Tag Archives: Belief Fixation

So what is all this fuss about the relation between inquiry and signs, as analyzed in Peirce’s theories of their structure and function and synthesized in his theory of information? The best way I’ve found to see where the problem … Continue reading →

One of the most tantalizing puzzles in Peirce’s work is the relation between his theory of inquiry and his theory of signs.  From the outset I found it useful to return to his early ventures where the two theories work … Continue reading →

Re: Peirce List • JA • JFS • JA What interests me about Peirce’s first articulation of the “laws of information” in his early lectures on the “Logic of Science” is how the primal twins of Inquiry and Semiotics nestle … Continue reading →

Re: Peirce List • John Sowa What you say goes to the heart of a problem I saw in Natural Propositions, whether it was Peirce’s account or Stjernfelt’s analysis I did not have time to decide as the schedule of … Continue reading →

Re: Peirce List • Jeffrey Brian Downard JBD quoting CSP: I restricted myself to terms, because at the time this chapter was first written (1867), I had not remarked that the whole doctrine of breadth and depth was equally applicable … Continue reading →

Re: Peirce List • John Sowa I gave Frederik Stjernfelt’s Natural Propositions a careful reading back when the Peirce List took it up.  The following archive links will take you to the topic thread and initial post. Peirce List • Frederik Stjernfelt … Continue reading →

Re: Peirce List • John Sowa JFS: A more fundamental term is proposition, which is informally defined as the “meaning” of a sentence.  That meaning is usually analyzed as comprehension (also known as intension) and extension. The easier-on-the-eyes blog copy of my … Continue reading →

A puzzle in Peirce I have puzzled over for as long as I can remember involves the relationship between his theory of signs, marking the characters of icons, indices, and symbols, and his theory of inquiry, bearing the three inferences … Continue reading →

Note.  This is a placeholder, to be developed later. Figure 2 shows the implication ordering of logical terms in the form of a lattice diagram. Figure 2. Disjunctive Term u, Taken as Subject Reference Peirce, C.S. (1866), “The Logic of … Continue reading →

Let’s stay with Peirce’s example of abductive inference a little longer and try to clear up the more troublesome confusions tending to arise. Figure 1 shows the implication ordering of logical terms in the form of a lattice diagram. Figure … Continue reading →