Pragmatic Theory Of Truth • 17

Re: Pragmatic Theory Of Truth • (14)(16)
Re: Peirce ListTom Gollier

I meant to write more last time but got waylaid by an onslaught of weather and progress on this topic is likely to be glacial for now.  But I have been mulling over Tom Gollier’s comments all the while and the best I can do so far by way of getting our minds on the same page is simply to assemble our words on this one.

JA:
There are many conceptions of truth — linguistic, model-theoretic, proof-theoretic — for the moment I’m focused on cybernetics, systems, and experimental sciences and this is where the pragmatic conception of truth fits what we naturally do in those sciences remarkably well.
The main thing in those activities is the relationship among symbol systems, the world, and our actions, whether in thought, among ourselves, or between ourselves and the world.
So the notion of truth we want here is predicated on three dimensions:  the patch of the world we are dealing with in a given application, the systems of signs we are using to describe that domain, and the transformations of signs we find of good service in bearing information about that piece of the world.
TG:
First, assuming that “symbol systems” are more or less consistent and complete a priori structures of Thirdness and “the world” is existential Secondness, the question of “truth” seems to be just what “actions” will bridge the abyss between them.  “Thought” alone doesn’t, but thought “among ourselves” (the a priori method) might have a shot at it.  Scientific experimentation seems to be pretty good at it, but …
Secondly, assuming those systems of Thirdness are finite while the world of Secondness is both interconnected and infinite, any claim to truth must be made in the face of leaving something, a lot, out of it.

There is much about “the relationship among symbol systems, the world, and our actions, whether in thought, among ourselves, or between ourselves and the world” to mull over here.  (Suddenly I have a craving for cider …)

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Pragmatic Theory Of Truth • 16

Re: Pragmatic Theory Of Truth • 14
Re: Peirce ListTom Gollier

Staying focused on a set objective has never been my strong point so let me emblazon the following emblem by way of keeping my eyes on the prize.

For the moment I’m focused on cybernetics, systems, and experimental sciences and this is where the pragmatic conception of truth fits what we naturally do in those sciences remarkably well.

I’ve been planning to dig up a few choice texts to illustrate the links among cybernetic, pragmatic, and scientific thinking in general, but most of my books are still packed in boxes from our move last year, so maybe that’ll remind me to keep digging.

Right now though I’ve got to go shovel some snow …

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Posted in Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Coherence, Concordance, Congruence, Consensus, Convergence, Correspondence, Dewey, Fixation of Belief, Information, Inquiry, John Dewey, Kant, Logic, Logic of Science, Method, Peirce, Philosophy, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Truth, Truth Theory, William James | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 2 Comments

Pragmatic Theory Of Truth • 15

The way of inquiry being blocked on Wikipedia, I saved the last version of Pragmatic Truth I worked on to several other wikis.  The current state of that article fork begins as follows:

Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

Pragmatic theory of truth refers to those accounts, definitions, and theories of the concept truth distinguishing the philosophies of pragmatism and pragmaticism.  The conception of truth in question varies along lines reflecting the influence of several thinkers, initially and notably, Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, but a number of common features can be identified.  The most characteristic features are (1) a reliance on the pragmatic maxim as a means of clarifying the meanings of difficult concepts, truth in particular, and (2) an emphasis on the fact that the product variously branded as belief, certainty, knowledge, or truth is the result of a process, namely, inquiry.

Document History

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Semiotics, Semiosis, Sign Relations • 8

Re: Semiotics, Semiosis, Sign Relations • (5)(7)
Re: FB | SemeioticsGary Herstein

Continuing questions about “infinite semiosis” vs. “unbounded semiosis” prompt me to make another comment by way of bringing our focus to bear on the empirical context of semiosis and sign relations.

The semiotic question goes back to a line from Peirce and the uses later writers like Eco and Derrida made of it.  But the real issue is not about the cardinality or topology of any sub-posed continuum, “signiferous ether”, or semiotic medium so much as the empirical data streams we actually have, which are captured categorically and coded discretely as sequences of signs.

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Semiotics, Semiosis, Sign Relations • 7

Re: Semiotics, Semiosis, Sign Relations • 5

It’s a common mistake to confound infinite with unbounded.  A process can continue without end and still be “bounded in a nutshell”.  So a sign process can pass from sign to interpretant sign to next interpretant sign ad infinitum without ever leaving a finite set of signs.

The number of questions I got about that statement tells me I should have delineated the context in which it was set a little more fully.

A sign process in this context is simply a sequence of signs, of the sort we might observe in communicational, computational, or experimental settings.  For people who remember the more ancient arts of AI, cognitive science, and cybernetics, it may help to recall the orders of considerations arising in protocol analysis.

It goes with this territory to assume the formal equivalent of categorical perception.  This means we can set aside the subtleties of token haecceity — the nominal distinctiveness of every individual sign instance — along with the possibility of signs being sampled from a continuous medium.

In this setting we are left with two interpretations for infinite and bounded, depending on whether the sign domain has a quantitative measure defined on it, or not.  In the first case, bounded means the sequence never exceeds a finite bound in the relevant measure.  In the second case, bounded means the sequence never leaves a finite set.

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Pragmatic Theory Of Truth • 14

Re: Cybernetic CommunicationsStephen Paul King

There are many conceptions of truth — linguistic, model-theoretic, proof-theoretic — for the moment I’m focused on cybernetics, systems, and experimental sciences and this is where the pragmatic conception of truth fits what we naturally do in those sciences remarkably well.

The main thing in those activities is the relationship among symbol systems, the world, and our actions, whether in thought, among ourselves, or between ourselves and the world.  So the notion of truth we want here is predicated on three dimensions:  the patch of the world we are dealing with in a given application, the systems of signs we are using to describe that domain, and the transformations of signs we find of good service in bearing information about that piece of the world.

I’ll dig up some material on the pragmatic conception of truth …

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Posted in Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Coherence, Concordance, Congruence, Consensus, Convergence, Correspondence, Dewey, Fixation of Belief, Information, Inquiry, John Dewey, Kant, Logic, Logic of Science, Method, Peirce, Philosophy, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Truth, Truth Theory, William James | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 3 Comments

Pragmatic Theory Of Truth • 13

Re: FB | Charles S. Peirce SocietyJohn Corcoran

I looked at John Corcoran’s contribution on “Formalizing Pragmatic Truth” but did not see anything near enough what I’d recognize as a pragmatic theory of truth.

Pragmatic inquiry into a putative concept of truth would begin by applying the pragmatic maxim to clarify the concept as far as possible and a pragmatic definition of truth, if any should result, would find its place within Peirce’s theory of logic as formal semiotics, in other words, stated in terms of a formal theory of triadic sign relations.

Resources

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Posted in Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Coherence, Concordance, Congruence, Consensus, Convergence, Correspondence, Dewey, Fixation of Belief, Information, Inquiry, John Dewey, Kant, Logic, Logic of Science, Method, Peirce, Philosophy, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Truth, Truth Theory, William James | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment