Category Archives: Higher Order Propositions

The Difference That Makes A Difference That Peirce Makes : 18

Posted on July 24, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peter Smith • Which Is The Quantifier? From a functional logic point of view logicians dropped a step backward when they passed from Peirce’s and to the current convention of using and for logical quantifiers.  There’s a rough indication … Continue reading →

Posted in C.S. Peirce, Category Theory, Complementarity, Duality, Formal Languages, Higher Order Propositions, Indicator Functions, Inquiry, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Peirce, Pragmatism, Predicate Calculus, Propositional Calculus, Propositions, Quantifiers, Relation Theory, Semiotics, Type Theory, Zeroth Order Logic | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Signs Of Signs • 4

Posted on May 31, 2015 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Michael Harris • Language About Language But then inevitably I find myself wondering whether a proof assistant, or even a formal system, can make the distinction between “technical” and “fundamental” questions.  There seems to be no logical distinction.  The … Continue reading →

Posted in Aesthetics, C.S. Peirce, Category Theory, Coherentism, Communication, Connotation, Form, Formal Languages, Foundations of Mathematics, Higher Order Propositions, Illusion, Information, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Into Inquiry, Interpretation, Interpretive Frameworks, Intuition, Language, Logic, Mathematics, Music, Objective Frameworks, Objectivism, Peirce, Philosophy of Mathematics, Pragmata, Pragmatics, Pragmatism, Recursion, Reflection, Riffs and Rotes, Semantics, Semiotics, Set Theory, Sign Relations, Syntax, Translation, Triadic Relations, Type Theory | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 2 Comments

Signs Of Signs • 3

Posted on May 27, 2015 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Michael Harris • Language About Language And if we don’t, who puts us away? One’s answer, or at least one’s initial response to that question will turn on how one feels about formal realities.  As I understand it, reality … Continue reading →

Posted in Aesthetics, Category Theory, Coherentism, Communication, Connotation, Form, Formal Languages, Foundations of Mathematics, Higher Order Propositions, Illusion, Information, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Into Inquiry, Interpretation, Interpretive Frameworks, Intuition, Language, Logic, Mathematics, Objective Frameworks, Objectivism, Peirce, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mathematics, Pragmata, Pragmatics, Pragmatism, Recursion, Reflection, Semantics, Semiotics, Set Theory, Sign Relations, Syntax, Translation, Triadic Relations, Type Theory | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Signs Of Signs • 2

Posted on May 27, 2015 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Michael Harris • Language About Language I compared mathematics to a “consensual hallucination,” like virtual reality, and I continue to believe that the aim is to get (consensually) to the point where that hallucination is a second nature. I … Continue reading →

Posted in Aesthetics, Category Theory, Coherentism, Communication, Connotation, Form, Formal Languages, Foundations of Mathematics, Higher Order Propositions, Illusion, Information, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Into Inquiry, Interpretation, Interpretive Frameworks, Intuition, Language, Logic, Mathematics, Objective Frameworks, Objectivism, Peirce, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mathematics, Pragmata, Pragmatics, Pragmatism, Recursion, Reflection, Semantics, Semiotics, Set Theory, Sign Relations, Syntax, Translation, Triadic Relations, Type Theory | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Signs Of Signs • 1

Posted on May 27, 2015 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Michael Harris • Language About Language There is a language and a corresponding literature that approaches logic and mathematics as related species of communication and information gathering, namely, the pragmatic-semiotic tradition passed on to us through the lifelong efforts … Continue reading →

Posted in Aesthetics, Category Theory, Coherentism, Communication, Connotation, Form, Formal Languages, Foundations of Mathematics, Higher Order Propositions, Illusion, Information, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Into Inquiry, Interpretation, Interpretive Frameworks, Intuition, Language, Logic, Mathematics, Objective Frameworks, Objectivism, Peirce, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mathematics, Pragmata, Pragmatics, Pragmatism, Recursion, Reflection, Semantics, Semiotics, Set Theory, Sign Relations, Syntax, Translation, Triadic Relations, Type Theory | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Constants, Inconstants, and Higher Order Propositions

Posted on December 20, 2012 by Jon Awbrey

A question arising on the Foundations Of Math List gives me an opportunity to introduce the subject of higher order propositions, which I think afford a better way to handle the situations of confusion, doubt, obscurity, uncertainty, and vagueness often … Continue reading →

Posted in Foundations of Mathematics, Higher Order Propositions, Irving Anellis, Logic, Mathematics | Tagged , , , , | Leave a comment