, Interpretation, Interpretive Frameworks, Intuition, Language, Logic, Mathematics, Objective Frameworks, Objectivism, Peirce, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mathematics, Pragmata, Pragmatics, Pragmatism, Recursion, Reflection, Semantics, Semiotics, Set Theory, Sign Relations, Syntax, Translation, Triadic Relations, Type Theory | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Signs Of Signs • 2

Re: Michael Harris • Language About Language I compared mathematics to a “consensual hallucination,” like virtual reality, and I continue to believe that the aim is to get (consensually) to the point where that hallucination is a second nature. I … Continue reading

Posted in Aesthetics, Category Theory, Coherentism, Communication, Connotation, Form, Formal Languages, Foundations of Mathematics, Higher Order Propositions, Illusion, Information, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Into Inquiry, Interpretation, Interpretive Frameworks, Intuition, Language, Logic, Mathematics, Objective Frameworks, Objectivism, Peirce, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mathematics, Pragmata, Pragmatics, Pragmatism, Recursion, Reflection, Semantics, Semiotics, Set Theory, Sign Relations, Syntax, Translation, Triadic Relations, Type Theory | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Signs Of Signs • 1

Re: Michael Harris • Language About Language There is a language and a corresponding literature that approaches logic and mathematics as related species of communication and information gathering, namely, the pragmatic-semiotic tradition passed on to us through the lifelong efforts … Continue reading

Posted in Aesthetics, Category Theory, Coherentism, Communication, Connotation, Form, Formal Languages, Foundations of Mathematics, Higher Order Propositions, Illusion, Information, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Into Inquiry, Interpretation, Interpretive Frameworks, Intuition, Language, Logic, Mathematics, Objective Frameworks, Objectivism, Peirce, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mathematics, Pragmata, Pragmatics, Pragmatism, Recursion, Reflection, Semantics, Semiotics, Set Theory, Sign Relations, Syntax, Translation, Triadic Relations, Type Theory | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Infinite Uses → Finite Means

The idea that a language is based on a system of rules determining the interpretation of its infinitely many sentences is by no means novel.  Well over a century ago, it was expressed with reasonable clarity by Wilhelm von Humboldt in … Continue reading

Posted in Automata, Chomsky, Descartes, Finite Means, Formal Grammars, Formal Languages, Foundations of Mathematics, Infinite Use, Innate Ideas, Linguistics, Pigeonhole Principle, Recursion, Syntax, Wilhelm von Humboldt | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Quotiens?

How many times do I repeat the same experience? Before I come to see it as the same experience?

Posted in Algorithms, Anamnesis, Arithmetic, Deja Vu, Education, Epistemology, Eternal Return, Inquiry, Learning, Meno, Music, Pattern Recognition, Plato, Poetry, Recursion, Repetition, Rhythm, Teaching | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 2 Comments