{ Information = Comprehension × Extension } • Discussion 10

Re: Ontolog ForumAzamat Abdoullaev

As I see it, the semiotics or theory of signs handed down by Aristotle, Augustine, the Medieval Scholastics, Locke, and others took a significant leap toward a truly scientific theory with the work of C.S. Peirce.  This became possible, I believe, not so much driven by any mutation in the taxonomy of signs as catalyzed by Peirce’s concurrent development of the logic of relatives and the mathematics of relations, especially triadic relations.

The task I’ve set for myself under this heading is threefold —

  1. There is the scholarly task of figuring out what Peirce meant by the formula:  “Information = Comprehension × Extension”.
  2. There is the scientific task of finding out whether Peirce’s theory of information tells us anything useful about empirical realities.
  3. There is the theory-engineering task that bridges tasks 1 and 2.  It looks for ways to repair incomplete or inconsistent theories in order to give them a better grasp of the empirical realities.


cc: CyberneticsOntolog ForumStructural ModelingSystems Science

This entry was posted in Abduction, C.S. Peirce, Comprehension, Deduction, Extension, Hypothesis, Icon Index Symbol, Induction, Inference, Information = Comprehension × Extension, Information Theory, Inquiry, Intension, Logic, Logic of Science, Peirce, Peirce's Categories, Pragmatic Semiotic Information, Pragmatism, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Sign Relations and tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , . Bookmark the permalink.

4 Responses to { Information = Comprehension × Extension } • Discussion 10

  1. Pingback: Survey of Pragmatic Semiotic Information • 4 | Inquiry Into Inquiry

  2. Pingback: Survey of Pragmatic Semiotic Information • 4 | Inquiry Into Inquiry

  3. Pingback: Survey of Pragmatic Semiotic Information • 5 | Inquiry Into Inquiry

  4. Pingback: C.S. Peirce and Category Theory • 4 | Inquiry Into Inquiry

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