Tag Archives: Aristotle

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 4

Re: Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 3 Re: Laws of Form • Lyle Anderson Lyle, We are engaged in the wider context of which Peirce’s systems of graphs for propositional logic and Spencer Brown’s calculus of indications constitute … Continue reading

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Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 3

The passages from Aristotle collected in the present and preceding two posts prepare the way to address overarching tasks in Peirce’s Logic of Science, namely, bringing the Theory of Signs and the Theory of Inquiry into their proper relationship and … Continue reading

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Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson I’m still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle’s account relates to Peirce’s usage, though I’m pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle’s usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort … Continue reading

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Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1

Re: Peirce List • Benjamin Udell • Michael Shapiro Here’s a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense — A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss;  for … Continue reading

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Survey of Precursors Of Category Theory • 6

A few years ago I began a sketch on the “Precursors of Category Theory”, tracing the continuities of the category concept from Aristotle, to Kant and Peirce, through Hilbert and Ackermann, to contemporary mathematical practice.  A Survey of resources on … Continue reading

Posted in Abstraction, Ackermann, Analogy, Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Carnap, Category Theory, Foundations of Mathematics, Hilbert, Hypostatic Abstraction, Kant, Logic, Mathematics, Propositions As Types Analogy, Relation Theory, Saunders Mac Lane, Semiotics, Type Theory, Universals | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 4 Comments

Survey of Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy, Inquiry • 5

This is a Survey of blog and wiki posts on three elementary forms of inference, as recognized by a logical tradition extending from Aristotle through Charles S. Peirce.  Particular attention is paid to the way the inferential rudiments combine to … Continue reading

Posted in Abduction, Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Deduction, Dewey, Discovery, Doubt, Fixation of Belief, Functional Logic, Icon Index Symbol, Induction, Inference, Information, Inquiry, Invention, Logic, Logic of Science, Mathematics, Morphism, Paradigmata, Paradigms, Pattern Recognition, Peirce, Philosophy, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Scientific Inquiry, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Surveys, Syllogism, Triadic Relations, Visualization | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Pragmatic Truth • 6

Peirce on Semiosis and Inquiry Peirce’s theory of truth depends on two other, intimately related subject matters, his theory of sign relations and his theory of inquiry.  Inquiry is special case of semiosis, a process passing from signs to signs while … Continue reading

Posted in Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Coherence, Concordance, Congruence, Consensus, Convergence, Correspondence, Dewey, Fixation of Belief, Information, Inquiry, John Dewey, Kant, Logic, Logic of Science, Method, Peirce, Philosophy, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Truth, Truth Theory, William James | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 4 Comments

Pragmatic Truth • 5

Peirce on Reality, Signs, Truth Very little in Peirce’s thought can be understood in its proper light without understanding he thinks all thoughts are signs, and thus, according to his theory of thought, no thought is understandable outside the context … Continue reading

Posted in Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Coherence, Concordance, Congruence, Consensus, Convergence, Correspondence, Dewey, Fixation of Belief, Information, Inquiry, John Dewey, Kant, Logic, Logic of Science, Method, Peirce, Philosophy, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Truth, Truth Theory, William James | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 4 Comments

Pragmatic Truth • Discussion 28

Re: Pragmatic Truth • Discussion • (26) • (27) Re: FB | Cybersemiotics • Richard Saunders RS: My intention was not to expand the correspondence theory of truth but to narrow it with specific constraints.  I think of it as … Continue reading

Posted in Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Coherence, Concordance, Congruence, Consensus, Convergence, Correspondence, Dewey, Fixation of Belief, Information, Inquiry, John Dewey, Kant, Logic, Logic of Science, Method, Peirce, Philosophy, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Truth, Truth Theory, William James | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 4 Comments

Pragmatic Truth • Discussion 27

Re: Pragmatic Truth • Discussion 26 Re: FB | Cybersemiotics • Richard Saunders RS: Agreed, but given those qualifications (the perspective on facts qualified by the pragmatic maxim and the perspective on correspondence qualified by irreducible triadic relations) the pragmatic … Continue reading

Posted in Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Coherence, Concordance, Congruence, Consensus, Convergence, Correspondence, Dewey, Fixation of Belief, Information, Inquiry, John Dewey, Kant, Logic, Logic of Science, Method, Peirce, Philosophy, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Truth, Truth Theory, William James | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 5 Comments