A puzzle in Peirce I have puzzled over for as long as I can remember involves the relationship between his theory of signs, begetting the typology of icons, indices, and symbols, and his theory of inquiry, founded on the three inferences of abduction, induction, and deduction. I have long felt the resolution would lie in his theory of information, as epitomized in the formula “Information = Comprehension × Extension”.
Last summer looked ripe for another run at the problem, which I had some years before begun tackling in a series of selections from and comments on Peirce’s “Logic of Science” lectures at Harvard (1865) and the Lowell Institute (1866).
There’s a working draft of those selections and comments here:
I serialized the selections and comments on my blog as I worked my way through them.
By September I had come to what I imagined was a new understanding of the relationship between the types of signs and the types of inference, at which time I put the whole matter away to cool, it being far harder to judge a new idea when it’s hot. At any rate, I think a year is long enough to gain a cool eye or two, so I’ll try sharing the new improved analysis to the wider world.