Tag Archives: Hypothesis

I am going to begin with six selections from Peirce’s Lectures of 1866 where he addressess, among other things, the roles of signs informing sign relations and their connection with rules of inference guiding inquiries. ⁂ ⁂ ⁂ Our first … Continue reading →

Perhaps the best perspective from which to bring the connection between the theory of signs and the theory of inquiry into its proper focus is Peirce’s own Theory of Information, which he began setting forth in lectures at Harvard and … Continue reading →

Let’s stay with Peirce’s example of inductive inference a little longer and try to clear up the more troublesome confusions tending to arise. Figure 2 shows the implication ordering of logical terms in the form of a lattice diagram. Figure … Continue reading →

Re: Information = Comprehension × Extension • Comment 2 Returning to Peirce’s example of inductive inference, let’s try to get a clearer picture of why he connects it with disjunctive terms and indicial signs.  At this point in time I … Continue reading →

Let’s stay with Peirce’s example of abductive inference a little longer and try to clear up the more troublesome confusions tending to arise. Figure 1 shows the implication ordering of logical terms in the form of a lattice diagram. Figure … Continue reading →

Re: Information = Comprehension × Extension • Comment 3 Many things still puzzle me about Peirce’s account at this point.  The question marks I added to the Figures of the previous post indicate the node labels I have remaining doubts … Continue reading →

Peirce identifies inference with a process he describes as symbolization.  Let us consider what that might imply. I am going, next, to show that inference is symbolization and that the puzzle of the validity of scientific inference lies merely in … Continue reading →

Let’s examine Peirce’s second example of a disjunctive term — neat, swine, sheep, deer — within the style of lattice framework we used before. Hence if we find out that neat are herbivorous, swine are herbivorous, sheep are herbivorous, and … Continue reading →

Selection 1 ends with Peirce drawing the following conclusion about the links between information, comprehension, inference, and symbolization. Thus information measures the superfluous comprehension.  And, hence, whenever we make a symbol to express any thing or any attribute we cannot … Continue reading →

Selection 1 opens with Peirce proposing, “The information of a term is the measure of its superfluous comprehension”, and it closes with his offering the following promise. I am going, next, to show that inference is symbolization and that the … Continue reading →