Tag Archives: Likelihood

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 4

Posted on June 13, 2026 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 3 Re: Laws of Form • Lyle Anderson Lyle, We are engaged in the wider context of which Peirce’s systems of graphs for propositional logic and Spencer Brown’s calculus of indications constitute … Continue reading →

Posted in Analogy, Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Icon Index Symbol, Induction, Inquiry, Likelihood, Likely Story, Likeness, Logic, Mathematics, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 3

Posted on May 23, 2026 by Jon Awbrey

The passages from Aristotle collected in the present and preceding two posts prepare the way to address overarching tasks in Peirce’s Logic of Science, namely, bringing the Theory of Signs and the Theory of Inquiry into their proper relationship and … Continue reading →

Posted in Analogy, Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Icon Index Symbol, Induction, Inquiry, Likelihood, Likely Story, Likeness, Logic, Mathematics, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 3 Comments

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2

Posted on May 19, 2026 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson I’m still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle’s account relates to Peirce’s usage, though I’m pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle’s usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort … Continue reading →

Posted in Analogy, Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Icon Index Symbol, Induction, Inquiry, Likelihood, Likely Story, Likeness, Logic, Mathematics, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1

Posted on May 17, 2026 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List • Benjamin Udell • Michael Shapiro Here’s a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense — A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss;  for … Continue reading →

Posted in Analogy, Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Icon Index Symbol, Induction, Inquiry, Likelihood, Likely Story, Likeness, Logic, Mathematics, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

Pragmatic Traction • 5

Posted on September 28, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

☯   TAO   ☯ Trials And Outcomes Expression | Impression Effectors | Receptors Exertion | Reaction Conduct | Bearing Control | Observe Effect | Detect Poke | Peek Note | Note Pat | Apt | Tap Pragmatism makes thinking … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, C.S. Peirce, Control, Cybernetics, Deduction, Error, Error-Controlled Regulation, Feedback, Fixation of Belief, Hypothesis, Induction, Inference, Information, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Knowledge, Knowledge Representation, Learning, Learning Theory, Likelihood, Logic, Logic of Science, Logical Graphs, Peirce, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Pragmatic Information, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Scientific Inquiry, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Statistical Inference, Statistics, Uncertainty, Volition | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Pragmatic Traction • 4

Posted on September 27, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Oliver Maclaren • Statistics Without True Models Or Hypothesis Testing I once wrote a “pure empiricist” sequential learning program that took this sort of approach to the data in its input stream. Here is the manual, that will give … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, C.S. Peirce, Control, Cybernetics, Deduction, Error, Error-Controlled Regulation, Feedback, Fixation of Belief, Hypothesis, Induction, Inference, Information, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Knowledge, Knowledge Representation, Learning, Learning Theory, Likelihood, Logic, Logic of Science, Logical Graphs, Peirce, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Pragmatic Information, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Scientific Inquiry, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Statistical Inference, Statistics, Uncertainty | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Pragmatic Traction • 3

Posted on September 25, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Deborah G. Mayo • Revisiting Popper’s Demarcation of Science I think Peirce would say that any struggle to pass from the irritation of doubt toward the settlement of belief is a form of inquiry — it’s just that some … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, C.S. Peirce, Control, Cybernetics, Deborah G. Mayo, Deduction, Error, Error-Controlled Regulation, Feedback, Fixation of Belief, Hypothesis, Induction, Inference, Information, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Knowledge, Knowledge Representation, Learning, Learning Theory, Likelihood, Logic, Logic of Science, Peirce, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Pragmatic Information, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Scientific Inquiry, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Statistical Inference, Statistics, Uncertainty | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Pragmatic Traction • 2

Posted on September 16, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: FB | Ecology of Systems Thinking • Richard Saunders I’m about to be diverted for a couple of weeks but this is an ever-ongoing question so I know I’ll be coming back to it again.  The short shrift goes … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, C.S. Peirce, Control, Cybernetics, Deborah G. Mayo, Deduction, Error, Error-Controlled Regulation, Feedback, Fixation of Belief, Hypothesis, Induction, Inference, Information, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Knowledge, Knowledge Representation, Learning, Learning Theory, Likelihood, Logic, Logic of Science, Peirce, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Pragmatic Information, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Scientific Inquiry, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Statistical Inference, Statistics, Uncertainty | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Pragmatic Traction • 1

Posted on September 14, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Deborah G. Mayo • Peircean Induction and the Error-Correcting Thesis C.S. Peirce’s pragmatic maxim marks the place where the tire of theory meets the test track of experience — it tells us how general ideas are impacted by practical … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, C.S. Peirce, Control, Cybernetics, Deborah G. Mayo, Deduction, Error, Error-Controlled Regulation, Feedback, Fixation of Belief, Hypothesis, Induction, Inference, Information, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Knowledge, Knowledge Representation, Learning, Learning Theory, Likelihood, Logic, Logic of Science, Peirce, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Pragmatic Information, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Scientific Inquiry, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Statistical Inference, Statistics, Uncertainty | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Problems In Philosophy • 4

Posted on February 9, 2016 by Jon Awbrey

Re: R.J. Lipton and K.W. Regan • Did Euclid Really Mean ‘Random’? These are the forms of time, which imitates eternity and revolves according to a law of number. Plato • Timaeus • 38 A Benjamin Jowett (trans.) It is … Continue reading →

Posted in Aristotle, Computation, Computer Science, Euclid, Genericity, Geometry, Iconicity, Likelihood, Likely Story, Likeness, Mathematics, Number Theory, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mathematics, Plato, Probability, Socrates | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 3 Comments