Category Archives: Induction

Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy, Inquiry • 3

Posted on February 17, 2016 by Jon Awbrey

Re: R.J. Lipton and K.W. Regan • Waves, Hazards, Guesses Aristotle’s apagoge, variously translated as abduction, reduction, or retroduction, is a form of reasoning common to two types of situations. Abduction may involve either of the following two operations. The … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, Analogy, Aristotle, Artificial Intelligence, C.S. Peirce, Computation, Computational Complexity, Deduction, Induction, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Intelligent Systems, Logic, Problem Solving, Semiotics | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 7 Comments

Inquiry, Signs, Relations • 1

Posted on July 5, 2015 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Michael Harris • A Non-Logical Cognitive Phenomenon Human spontaneous non-demonstrative inference is not, overall, a logical process.  Hypothesis formation involves the use of deductive rules, but is not totally governed by them;  hypothesis confirmation is a non-logical cognitive phenomenon:  … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, Action, Analogy, C.S. Peirce, Cognition, Cognitive Science, Communication, Deduction, Foundations of Mathematics, Induction, Information, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Into Inquiry, Interpretation, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Logic of Science, Mathematics, Michael Harris, Peirce, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mathematics, Philosophy of Science, Pragmatism, Relation Theory, Relevance, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Triadic Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Survey of Semiotic Theory Of Information • 1

Posted on May 17, 2015 by Jon Awbrey

This is a Survey of previous blog and wiki posts on the Semiotic Theory Of Information.  All my projects are exploratory in essence but this line of inquiry is more open-ended than most.  The question is: What is information and how … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, C.S. Peirce, Communication, Control, Cybernetics, Deduction, Determination, Discovery, Doubt, Epistemology, Fixation of Belief, Induction, Information, Information = Comprehension × Extension, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Inquiry Into Inquiry, Interpretation, Invention, Knowledge, Learning Theory, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Logic of Science, Mathematics, Peirce, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Pragmatic Information, Probable Reasoning, Process Thinking, Relation Theory, Scientific Inquiry, Scientific Method, Semeiosis, Semiosis, Semiotic Information, Semiotics, Sign Relational Manifolds, Sign Relations, Surveys, Triadic Relations, Uncertainty | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Survey of Inquiry Driven Systems • 1

Posted on May 14, 2015 by Jon Awbrey

This is a Survey of blog and wiki posts on Inquiry Driven Systems, material I plan to refine toward a more compact and systematic treatment of the subject. An inquiry driven system is a system having among its state variables … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, Action, Adaptive Systems, Aristotle, Artificial Intelligence, Automated Research Tools, Change, Cognitive Science, Communication, Cybernetics, Deduction, Descartes, Dewey, Discovery, Doubt, Education, Educational Systems Design, Educational Technology, Fixation of Belief, Induction, Information, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Inquiry Into Inquiry, Intelligent Systems, Interpretation, Invention, Kant, Knowledge, Learning, Learning Theory, Logic, Logic of Science, Mathematics, Mental Models, Peirce, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Process Thinking, Scientific Inquiry, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Surveys, Teaching, Triadic Relations, Visualization | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 3

Posted on December 12, 2013 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson A more complete excerpt and the translator’s notes are very helpful here. A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss ;  for that which people … Continue reading →

Posted in Analogy, Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Icon Index Symbol, Induction, Inquiry, Likelihood, Likely Story, Likeness, Logic, Mathematics, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2

Posted on December 11, 2013 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson I’m still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle’s account relates to Peirce’s usage, though I’m pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle’s usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort … Continue reading →

Posted in Analogy, Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Icon Index Symbol, Induction, Inquiry, Likelihood, Likely Story, Likeness, Logic, Mathematics, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1

Posted on December 11, 2013 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List • Benjamin Udell • Michael Shapiro Here’s a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense — A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss;  for … Continue reading →

Posted in Analogy, Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Icon Index Symbol, Induction, Inquiry, Likelihood, Likely Story, Likeness, Logic, Mathematics, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 2 Comments

“What we’ve got here is (a) failure to communicate” • 6

Posted on November 15, 2013 by Jon Awbrey

Excerpt from Warren S. McCulloch, “What Is a Number, that a Man May Know It, and a Man, that He May Know a Number?” (1960) Please remember that we are not now concerned with the physics and chemistry, the anatomy … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, Amphecks, Aristotle, Automata, Boolean Algebra, Boolean Functions, C.S. Peirce, Combinatorics, Deduction, Duns Scotus, Induction, Leibniz, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Mathematics, Neural Models, Ockham, Peirce, Propositional Logic, Psychons, Relation Theory, Sources, Triadic Relations, Warren S. McCulloch, William James | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

What Is A Theorem That A Human May Prove It?

Posted on June 19, 2013 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Gil Kalai • Why Is Mathematics Possible? • Tim Gowers’ Take On The Matter Comment 1 To the extent that mathematics has to do with reasoning about possible existence, or inference from pure hypothesis, a line of thinking going … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, Analogy, Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Conjecture, Deduction, Epistemology, Hypothesis, Induction, Inquiry, Logic, Logic of Science, Mathematics, Peirce, Proof Theory, Retroduction, Theorem Proving, Warren S. McCulloch | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 2 Comments

Demonstrative And Otherwise

Posted on December 17, 2012 by Jon Awbrey

I am constantly encountering what I perceive as echoes of Peircean themes in places where acquaintance with or interest in Peirce’s work is slight at best, and that leaves me with a lot of pent up thoughts that I’ve learned through … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, Artificial Intelligence, C.S. Peirce, Computation, Computational Complexity, Cybernetics, Deduction, Induction, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Intelligent Systems, Logic, Peirce, Programming, Semiotics | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 2 Comments