In trying to remember why I started this thread, I traced it back to the point when various notions of information came up in Chapter 3.3 of Frederik Stjernfelt’s Natural Propositions.
So let us review …
First we have the eureka moment in Kaina Stoicheia where Peirce declares a “true definition of a proposition”, namely, “A proposition is a sign which separately, or independently, indicates its object.” And we know that Peirce attaches the label of a “Dicisign” to the definiens of that definition.
True to Peirce’s general way of investigating sign types, he describes Dicisigns compositionally, functionally, and systematically. As Hilpinen (1992) says, Peirce’s recurrent and “standard” definition of Dicisigns is given in the following italicized passage from “Kaina stoicheia”:
“It is remarkable that while neither a pure icon or a pure index can assert anything, an index which forces something to be an icon, as a weathercock does, or which forces us to regard it as an icon, as the legend under the portrait does, does make an assertion, and forms a proposition. This suggests a true definition of a proposition, which is a question in much dispute at the moment. A proposition is a sign which separately, or independently, indicates its object.” (EP2, 307, emphasis Hilpinen’s)
(Frederik Stjernfelt, Natural Propositions, 53–54)
To be continued …