Time, Topology, Differential Logic • 2

Re: Peirce List Discussion • JBDJAJA

Topology is the most general study of geometric space.  It is critical here to get beyond the “popular” accounts and learn the basics from a real math book.  A classic introduction is General Topology by J.L. Kelley but there are lots of equally good choices out there.

One of the reasons I like Kelley is that it has an appendix on set theory where I got my first real taste of axiomatic set theory.  I posted excerpts from the appendix and the main text to several discussion groups early in the present millennium and I archived copies at the following locations:

These are raw text copies right now but I’m in the process of segmenting them for ease of study and retrieving Internet Archive links for the discussion pages no longer live on the web.

Another good text I recall on topology is Munkres.  I imagine there are newer editions still in print.

References

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Time, Topology, Differential Logic • 1

The clock indicates the moment . . . . but what does
eternity indicate?

Walt Whitman • Leaves of Grass

Re: Peirce List Discussion • ETJFSJA

Trying to understand inquiry in particular and semiosis in general as temporal processes is one of the forces that drove me to develop differential logic as an extension of propositional logic, for which I naturally turned to Peirce’s logical graphs as a starting point.

It might be thought that an independent time variable needs to be brought in at this point, but it is an insight of fundamental importance that the idea of process is logically prior to the notion of time.  A time variable is a reference to a clock — a canonical, conventional process that is accepted or established as a standard of measurement, but in essence no different than any other process.  This raises the question of how different subsystems in a more global process can be brought into comparison, and what it means for one process to serve the function of a local standard for others.  (Reference 2)

References

  1. Differential Propositional Calculus
  2. Differential Logic and Dynamic Systems
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Pragmatic Maxims • 4

Re: Peirce List Discussion • (1)(2)

I haven’t been able to do more than randomly sample the doings on the Peirce List for the last half year, being deeply immersed in other Peirce work that I hope to report on one of these days, but Jon Alan Schmidt’s remarks on the Pragmatic Maxim drew me back in for a bit.  He recited one of the places where Peirce declares the role of the Pragmatic Maxim in giving a rule to abduction, a point often missed by many of the most careful commentators.  There are aspects of the Pragmatic Maxim that come more naturally to engineers, workers in the applied sciences, therapeutic professions, and other practical categories than they do to specialists in spectator philosophies.  But I have lost track of that direction for the moment.  No doubt the occasion will arise again …

Reference

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Pragmatic Maxims • 3

Re: Peirce List DiscussionJerry Rhee

Inquiry begins in doubt and aims for belief but the rush to get from doubt to belief and achieve mental peace can cause us to short the integrated circuits of inquiry that we need to compute better answers.

For one thing, we sometimes operate under the influence of fixed ideas and hidden assumptions that keep us from seeing the sense of fairly plain advice, and here I would simply recommend reading those versions of the Pragmatic Maxim again and again and trying to triangulate the points to which they point.

For another thing, not everything in logic is an argument.  A well-developed formal system will have:  (1) Primitives, the undefined terms that acquire meaning from their place in the whole system rather than from explicit definitions, (2) Definitions, that connect derived terms to primitives, (3) Axioms, propositions taken to be true for the sake of the theorems that can be derived from them by means of certain (4) Inference Rules.

But that’s just the formal underpinnings — there’s all sorts of informal heuristics, regulative principles, rules of thumb that go toward sustaining any system of significant practical use, and that’s where bits of practical advice like the Maxim in question come into play.

Reference

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Pragmatic Maxims • 2

Re: Peirce List DiscussionJerry Rhee

I tend to think more in relative terms than absolute terms, so I would not expect to find an absolute best formulation of any core principle in philosophy, science, or even math.  But taken relative to specific interpreters and objectives we frequently find that symbolic expressions of meaningful principles can be improved almost indefinitely.

Reference

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Pragmatic Maxims • 1

Re: Peirce List Discussion

Here is a set of variations on the Pragmatic Maxim that I collected a number of years ago, along with some commentary of my own as I last left it.  As I understand them, they all say essentially the same thing, merely differing in emphasis, point of view, or rhetorical style as befit the moment’s audience or occasion.

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{ Information = Comprehension × Extension } • Comment 6

Note. This is a placeholder, to be developed later.

Figure 2 shows the implication ordering of logical terms in the form of a lattice diagram.

Figure 2. Disjunctive Term u, Taken as Subject

Figure 2. Disjunctive Term u, Taken as Subject

Reference

  • Peirce, C.S. (1866), “The Logic of Science, or, Induction and Hypothesis”, Lowell Lectures of 1866, pp. 357–504 in Writings of Charles S. Peirce : A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857–1866, Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.

Resources

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