Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability : 1

Re: Peirce List DiscussionBenjamin UdellMichael Shapiro

Here’s a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense:

A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss;  for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability:  e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.  A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted.  That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70a3–10).

Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Related content in Appendix A of Theme One Program • User Guide.

This entry was posted in Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Icon Index Symbol, Logic, Peirce, Peirce List, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Semiotics, Sign Relations and tagged , , , , , , , , , . Bookmark the permalink.

1 Response to Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability : 1

  1. Jon — You may wish to have a look at an article I published in Language in ’08 called “Is An Icon Iconic” which is available as a PDF on my blog.


Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed.