Pragmatic Truth • Discussion 5

I’ve begun reworking the InterSciWiki article on the Pragmatic Theory of Truth and I think it will be useful to develop it further.  The plan that usually works best for me is to revise the content on the wiki and serialize it on my blog.

The ISW article derives from the last Wikipedia version I edited:

I copied that content to several other wikis around the web from 2007 on and a subsequent version of it eventually ended up at ISW, my main working wiki these days.

Here is the lead-in to the ISW article as it currently stands:

Pragmatic theory of truth refers to those accounts, definitions, and theories of the concept truth that distinguish the philosophies of pragmatism and pragmaticism.  The conception of truth in question varies along lines that reflect the influence of several thinkers, initially and notably, Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, but a number of common features can be identified.  The most characteristic features are (1) a reliance on the pragmatic maxim as a means of clarifying the meanings of difficult concepts, truth in particular, and (2) an emphasis on the fact that the product variously branded as belief, certainty, knowledge, or truth is the result of a process, namely, inquiry.

Resources

Posted in Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Coherence, Concordance, Congruence, Consensus, Convergence, Correspondence, Dewey, Fixation of Belief, Information, Inquiry, John Dewey, Kant, Logic, Logic of Science, Method, Peirce, Philosophy, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Truth, Truth Theory, William James | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 5 Comments

Pragmatic Truth • Discussion 4

Re: Peirce ListJerry Rhee (quoting Peirce)

The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to
by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth,
and the object represented in this opinion is the real. 
(CP 5.407, JR’s emphasis).

The key word here is “investigate”.  We can read that loosely as any method of fixing belief, but we know that Peirce ranked methods of fixing belief in order of their malleability to the impressions of reality, their aptness to let what is permanent, persistent, “something upon which our thinking has no effect” (CP 5.384) settle the matter once and for all.

This is the question of “convergence”, a question that mathematicians, physicists, systems theorists, etc. have investigated in great detail.  As a rule we find that some methods of procedure, of stepping through a sequence of states, will eventually converge on a settled or stable state while others will not.  All that is relative, of course, to the mathematical model or theory we have in hand for describing states of information in time.  So we never quite escape the question of how to tell whether a model is good and succeeds in its purpose of giving us information about its object or whether it falls short of that object.

References

  • Peirce, C.S. (1877), “The Fixation Of Belief”, Popular Science Monthly 12 (Nov 1877), pp. 1–15.  Reprinted in Collected Papers, CP 5.358–387.  Online.
  • Peirce, C.S. (1878), “How To Make Our Ideas Clear”, Popular Science Monthly 12 (Jan 1878), pp. 286–302.  Reprinted in Collected Papers, CP 5.388–410.  Online.

Resources

Posted in Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Coherence, Concordance, Congruence, Consensus, Convergence, Correspondence, Dewey, Fixation of Belief, Information, Inquiry, John Dewey, Kant, Logic, Logic of Science, Method, Peirce, Philosophy, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Truth, Truth Theory, William James | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 4 Comments

Pragmatic Truth • Discussion 3

Re: Peirce ListVal Daniel

I propose that we complete the customary (incomplete/dyadic) theories of truth, viz., by consensus and by correspondence, by adding, Truth by “concordance” (what you, Jon, call “triple correspondence”).

Proposal accepted!  Actually, I feel like I’ve been working along these lines ever since I first met up with Peirce.  I’m currently fighting some emotional resistance — it makes me a little sad to look on those old wiki-scraps — the dreams we dreamed about what Wikipedia could be!  a true community of learning and inquiry!  but it was neither designed nor destined to become that.

At any rate, I would begin by poring over the relics I saved and trying to see what sense we could make of them.  By way of secondary literature, I remember Susan Haack’s Evidence and Inquiry and Cheryl Misak’s Truth and the End of Inquiry helping to frame the issues.  The papers Susan Awbrey and I wrote in the 90s and 00s attempted to tackle pieces of the puzzle, namely, how to integrate the object-facing and inter-sign aspects of semiosis, the first implied by correspondence theories and the second implied by consensus theories of truth.

References

  • Awbrey, S.M., and Awbrey, J.L. (2001), “Conceptual Barriers to Creating Integrative Universities”, Organization : The Interdisciplinary Journal of Organization, Theory, and Society 8(2), Sage Publications, London, UK, pp. 269–284.  Abstract.
  • Awbrey, S.M., and Awbrey, J.L. (1999), “Organizations of Learning or Learning Organizations : The Challenge of Creating Integrative Universities for the Next Century”, Second International Conference of the Journal ‘Organization’, Re-Organizing Knowledge, Trans-Forming Institutions : Knowing, Knowledge, and the University in the 21st Century, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA.  Online.
  • Haack, Susan (1993), Evidence and Inquiry : Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, UK.
  • Misak, Cheryl J. (1991), Truth and the End of Inquiry : A Peircean Account of Truth, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.

Resources

Posted in Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Coherence, Concordance, Congruence, Consensus, Convergence, Correspondence, Dewey, Fixation of Belief, Information, Inquiry, John Dewey, Kant, Logic, Logic of Science, Method, Peirce, Philosophy, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Truth, Truth Theory, William James | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 8 Comments

Pragmatic Truth • Discussion 2

Re: Peirce List | Truth As Regulative Or RealCGJFSJLRC

I’ve been reviewing the old articles mentioned in my last post and the more I look at them the more I think they might be worth salvaging.

John Sowa’s comment about the “major failures caused by ignoring [Peirce]” and Jerry Chandler’s remark about later readings serving as a “Procrustian bed for CSP’s concepts” are very much to the point in this context and I will have a few things to say along those lines in due time.

Resources

Posted in Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Coherence, Concordance, Congruence, Consensus, Convergence, Correspondence, Dewey, Fixation of Belief, Information, Inquiry, John Dewey, Kant, Logic, Logic of Science, Method, Peirce, Philosophy, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Truth, Truth Theory, William James | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 5 Comments

Pragmatic Truth • Discussion 1

Re: Peirce List | Truth As Regulative Or RealCGJLRCJASJBDJAJFS
Cf: Peirce List | Pragmatic Theory Of TruthJA

Comment 1

Folks who were around a dozen years ago will remember all the fun and fuss we had when some rather absurd things about Peirce’s theory of truth or the lack thereof popped up in various Wikipedious articles.  Some of us eventually hashed out a fairly useful account of a Pragmatic Theory of Truth, at least, in my humble opinion.

Incidental Musement

Busy watching Goblet of Fire 🔥 for about the dozenth time now, where I am finding Rita Skeeter’s theory of Alternative Truth especially poignant in view of current events, but I will dig up some old scraps of text later.

Comment 2

I haven’t looked at these articles since the days I wasted trying to justify the ways of Peirce to Wikipediots, other than to reformat them a little here and there, but some of their material may be instructive for ongoing discussions, especially the quotes from Peirce and Kant on the nominal character of truth definitions in terms of correspondence.  To make the shortest possible shrift, we need to keep in mind that “correspondence” for Peirce can mean “triple correspondence”, in other words, just another name for a triadic relation.

Resources

Note.  The document histories of the latter two article forks tell me those drafts derive from Wikipedia revisions of 14 Feb 2007 and 29 Jun 2006, respectively.

Posted in Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Coherence, Concordance, Congruence, Consensus, Convergence, Correspondence, Dewey, Fixation of Belief, Information, Inquiry, John Dewey, Kant, Logic, Logic of Science, Method, Peirce, Philosophy, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Truth, Truth Theory, William James | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 7 Comments

Survey of Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy, Inquiry • 1

This is a Survey of blog and wiki posts on three elementary forms of inference, as recognized by a logical tradition extending from Aristotle through Charles S. Peirce.  Particular attention is paid to the way these inferential rudiments combine to form the more complex patterns of analogy and inquiry.

Blog Dialogs

More to be added later …

Posted in Abduction, Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Deduction, Dewey, Discovery, Doubt, Fixation of Belief, Functional Logic, Icon Index Symbol, Induction, Inference, Information, Inquiry, Invention, Logic, Logic of Science, Mathematics, Morphism, Paradigmata, Paradigms, Pattern Recognition, Peirce, Philosophy, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Scientific Inquiry, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Surveys, Syllogism, Triadic Relations, Visualization | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 5 Comments

Animated Logical Graphs • 10

Re: Peirce List DiscussionCharles Pyle

Let’s consider Peirce’s logical graphs at the alpha level, the abstract forms of which can be interpreted for propositional logic.  I say “can be interpreted” advisedly because the system of logical graphs itself forms an uninterpreted syntax, the formulas of which have no fixed meaning until interpreted.  As it happens, the forms themselves do not determine their interpretations uniquely.  There is at minimum a degree of freedom that allows them to be interpreted in two different ways, corresponding to what Peirce called his entitative graphs and his existential graphs.

Bringing this to bear on the empty sheet of assertion we have the following facts:

The blank SA is a symbol and wants interpretation to give it a meaning.  Under the entitative reading (En) it means “false”.  Under the existential reading (Ex) it means “true”.  What in turn these “interpretants” mean requires a further, denotative interpretation relative to the universe of discourse at hand, “true” denoting the whole universe and “false” denoting the empty set.

Posted in Amphecks, Animata, Boolean Algebra, Boolean Functions, C.S. Peirce, Cactus Graphs, Constraint Satisfaction Problems, Deduction, Diagrammatic Reasoning, Duality, Equational Inference, Graph Theory, Laws of Form, Logic, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Minimal Negation Operators, Model Theory, Painted Cacti, Peirce, Proof Theory, Propositional Calculus, Propositional Equation Reasoning Systems, Spencer Brown, Theorem Proving, Visualization | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 11 Comments

The Difference That Makes A Difference That Peirce Makes • 3

It was fifty years ago this month that I first came North to Michigan, prospecting for a college to enter in the Fall.  I reached East Lansing in the middle of what would later be regaled as the Blizzard of ’67 and spiting all that various twists of fate led me to enroll the next Summer Term at Michigan State.

To be continued …

Posted in C.S. Peirce, Chemistry, Complementarity, Inquiry, Laws of Form, Logic, Mathematics, Peirce, Philosophy, Physics, Pragmatism, Quantum Mechanics, Relativity, Science, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Spencer Brown | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Survey of Semiotic Theory Of Information • 2

This is a Survey of previous blog and wiki posts on the Semiotic Theory Of Information.  All my projects are exploratory in essence but this line of inquiry is more open-ended than most.  The question is:

What is information and how does it impact the spectrum of activities that answer to the name of inquiry?

Setting out on what would become his lifelong quest to explore and explain the “Logic of Science”, C.S. Peirce pierced the veil of historical confusions obscuring the issue and fixed on what he called the “laws of information” as the key to solving the puzzle.  This was in 1865 and 1866, detailed in his lectures at Harvard University and the Lowell Institute.

Fast forward to the present and I see the Big Question as follows.  Having gone through the exercise of comparing and contrasting Peirce’s theory of information, however much it yet remains in a rough-hewn state, with Shannon’s paradigm so pervasively informing the ongoing revolution in our understanding and use of information, I have reason to believe Peirce’s idea is root and branch more general and has the potential, with due development, to resolve many mysteries still bedeviling our grasp of inference, information, and inquiry.

Inference, Information, Inquiry

Excursions

Blog Dialogs

Reference

Posted in Abduction, C.S. Peirce, Communication, Control, Cybernetics, Deduction, Determination, Discovery, Doubt, Epistemology, Fixation of Belief, Induction, Information, Information = Comprehension × Extension, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Inquiry Into Inquiry, Interpretation, Invention, Knowledge, Learning Theory, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Logic of Science, Mathematics, Peirce, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Pragmatic Information, Probable Reasoning, Process Thinking, Relation Theory, Scientific Inquiry, Scientific Method, Semeiosis, Semiosis, Semiotic Information, Semiotics, Sign Relational Manifolds, Sign Relations, Surveys, Triadic Relations, Uncertainty | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

The Difference That Makes A Difference That Peirce Makes • 2

Re: A Flash From The Past ⚡⚡⚡

My mind keeps flashing back to the days when I first encountered Peirce’s thought.  It was so fresh, it spoke to me like no other thinker’s thought I knew, and it held so much promise of setting aside all the old schisms that boggled the mind through the ages.

I feel that way about it still but communicating precisely what I find so revolutionary in Peirce’s thought remains a work in progress for me.

Many readers of Peirce share the opinion that there is something truly novel in his thought, a difference that makes a critical difference in the way we understand our thoughts and undertake our actions in its light.  The question has arisen once again, just what that difference might be.

So I’ll make another try at answering that …

Posted in C.S. Peirce, Inquiry, Logic, Mathematics, Peirce, Philosophy, Pragmatism, Science, Scientific Method, Semiotics | Tagged , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment