Problems In Philosophy • 11

Re: Problems In Philosophy 9Richard Saunders

RS:
BTW I’m not sure I really see a distinction between descriptive and normative (prescriptive?) science except in the set of aims, goals, etc. that are entertained.  It might be useful to try to characterize some distinctions in the goals of each.

Re: Problems In Philosophy 10Richard Saunders

RS:
Jon, the philosophy of science is all about the aims of science \textsc{and} good ways of achieving them.  I’m still not seeing a clear distinction, traditions notwithstanding, between descriptive and normative science.  I do see the recursive entanglement though, and I’m still wondering if we can find common axioms that underlie both.

\textsc{Saturday, November 7}

Dear Richard,

Sue and I will be downing some bubbly and sleeping it off till the dawn’s early light, but Sue was into this Policy-Theory Reunion stuff well before I clued into it, so here’s one of her earlier papers you might find of interest in the interim.

  • Scott, David K., and Awbrey, Susan M. (1993), “Transforming Scholarship”, Change : The Magazine of Higher Learning, 25(4), 38–43.  Online (1) (2) (3).

\textsc{Monday, November 9}

I am still trying to unscramble my brains after the week’s events but I’m surprised to see so much difficulty over the difference between descriptive sciences, the special sciences as Peirce called them, and normative sciences like aesthetics, ethics, and logic.  I deferred to common idiom and conventional wisdom regarding the irreducibility of “Ought” to “Is” but roughly the same dimension and tension is recognized under a legion of names — policy vs. theory, procedural vs. declarative, deontic vs. ontic, and many others.

A pragmatic semiotician’s ears will naturally perk up at reading the word irreducibility above and lead to wondering whether the irreducibility of normative to descriptive has anything to do with the irreducibility of triadic relations to dyadic relations.

To my way of thinking, yes, it does.

Resources

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Posted in Aesthetics, Algorithms, Animata, Automata, Beauty, C.S. Peirce, Ethics, Inquiry, Justice, Logic, Model Theory, Normative Science, Peirce, Philosophy, Pragmatism, Problem Solving, Proof Theory, Summum Bonum, Truth, Virtue | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

Problems In Philosophy • 10

Re: Ontolog ForumDavid Whitten

DW:
Why does classical tradition or any tradition consider logic to be a normative science?

Dear David,

A science is called that because it deals in knowledge (Latin scientia).  Knowing what is the case in a given domain of experience may be distinguished from knowing what ought to be in a given set of circumstances, and people who think in threes, like Kant and Peirce and me, add knowing what may be hoped to the mix.

In the quest to understand how science works a praxis/pragmatist like myself gives the process, inquiry, equal billing with the product, knowledge.  People have gotten used to seeing sciences as bodies of ostensible knowledge (BOOKs) and taking their analysis as a matter of assigning them distinctive catalogue numbers and sorting them to the indicated library shelves.  That is all well and good but it leaves an all too static impression of science if we settle for that.

Here are capsule summaries on the Sciences of Is and the Sciences of Ought from the Wikiversity articles on Descriptive Science and Normative Science.

Descriptive Science
A descriptive science, or a special science, is a form of inquiry, typically involving a community of inquiry and its accumulated body of provisional knowledge, which seeks to discover what is true about a recognized domain of phenomena.
Normative Science
A normative science is a form of inquiry, typically involving a community of inquiry and its accumulated body of provisional knowledge, which seeks to discover good ways of achieving recognized aims, ends, goals, objectives, or purposes.
The three normative sciences, according to traditional conceptions in philosophy, are aesthetics, ethics, and logic.

Resources

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Posted in Aesthetics, Algorithms, Animata, Automata, Beauty, C.S. Peirce, Ethics, Inquiry, Justice, Logic, Model Theory, Normative Science, Peirce, Philosophy, Pragmatism, Problem Solving, Proof Theory, Summum Bonum, Truth, Virtue | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 2 Comments

Problems In Philosophy • 9

Re: FB | Ecology Of Systems ThinkingRichard Saunders

RS:
Hume’s is/ought dichotomy:  are these as Gould said “non-overlapping magisteria” or are they concentric domains?  Is a science of aesthetics at the core?  If memory serves it seems like that was what Wittgenstein suggested at the end of Tractatus.  In The Moral Landscape, Harris narrows the aesthetic focus to a distinction between the minimum and maximum suffering of all sentient beings.  Maximum suffering is bad or ugly and minimum suffering is good or beautiful.  The relationship of conduct to result is the subject of consequentialism, isn’t it?  Isn’t that also the subject of science?

I know a lot of people see a cut and dried dichotomy here and conventional wit says you can’t derive Ought from Is.  My tracings of the boundaries though tend to find them recursively entangled.

RS:
Recursively entangled is a nice phrase, like the the chicken and the egg.  But I’m still wondering about the catch-22.  On what general axiom is aesthetics/ethics/logic based?  Harris suggests it’s minimizing net suffering.  (That doesn’t imply the elimination of suffering, because some suffering has a net positive result.)

I got no absolutes here.  I have my personal aesthetic, but a personal aesthetic is the moral equivalent of a religion, and folks are pretty free about that.

I’ll have more to say about my personal aesthetic … all in good time.

Resources

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Posted in Aesthetics, Algorithms, Animata, Automata, Beauty, C.S. Peirce, Ethics, Inquiry, Justice, Logic, Model Theory, Normative Science, Peirce, Philosophy, Pragmatism, Problem Solving, Proof Theory, Summum Bonum, Truth, Virtue | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 3 Comments

Problems In Philosophy • 8

Re: Ontolog ForumDavid Whitten

Dear David,

I’ll extend this post tomorrow, apocalypse permitting, but while I wait for the election returns I’ll post just a pair of links to the Wikiversity articles on Descriptive Science and Normative Science, forked over from the Wikipedia articles as I left them a decade and a half ago.  I have no idea what, if anything exists on Wikipedia itself these days but this much gives the basic ideas in a couple of nutshells.

Resource

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Problems In Philosophy • 7

Re: FB | Charles S. Peirce Society
(a) John Corcoran • Cosmic Justice Hypotheses
(b) John Corcoran • The Inseparability of Logic and Ethics

Peirce emphasized the intricate relationships among the Big Three Normative Sciences — Aesthetics, Ethics, Logic — a topic early and often discussed in the secondary literature and on the Peirce List.  One might also compare Theodore Parker’s well-known thesis:

I do not pretend to understand the moral universe;
the arc is a long one, my eye reaches but little ways;
I cannot calculate the curve and complete the figure by
the experience of sight;  I can divine it by conscience.
And from what I see I am sure it bends towards justice.

Theodore Parker

Questions about the interdependence of the principal normative sciences — Aesthetics, Ethics, Logic — just came up on another blog and prompted me to go looking for some of my earlier grapplings with the subject.  There’s an initial fragment of that harvest in the following post.

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Problems In Philosophy • 6

Another one of those recurring questions I’m constantly forgetting what I wrote about or where before just came up again on the Gödel’s Lost Letter blog.

Re: R.J. Lipton and K.W. ReganThe Night Of The Ethical Algorithm

Classical tradition views logic as a normative science, one whose object is truth.  This puts logic on a par with ethics, whose object is justice or morality in action, and aesthetics, whose object is beauty or the admirable for its own sake.

The pragmatic spin on this line of thinking treats logic, ethics, aesthetics as a concentric series of normative sciences, each a subdiscipline of the next.  Logic tells us how we ought to conduct our reasoning in order to achieve the goals of reasoning in general.  Thus logic is a special case of ethics.  Ethics tells us how we ought to conduct our activities in general in order to achieve the good appropriate to each enterprise.  What makes the difference between a normative science and a prescriptive dogma is whether this telling is based on actual inquiry into the relationship of conduct to result, or not.

Here’s a bit I wrote on this a long time ago in a galaxy not far away —

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Survey of Pragmatic Semiotic Information • 5

This is a Survey of previous blog and wiki posts on the Semiotic Theory Of Information.  All my projects are exploratory in essence but this line of inquiry is more open-ended than most.  The question is:

What is information and how does it impact the spectrum of activities answering to the name of inquiry?

Setting out on what would become his lifelong quest to explore and explain the “Logic of Science”, C.S. Peirce pierced the veil of historical confusions obscuring the issue and fixed on what he called the “laws of information” as the key to solving the puzzle.  This was in 1865 and 1866, detailed in his lectures at Harvard University and the Lowell Institute.

Fast forward to the present and I see the Big Question as follows.  Having gone through the exercise of comparing and contrasting Peirce’s theory of information, however much it yet remains in a rough-hewn state, with Shannon’s paradigm so pervasively informing the ongoing revolution in our understanding and use of information, I have reason to believe Peirce’s idea is root and branch more general and has the potential, with due development, to resolve many mysteries still bedeviling our grasp of inference, information, and inquiry.

Inference, Information, Inquiry

Pragmatic Semiotic Information

Semiotics, Semiosis, Sign Relations

Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Relation Theory

  • Blog Series • (1)
    • Discusssions • (1)(2)

Excursions

Blog Dialogs

References

  • Peirce, C.S. (1867), “Upon Logical Comprehension and Extension”.  Online.
  • Awbrey, J.L., and Awbrey, S.M. (1992), “Interpretation as Action : The Risk of Inquiry”, The Eleventh International Human Science Research Conference, Oakland University, Rochester, Michigan.
  • Awbrey, J.L., and Awbrey, S.M. (1995), “Interpretation as Action : The Risk of Inquiry”, Inquiry : Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 15(1), pp. 40–52.  ArchiveJournalOnline.

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Posted in Abduction, C.S. Peirce, Communication, Control, Cybernetics, Deduction, Determination, Discovery, Doubt, Epistemology, Fixation of Belief, Induction, Information, Information = Comprehension × Extension, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Inquiry Into Inquiry, Interpretation, Invention, Knowledge, Learning Theory, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Logic of Science, Mathematics, Peirce, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Pragmatic Information, Probable Reasoning, Process Thinking, Relation Theory, Scientific Inquiry, Scientific Method, Semeiosis, Semiosis, Semiotic Information, Semiotics, Sign Relational Manifolds, Sign Relations, Surveys, Triadic Relations, Uncertainty | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 10 Comments

Theme One • A Program Of Inquiry 20

Re: Richard J. LiptonVaccines Are Not Developing

Back in the day when I was making The Big Bucks (inflation-adjusted dollars) consulting on research statistics in bioscience-medical-nursing-public-health settings, I noticed a certain analogy between propositional calculus research (PCR0) and polymerase chain reactions (PCR1).  I was going to say something about it on a previous thread where these topics collided but then I lost track of the links I needed, so I will go dig them up now.

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Posted in Algorithms, Animata, Artificial Intelligence, Boolean Functions, C.S. Peirce, Cactus Graphs, Cognition, Computation, Constraint Satisfaction Problems, Data Structures, Differential Logic, Equational Inference, Formal Languages, Graph Theory, Inquiry Driven Systems, Laws of Form, Learning Theory, Logic, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Minimal Negation Operators, Painted Cacti, Peirce, Propositional Calculus, Semiotics, Spencer Brown, Visualization | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 7 Comments

Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Relation Theory • Discussion 2

Re: Peirce ListEdwina Taborsky

Dear Edwina,

Analytic frameworks, our various theories of categories, sets, sorts, and types, have their uses but they tend to become à priori, autonomous, top-down, and top-heavy unless they are supported by a robust population of concrete examples arising in practical experience, one of the things the maxim of pragmatism advises us to remember.  That is why Peirce’s tackling of information and inquiry is even-handed with respect to their extensional and intensional sides.  And it’s why we need to pay attention when anomalies accumulate and the population of presenting cases rebels against the dictates of Procrustean predicates.  Times like that tell us we may need to reconceive our customary conceptual frameworks.

As it happens, I’ve been thinking a lot lately about a particular class of sign sequences, namely, proofs in propositional calculus regarded as cases of sign process, or semiosis.  Naturally I’ve been thinking of delving more deeply into Robert Marty’s work on paths through the lattice of sign classes but so far I’m still in the early stages of that venture.

For what they’re worth, here are my blog posts so far on Proof As Semiosis.

Resources

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Posted in C.S. Peirce, Icon Index Symbol, Information, Inquiry Driven Systems, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Mathematics, Peirce, Pragmatism, Relation Theory, Semiosis, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Triadicity, Visualization | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 16 Comments

Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Relation Theory • Discussion 1

Re: Peirce ListEdwina Taborsky

ET:
I particularly like your comment that “signhood is a role in a triadic relation, a role that a thing bears or plays in a given context of relationships — it is not an absolute, non-relative property of a thing-in-itself, one that it possesses independently of all relationships to other things”.
I myself emphasize that this context of the role is made up of relationships (plural) — which gives the triad its capacity for complexity.  Therefore, as we see in Robert Marty’s lattice, a thing is never a thing-in-itself but is an action, a process, composed of complex relations.

Dear Edwina,

Things grow complex rather quickly once we start to think about all the roles a sign may play on all the stages where it struts and frets its parts.  There is no unique setting, no one scene, but concentric and overlapping contexts of relationship all have their bearing on the sign’s significance.

One strategy we have for dealing with these complexities and avoiding being overwhelmed by them is to build up a stock of well-studied examples, graded in complexity from the very simplest to the increasingly complex.  The wide world may always present us with situations more complex than any in our inventory of familiar cases but the better our stock of ready examples the more aspects of novel situations we can capture and the greater our odds of coping with them.

Resources

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Posted in C.S. Peirce, Icon Index Symbol, Information, Inquiry Driven Systems, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Mathematics, Peirce, Pragmatism, Relation Theory, Semiosis, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Triadicity, Visualization | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 15 Comments