Category Archives: Pragmatism

Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Relations • 1

Posted on May 9, 2018 by Jon Awbrey

To understand how signs work in Peirce’s theory of triadic sign relations, also known as “semiotics”, we have to understand, in order of increasing generality, sign relations, triadic relations, and relations in general, all as conceived in Peirce’s logic of … Continue reading →

Posted in C.S. Peirce, Icon Index Symbol, Knowledge Representation, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Mathematics, Ontology, Peirce, Pragmatism, Relation Theory, Semiosis, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Triadicity | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 16 Comments

Pragmatic Traction • 7

Posted on November 8, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List • John Sowa It’s good to remember that observation, perception itself, has an abductive character in Peirce’s analysis and induction for him is more a final testing than initial conception stage.  Yes, it’s wheels upon wheels but … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, Action, C.S. Peirce, Control, Cybernetics, Deduction, Definition, Determination, Fixation of Belief, Induction, Inference, Information, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Learning, Learning Theory, Logic, Logic of Science, Mathematics, Metaphysics, Normative Science, Observation, Peirce, Peirce's Categories, Perception, Phenomenology, Philosophy, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Recursion, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Volition | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Ask Meno Questions • Discussion 4

Posted on October 19, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: FB | Foundations of Mathematics • Oguzhan Kosar The questions raised under the heading of “Foundations of Mathematics” are generally considered to fall under the “Philosophy of Mathematics”, in particular, critical reflection on the possibility of mathematical knowledge and … Continue reading →

Posted in Anamnesis, Arete, C.S. Peirce, Descartes, Education, Epistemology, Eternal Return, Foundations of Mathematics, Infinity, Innate Idea, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Inquiry Into Inquiry, Knowledge, Learning, Locke, Logic, Mathematics, Medium = Message, Meno, Peirce, Philosophy of Mathematics, Plato, Pragmata, Pragmatism, Pythagoras, Recollection, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Socrates, Tabula Rasa, Teaching, Triadic Relations, Turing Test, Virtue | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Pragmatic Traction • 6

Posted on October 15, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List Discussion • GF • JFS When it comes to the relative contributions of phenomenology and mathematics to logic, I always find myself returning to the picture I drew once before from Peirce’s Syllabus, on the relationship of phenomenology and … Continue reading →

Posted in C.S. Peirce, Control, Cybernetics, Definition, Determination, Fixation of Belief, Information, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Logic, Logic of Science, Mathematics, Metaphysics, Normative Science, Peirce, Peirce's Categories, Phenomenology, Philosophy, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Volition | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 2 Comments

Pragmatic Traction • 5

Posted on September 28, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

☯   TAO   ☯ Trials And Outcomes Expression | Impression Effectors | Receptors Exertion | Reaction Conduct | Bearing Control | Observe Effect | Detect Poke | Peek Note | Note Pat | Apt | Tap Pragmatism makes thinking … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, C.S. Peirce, Control, Cybernetics, Deduction, Error, Error-Controlled Regulation, Feedback, Fixation of Belief, Hypothesis, Induction, Inference, Information, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Knowledge, Knowledge Representation, Learning, Learning Theory, Likelihood, Logic, Logic of Science, Logical Graphs, Peirce, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Pragmatic Information, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Scientific Inquiry, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Statistical Inference, Statistics, Uncertainty, Volition | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Pragmatic Traction • 4

Posted on September 27, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Oliver Maclaren • Statistics Without True Models Or Hypothesis Testing I once wrote a “pure empiricist” sequential learning program that took this sort of approach to the data in its input stream. Here is the manual, that will give … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, C.S. Peirce, Control, Cybernetics, Deduction, Error, Error-Controlled Regulation, Feedback, Fixation of Belief, Hypothesis, Induction, Inference, Information, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Knowledge, Knowledge Representation, Learning, Learning Theory, Likelihood, Logic, Logic of Science, Logical Graphs, Peirce, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Pragmatic Information, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Scientific Inquiry, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Statistical Inference, Statistics, Uncertainty | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Pragmatic Traction • 3

Posted on September 25, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Deborah G. Mayo • Revisiting Popper’s Demarcation of Science I think Peirce would say that any struggle to pass from the irritation of doubt toward the settlement of belief is a form of inquiry — it’s just that some … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, C.S. Peirce, Control, Cybernetics, Deborah G. Mayo, Deduction, Error, Error-Controlled Regulation, Feedback, Fixation of Belief, Hypothesis, Induction, Inference, Information, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Knowledge, Knowledge Representation, Learning, Learning Theory, Likelihood, Logic, Logic of Science, Peirce, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Pragmatic Information, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Scientific Inquiry, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Statistical Inference, Statistics, Uncertainty | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Pragmatic Traction • 2

Posted on September 16, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: FB | Ecology of Systems Thinking • Richard Saunders I’m about to be diverted for a couple of weeks but this is an ever-ongoing question so I know I’ll be coming back to it again.  The short shrift goes … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, C.S. Peirce, Control, Cybernetics, Deborah G. Mayo, Deduction, Error, Error-Controlled Regulation, Feedback, Fixation of Belief, Hypothesis, Induction, Inference, Information, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Knowledge, Knowledge Representation, Learning, Learning Theory, Likelihood, Logic, Logic of Science, Peirce, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Pragmatic Information, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Scientific Inquiry, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Statistical Inference, Statistics, Uncertainty | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Pragmatic Traction • 1

Posted on September 14, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Deborah G. Mayo • Peircean Induction and the Error-Correcting Thesis C.S. Peirce’s pragmatic maxim marks the place where the tire of theory meets the test track of experience — it tells us how general ideas are impacted by practical … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, C.S. Peirce, Control, Cybernetics, Deborah G. Mayo, Deduction, Error, Error-Controlled Regulation, Feedback, Fixation of Belief, Hypothesis, Induction, Inference, Information, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Knowledge, Knowledge Representation, Learning, Learning Theory, Likelihood, Logic, Logic of Science, Peirce, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Pragmatic Information, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Scientific Inquiry, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Statistical Inference, Statistics, Uncertainty | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

The Difference That Makes A Difference That Peirce Makes • 18

Posted on July 24, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peter Smith • Which Is The Quantifier? From a functional logic point of view logicians slipped a step backward when they passed from Peirce’s and to the current convention of using and for logical quantifiers.  There’s a rough indication … Continue reading →

Posted in C.S. Peirce, Category Theory, Complementarity, Duality, Formal Languages, Higher Order Propositions, Indicator Functions, Inquiry, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Peirce, Pragmatism, Predicate Calculus, Propositional Calculus, Propositions, Quantifiers, Relation Theory, Semiotics, Type Theory, Zeroth Order Logic | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment