Monthly Archives: March 2017

Re: Peirce List Discussion • JFS • JFS • JAS • GF • JAS • GF I realize that iconolatry — just one of many forms of dyadic reductionism — runs too deep at present for most folks to appreciate this, … Continue reading →

Re: Peirce List Discussion • CG • JA • CG • JA • CG • JA • CG One of the points I’ve been trying to make all along is that a person doesn’t normally need to make a working … Continue reading →

A paragraph from Kant and associated discussion I added to the Wikipedia article on the Correspondence Theory of Truth in June 2006 is useful at this point, and it serves to set up a corresponding statement from Peirce that we’ll take … Continue reading →

Re: Peirce List • Clark Goble • Jon Awbrey • Clark Goble • Jon Awbrey • Clark Goble To put things more plainly, it’s a routine observation we have no need for moods and tenses in actually doing mathematics, that … Continue reading →

Re: Peirce List • Clark Goble • Jon Awbrey • Clark Goble • Jon Awbrey With respect to the issues surrounding “modal realism” — what stance Peirce took and when he took it — let me refer to a figure … Continue reading →

Re: Peirce List Discussion • Val Daniel Viewing the normative science of logic and its object, truth, in the medium of a triadic sign relation, the first cut among notions of truth divides those that take the object domain into … Continue reading →

Re: Peirce List Discussion • CG • JA • JA • JA • JAS • JA • CG • JA • JBD • JA Working on what is worth saving in old Wikipedia articles requires me to rummage through their … Continue reading →

I’ve begun reworking the InterSciWiki article on the Pragmatic Theory of Truth and I think it will be useful to develop it further.  The plan that usually works best for me is to revise the content on the wiki and … Continue reading →

Re: Peirce List Discussion • Jerry Rhee (quoting Peirce) The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real.  … Continue reading →

Re: Peirce List Discussion • Val Daniel I propose that we complete the customary (incomplete/dyadic) theories of truth, viz., by consensus and by correspondence, by adding, Truth by “concordance” (what you, Jon, call “triple correspondence”). Proposal accepted!  Actually, I feel like … Continue reading →