Re: Systems Science • Kent Palmer

As a general rule Peirce avoided in advance many of the problems bedeviling later philosophies of science in the 20th Century.  Doing so came rather naturally to him as he rarely succumbed to the cycloptic species of reductionism afflicting so many modern isms.

In particular, it’s not so much that Peirce sought a way to jam together the extensions and intensions of concepts and other symbols, the stuffs empiricism and rationalism are made on, as that he grasped the whole body of information, the “synthetic unity of apperception” of which extensions and intensions are but the facets or lower dimensional projections.

That integral core of information borne by signs is the prize we’ll keep in view, stereoscopically, as we make our way into the texts of the 1860s.

cc: Ontolog Forum • Structural Modeling