Monthly Archives: May 2026

The passages from Aristotle collected in the present and preceding two posts prepare the way to address overarching tasks in Peirce’s Logic of Science, namely, bringing the Theory of Signs and the Theory of Inquiry into their proper relationship and … Continue reading →

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson I’m still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle’s account relates to Peirce’s usage, though I’m pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle’s usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort … Continue reading →

Re: Peirce List • Benjamin Udell • Michael Shapiro Here’s a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense — A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss;  for … Continue reading →