The best way to get a handle on what Peirce meant by his formula,
is to study a suitable sample of critical passages from his Lectures of 1865–1866 on the Logic of Science. The most instructive texts are those where he illustrates the abstract forms with concrete materials and minimal examples, simple but just complex enough to flesh out the most significant dimensions of the case.
I’ll be getting to that directly …
But I wanted to flag the following comment by Kent Palmer for future discussion, as doubt and uncertainty play a motivating role in both Peirce’s theory of inquiry and the revolution in our handling of information brought on by Shannon’s groundbreaking work.
- Kent Palmer:
- But then I noticed I had transformed Peirce’s formulation in order to make that connection and I was struck by doubt. Notice doubt is at the level of hyper-intension defined by Tichy. In fact, it is interesting that doubt is Cartesian and Husserl attempts to clarify doubt and refine it with his Epoche and Bracketing strategy. But doubt is noetic not a noema. Doubt is in the Husserlian hierarchy. It turns out that doubt is fairly low in Husserl’s noetic Hierarchy because he starts with Meaning as Intentional Morphe forming hyle and comes down from there, exactly the opposite of Analytic Philosophy that starts with Extension and begrudgingly adds each level of intension. Intentional morphe with hyle splits into noesis and noema. Notice that the schema here is Form.