Charles Sanders Peirce, George Spencer Brown, and Me • 3

Re: Laws of Form

There are a number of “difficulties at the beginning” that arise here.  I’ve been trying to get to the point where I can respond to James Bowery’s initial comments and also to questions about the relation between Spencer Brown’s imaginary logical values and the development of differential logic.

The larger issue I see at this point has to do with the relationship between the algebra and the arithmetic of logical graphs.  Peirce came right up to the threshold of discovering that relationship several times in his later work on existential graphs but never quite pushed it through to full realization.  It was left to Spencer Brown to bring it to light.

The relationship between Primary Arithmetic and Primary Algebra is discussed in the following article.

The other issue has to do with my using a different \mathrm{J_1} than Spencer Brown.  I believe I even called it \mathrm{J_1}' in the early days but eventually lost the prime as time went by.  As far as I can remember, it initially had to do with negotiating between the systems of C.S. Peirce and Spencer Brown but I think I stuck with the variant because it sorts the types of change — modifying structure and moving variables — into different bins.

See also the discussions at the following locations.

cc: CyberneticsLaws of FormOntologPeirceStructural ModelingSystems Science

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The Difference That Makes A Difference That Peirce Makes • 18

Re: Peter SmithWhich Is The Quantifier?

From a functional logic point of view logicians slipped a step backward when they passed from Peirce’s \sum and \prod to the current convention of using \exists and \forall for logical quantifiers.  There’s a rough indication of what I mean at the following location.

Functional Logic • Higher Order Propositions

Just a reminder to get back to this later …

Posted in C.S. Peirce, Category Theory, Complementarity, Duality, Formal Languages, Higher Order Propositions, Indicator Functions, Inquiry, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Peirce, Pragmatism, Predicate Calculus, Propositional Calculus, Propositions, Quantifiers, Relation Theory, Semiotics, Type Theory, Zeroth Order Logic | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Charles Sanders Peirce, George Spencer Brown, and Me • 2

Re: Laws of Form

I’m making an effort to present this material in a more gradual and logical order than I’ve ever managed to do before.  There are issues about the relationship between episodic and semantic memory that are giving me trouble as I try to remember how I came to look at things the way I do … but never mind that now.  I’ll eventually get around to explaining the forces that drove me to generalize the forms of logical graphs from trees to cacti, as graph theorists call them, and how that made the transition to differential logic so much easier than it would have been otherwise, but I think it would be better now to begin at the beginning with the common core of forms introduced by CSP and GSB.

Here’s a couple of articles I wrote for that purpose:

There are versions of those articles at several other places on the web which may be better formatted or more convenient for discussion:

One big issue arising at the beginning is the question of “duality”.  Both C.S. Peirce and Spencer Brown understood they were dealing with a very abstract calculus, one which could be interpreted for the purposes of ordinary propositional logic in two different ways.  Peirce called the two different ways of interpreting the abstract graphs his entitative and existential graphs.  He started out with a system of graphs he opted to interpret in the entitative manner but switched over to the existential choice as he developed his logical graphs beyond the purely propositional level.  Spencer Brown elected to emphasize the entitative reading in his main exposition but he was very clear in the terminology he used that the forms and transformations themselves are independent of their interpretations.

Table 1 at either of the locations linked below has columns for the graph-theoretic forms and the parenthesis-string forms of several basic expressions, reading them under the existential interpretation.

  • Table 1. Syntax and Semantics of a Calculus for Propositional Logic • (a)(b)

The Tables linked below serve to compare the existential and entitative interpretations of logical graphs by providing translations into familiar notations and English paraphrases for a few of the most basic and commonly occurring forms.

cc: CyberneticsLaws of FormOntologPeirceStructural ModelingSystems Science

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Charles Sanders Peirce, George Spencer Brown, and Me • 1

It’s almost 50 years now since I first encountered the volumes of Peirce’s Collected Papers in the math library at Michigan State, and shortly afterwards a friend called my attention to the entry for Spencer Brown’s Laws of Form in the Whole Earth Catalog and I sent off for it right away.  I would spend the next decade just beginning to figure out what either one of them was talking about in the matter of logical graphs and I would spend another decade after that developing a program, first in Lisp and then in Pascal, converting graph-theoretic data structures formed on their ideas to good purpose in the mechanics of its propositional reasoning engine.  I thought it might contribute to a number of ongoing discussions if I could articulate what I think I learned from that experience.

cc: CyberneticsLaws of FormOntologPeirceStructural ModelingSystems Science

Posted in Abstraction, Amphecks, Analogy, Animata, Boolean Algebra, Boolean Functions, C.S. Peirce, Cactus Graphs, Cybernetics, Deduction, Differential Logic, Duality, Form, Graph Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Laws of Form, Logic, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Minimal Negation Operators, Model Theory, Peirce, Proof Theory, Propositional Calculus, Semiotics, Sign Relational Manifolds, Sign Relations, Spencer Brown, Theorem Proving, Time, Topology | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 6 Comments

Charles Sanders Peirce, George Spencer Brown, and Me

James Bowery left a comment on my blog and opened a thread in the Yahoo! group devoted to discussing the mathematics of George Spencer Brown’s Laws of Form.  I’ve been meaning to join that discussion as soon as I could work up the time and concentration to think about it — at long last I think I can do that now.  I’ll use the above heading to blog any bits from my side of the conversation I think might serve a wider audience.

It’s been a long time since I joined a new discussion group so I thought I’d start by posting a bit of the old‑fashioned self‑intro.

cc: CyberneticsLaws of FormOntologPeirceStructural ModelingSystems Science

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¿Shifting Paradigms? • 5

Re: Peter CameronInfinity and Foundation

We always encounter a multitude of problems whenever we try to rationalize mathematics by reducing it to logic, where logic itself is reduced to a purely deductive style.  A number of thinkers have proposed it is time — well past time — to stop counting so heavily on that idea and to join a Declaration of Independence for Mathematics.

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{ Information = Comprehension × Extension } • Discussion 6

Re: Peirce ListJAJFSJA

What interests me about Peirce’s first articulation of the “laws of information” in his early lectures on the “Logic of Science” is how the primal twins of Inquiry and Semiotics nestle so closely in their first nest that we can see their kinship far better and more easily than we ever will again.  (I am cautiously optimistic their further development won’t go the way it did for Rome.)

More than that, whatever disclaimers Peirce may have made about his own originality, I don’t think anyone can fairly encounter his definition of a term’s information as “the measure of its superfluous comprehension” without being downright shocked at its novelty.

cc: Peirce List

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{ Information = Comprehension × Extension } • Discussion 5

Re: Peirce ListJohn Sowa

What you say goes to the heart of a problem I saw in Natural Propositions, whether it was Peirce’s account or Stjernfelt’s analysis I did not have time to decide as the schedule of the slow reading went too fast for me to take it up on the List.  I marked the critical passages and my copy of the book is around here someplace but I am trying to stay focused on the subject matter and the set of problems I introduced under the above subject line.

There are many issues about cross-disciplinary communication, the varieties of quasi-religious belief about the uses of words in the whole proposition-sentence-statement complex, the various uses Peirce and others use across contexts, disciplines, historical time, and even within the same discussion.  But I think it’s best to hold the forte on that for now.

cc: Peirce List

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{ Information = Comprehension × Extension } • Discussion 4

Re: Peirce ListJeffrey Brian Downard

JBD quoting CSP:
I restricted myself to terms, because at the time this chapter was first written (1867), I had not remarked that the whole doctrine of breadth and depth was equally applicable to propositions and to arguments.  The breadth of a proposition is the aggregate of possible states of things in which it is true;  the breadth of an argument is the aggregate of possible cases to which it applies.  The depth of a proposition is the total of fact which it asserts of the state of things to which it is applied;  the depth of an argument is the importance of the conclusions which it draws.  In fact, every proposition and every argument can be regarded as a term. —1893.  (C.S. Peirce, Collected Papers, CP 2.407 n. 1)

A very apt quote.  It reinforces an impression I had formed and tried to express on several occasions under the heading of contemporary category theory and computer science jargon about “polymorphism”.

There is never anything simple about the development of Peirce’s thought over time so I think the whole question of information “deserves further research”, as they say.

cc: Peirce List

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{ Information = Comprehension × Extension } • Discussion 3

Re: Peirce ListJohn Sowa

I gave Frederik Stjernfelt’s Natural Propositions a careful reading back when the Peirce List took it up.  The following archive links will take you to the topic thread and initial post.

There are remnants of my own comments and reflections at the following locations.

I have in mind getting back to the issues raised by that reading someday but it would take me too far afield from my current focus to do that now.

The short shrift for now is that Peirce is not talking about propositions in the sense of “double signs, informational signs, quasi-propositions, or Dicisigns” at this juncture but rather the simpler sorts of propositions falling under the head of propositional calculus as currently understood, most felicitously dealt with of course by means of Peirce’s own Alpha Graphs.

The concept of information arising this context is rather distinct.  Peirce’s early notion of information, however roughly cut, is clearer and stronger in its underlying realism than the residual nominalism of his later formulations, at least, as interpreted by others.

cc: Peirce List

Posted in Abduction, Belief Fixation, C.S. Peirce, Comprehension, Deduction, Extension, Hypothesis, Icon Index Symbol, Induction, Inference, Information, Information = Comprehension × Extension, Inquiry, Intension, Logic, Logic of Science, Peirce, Peirce's Categories, Pragmatism, Scientific Method, Semiotic Information, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 8 Comments