Category Archives: Philosophy of Mathematics

Ask Meno Questions • Discussion 4

Posted on October 19, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: FB | Foundations of Mathematics • Oguzhan Kosar The questions raised under the heading of “Foundations of Mathematics” are generally considered to fall under the “Philosophy of Mathematics”, in particular, critical reflection on the possibility of mathematical knowledge and … Continue reading →

Posted in Anamnesis, Arete, C.S. Peirce, Descartes, Education, Epistemology, Eternal Return, Foundations of Mathematics, Infinity, Innate Idea, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Inquiry Into Inquiry, Knowledge, Learning, Locke, Logic, Mathematics, Medium = Message, Meno, Peirce, Philosophy of Mathematics, Plato, Pragmata, Pragmatism, Pythagoras, Recollection, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Socrates, Tabula Rasa, Teaching, Triadic Relations, Turing Test, Virtue | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Problems In Philosophy • 5

Posted on February 10, 2016 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Michael Harris • Are Your Colleagues Zombies? What makes a zombie a legitimate object of philosophical inquiry is its absence of consciousness.  And today’s question is whether mathematical research requires consciousness, or whether it could just as well be … Continue reading →

Posted in Aristotle, Automata, Automated Research Tools, Automation, Cognition, Computation, Consciousness, Freud, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Intentionality, Mathematics, Mechanization, Michael Harris, Peirce, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mathematics, Philosophy of Mind, Plato, Psychology, Routinization, Socrates, Sophist, Turing Test | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Problems In Philosophy • 4

Posted on February 9, 2016 by Jon Awbrey

Re: R.J. Lipton and K.W. Regan • Did Euclid Really Mean ‘Random’? These are the forms of time, which imitates eternity and revolves according to a law of number. Plato • Timaeus • 38 A Benjamin Jowett (trans.) It is … Continue reading →

Posted in Aristotle, Computation, Computer Science, Euclid, Genericity, Geometry, Iconicity, Likelihood, Likely Story, Likeness, Mathematics, Number Theory, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mathematics, Plato, Probability, Socrates | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 3 Comments

Inquiry, Signs, Relations • 1

Posted on July 5, 2015 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Michael Harris • A Non-Logical Cognitive Phenomenon Human spontaneous non-demonstrative inference is not, overall, a logical process.  Hypothesis formation involves the use of deductive rules, but is not totally governed by them;  hypothesis confirmation is a non-logical cognitive phenomenon:  … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, Action, Analogy, C.S. Peirce, Cognition, Cognitive Science, Communication, Deduction, Foundations of Mathematics, Induction, Information, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Into Inquiry, Interpretation, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Logic of Science, Mathematics, Michael Harris, Peirce, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mathematics, Philosophy of Science, Pragmatism, Relation Theory, Relevance, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Triadic Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Signs Of Signs • 4

Posted on May 31, 2015 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Michael Harris • Language About Language But then inevitably I find myself wondering whether a proof assistant, or even a formal system, can make the distinction between “technical” and “fundamental” questions.  There seems to be no logical distinction.  The … Continue reading →

Posted in Aesthetics, C.S. Peirce, Category Theory, Coherentism, Communication, Connotation, Form, Formal Languages, Foundations of Mathematics, Higher Order Propositions, Illusion, Information, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Into Inquiry, Interpretation, Interpretive Frameworks, Intuition, Language, Logic, Mathematics, Music, Objective Frameworks, Objectivism, Peirce, Philosophy of Mathematics, Pragmata, Pragmatics, Pragmatism, Recursion, Reflection, Riffs and Rotes, Semantics, Semiotics, Set Theory, Sign Relations, Syntax, Translation, Triadic Relations, Type Theory | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 2 Comments

Signs Of Signs • 3

Posted on May 27, 2015 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Michael Harris • Language About Language And if we don’t, who puts us away? One’s answer, or at least one’s initial response to that question will turn on how one feels about formal realities.  As I understand it, reality … Continue reading →

Posted in Aesthetics, Category Theory, Coherentism, Communication, Connotation, Form, Formal Languages, Foundations of Mathematics, Higher Order Propositions, Illusion, Information, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Into Inquiry, Interpretation, Interpretive Frameworks, Intuition, Language, Logic, Mathematics, Objective Frameworks, Objectivism, Peirce, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mathematics, Pragmata, Pragmatics, Pragmatism, Recursion, Reflection, Semantics, Semiotics, Set Theory, Sign Relations, Syntax, Translation, Triadic Relations, Type Theory | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Signs Of Signs • 2

Posted on May 27, 2015 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Michael Harris • Language About Language I compared mathematics to a “consensual hallucination,” like virtual reality, and I continue to believe that the aim is to get (consensually) to the point where that hallucination is a second nature. I … Continue reading →

Posted in Aesthetics, Category Theory, Coherentism, Communication, Connotation, Form, Formal Languages, Foundations of Mathematics, Higher Order Propositions, Illusion, Information, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Into Inquiry, Interpretation, Interpretive Frameworks, Intuition, Language, Logic, Mathematics, Objective Frameworks, Objectivism, Peirce, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mathematics, Pragmata, Pragmatics, Pragmatism, Recursion, Reflection, Semantics, Semiotics, Set Theory, Sign Relations, Syntax, Translation, Triadic Relations, Type Theory | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Signs Of Signs • 1

Posted on May 27, 2015 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Michael Harris • Language About Language There is a language and a corresponding literature that approaches logic and mathematics as related species of communication and information gathering, namely, the pragmatic-semiotic tradition passed on to us through the lifelong efforts … Continue reading →

Posted in Aesthetics, Category Theory, Coherentism, Communication, Connotation, Form, Formal Languages, Foundations of Mathematics, Higher Order Propositions, Illusion, Information, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Into Inquiry, Interpretation, Interpretive Frameworks, Intuition, Language, Logic, Mathematics, Objective Frameworks, Objectivism, Peirce, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mathematics, Pragmata, Pragmatics, Pragmatism, Recursion, Reflection, Semantics, Semiotics, Set Theory, Sign Relations, Syntax, Translation, Triadic Relations, Type Theory | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

C.S. Peirce • Syllabus • Selection 1

Posted on August 24, 2014 by Jon Awbrey

Selection from C.S. Peirce, “A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic” (1903) An Outline Classification of the Sciences 180.   This classification, which aims to base itself on the principal affinities of the objects classified, is concerned not with all … Continue reading →

Posted in C.S. Peirce, Classification, Foundations of Mathematics, Logic, Mathematics, Metaphysics, Normative Science, Peirce, Phenomenology, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mathematics, Philosophy of Science, References, Science, Sources | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 12 Comments