Tag Archives: Aristotle

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 3

Posted on May 23, 2026 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson A more complete excerpt and the translator’s notes are very helpful here. A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss ;  for that which people … Continue reading →

Posted in Analogy, Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Icon Index Symbol, Induction, Inquiry, Likelihood, Likely Story, Likeness, Logic, Mathematics, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2

Posted on May 19, 2026 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson I’m still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle’s account relates to Peirce’s usage, though I’m pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle’s usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort … Continue reading →

Posted in Analogy, Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Icon Index Symbol, Induction, Inquiry, Likelihood, Likely Story, Likeness, Logic, Mathematics, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1

Posted on May 17, 2026 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List • Benjamin Udell • Michael Shapiro Here’s a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense — A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss;  for … Continue reading →

Posted in Analogy, Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Icon Index Symbol, Induction, Inquiry, Likelihood, Likely Story, Likeness, Logic, Mathematics, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

Survey of Precursors Of Category Theory • 6

Posted on May 5, 2025 by Jon Awbrey

A few years ago I began a sketch on the “Precursors of Category Theory”, tracing the continuities of the category concept from Aristotle, to Kant and Peirce, through Hilbert and Ackermann, to contemporary mathematical practice.  A Survey of resources on … Continue reading →

Posted in Abstraction, Ackermann, Analogy, Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Carnap, Category Theory, Foundations of Mathematics, Hilbert, Hypostatic Abstraction, Kant, Logic, Mathematics, Propositions As Types Analogy, Relation Theory, Saunders Mac Lane, Semiotics, Type Theory, Universals | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 4 Comments

Survey of Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy, Inquiry • 5

Posted on May 1, 2025 by Jon Awbrey

This is a Survey of blog and wiki posts on three elementary forms of inference, as recognized by a logical tradition extending from Aristotle through Charles S. Peirce.  Particular attention is paid to the way the inferential rudiments combine to … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Deduction, Dewey, Discovery, Doubt, Fixation of Belief, Functional Logic, Icon Index Symbol, Induction, Inference, Information, Inquiry, Invention, Logic, Logic of Science, Mathematics, Morphism, Paradigmata, Paradigms, Pattern Recognition, Peirce, Philosophy, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Scientific Inquiry, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Surveys, Syllogism, Triadic Relations, Visualization | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Pragmatic Truth • 6

Posted on July 25, 2024 by Jon Awbrey

Peirce on Semiosis and Inquiry Peirce’s theory of truth depends on two other, intimately related subject matters, his theory of sign relations and his theory of inquiry.  Inquiry is special case of semiosis, a process passing from signs to signs while … Continue reading →

Posted in Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Coherence, Concordance, Congruence, Consensus, Convergence, Correspondence, Dewey, Fixation of Belief, Information, Inquiry, John Dewey, Kant, Logic, Logic of Science, Method, Peirce, Philosophy, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Truth, Truth Theory, William James | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 4 Comments

Pragmatic Truth • 5

Posted on July 23, 2024 by Jon Awbrey

Peirce on Reality, Signs, Truth Very little in Peirce’s thought can be understood in its proper light without understanding he thinks all thoughts are signs, and thus, according to his theory of thought, no thought is understandable outside the context … Continue reading →

Posted in Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Coherence, Concordance, Congruence, Consensus, Convergence, Correspondence, Dewey, Fixation of Belief, Information, Inquiry, John Dewey, Kant, Logic, Logic of Science, Method, Peirce, Philosophy, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Truth, Truth Theory, William James | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 4 Comments

Pragmatic Truth • Discussion 28

Posted on July 19, 2024 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Pragmatic Truth • Discussion • (26) • (27) Re: FB | Cybersemiotics • Richard Saunders RS: My intention was not to expand the correspondence theory of truth but to narrow it with specific constraints.  I think of it as … Continue reading →

Posted in Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Coherence, Concordance, Congruence, Consensus, Convergence, Correspondence, Dewey, Fixation of Belief, Information, Inquiry, John Dewey, Kant, Logic, Logic of Science, Method, Peirce, Philosophy, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Truth, Truth Theory, William James | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 4 Comments

Pragmatic Truth • Discussion 27

Posted on July 17, 2024 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Pragmatic Truth • Discussion 26 Re: FB | Cybersemiotics • Richard Saunders RS: Agreed, but given those qualifications (the perspective on facts qualified by the pragmatic maxim and the perspective on correspondence qualified by irreducible triadic relations) the pragmatic … Continue reading →

Posted in Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Coherence, Concordance, Congruence, Consensus, Convergence, Correspondence, Dewey, Fixation of Belief, Information, Inquiry, John Dewey, Kant, Logic, Logic of Science, Method, Peirce, Philosophy, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Truth, Truth Theory, William James | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 5 Comments

Pragmatic Truth • Discussion 26

Posted on July 16, 2024 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Pragmatic Truth • (1) • (2) Re: OEIS Wiki | Correspondence Theory Of Truth Re: FB | Inquiry Driven Systems • Richard Saunders RS: The pragmatic theory of truth seems to be a correspondence theory in which all the … Continue reading →

Posted in Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Coherence, Concordance, Congruence, Consensus, Convergence, Correspondence, Dewey, Fixation of Belief, Information, Inquiry, John Dewey, Kant, Logic, Logic of Science, Method, Peirce, Philosophy, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Truth, Truth Theory, William James | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 6 Comments