{ Information = Comprehension × Extension } • Discussion 4

Re: Peirce ListJeffrey Brian Downard

JBD quoting CSP:
I restricted myself to terms, because at the time this chapter was first written (1867), I had not remarked that the whole doctrine of breadth and depth was equally applicable to propositions and to arguments.  The breadth of a proposition is the aggregate of possible states of things in which it is true;  the breadth of an argument is the aggregate of possible cases to which it applies.  The depth of a proposition is the total of fact which it asserts of the state of things to which it is applied;  the depth of an argument is the importance of the conclusions which it draws.  In fact, every proposition and every argument can be regarded as a term. —1893.  (C.S. Peirce, Collected Papers, CP 2.407 n. 1)

A very apt quote.  It reinforces an impression I had formed and tried to express on several occasions under the heading of contemporary category theory and computer science jargon about “polymorphism”.

There is never anything simple about the development of Peirce’s thought over time so I think the whole question of information “deserves further research”, as they say.

cc: Peirce List

This entry was posted in Abduction, Belief Fixation, C.S. Peirce, Comprehension, Deduction, Extension, Hypothesis, Icon Index Symbol, Induction, Inference, Information, Information = Comprehension × Extension, Inquiry, Intension, Logic, Logic of Science, Peirce, Peirce's Categories, Pragmatism, Scientific Method, Semiotic Information, Semiotics, Sign Relations and tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , . Bookmark the permalink.

3 Responses to { Information = Comprehension × Extension } • Discussion 4

  1. Pingback: Survey of Semiotic Theory Of Information • 3 | Inquiry Into Inquiry

  2. Pingback: Survey of Pragmatic Semiotic Information • 4 | Inquiry Into Inquiry

  3. Pingback: Survey of Pragmatic Semiotic Information • 5 | Inquiry Into Inquiry

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