Category Archives: Information

{ Information = Comprehension × Extension } • Discussion 4

Posted on July 1, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List • Jeffrey Brian Downard JBD quoting CSP: I restricted myself to terms, because at the time this chapter was first written (1867), I had not remarked that the whole doctrine of breadth and depth was equally applicable … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, Belief Fixation, C.S. Peirce, Comprehension, Deduction, Extension, Hypothesis, Icon Index Symbol, Induction, Inference, Information, Information = Comprehension × Extension, Inquiry, Intension, Logic, Logic of Science, Peirce, Peirce's Categories, Pragmatism, Scientific Method, Semiotic Information, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 9 Comments

{ Information = Comprehension × Extension } • Discussion 3

Posted on June 29, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List • John Sowa I gave Frederik Stjernfelt’s Natural Propositions a careful reading back when the Peirce List took it up.  The following archive links will take you to the topic thread and initial post. Peirce List • Frederik Stjernfelt … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, Belief Fixation, C.S. Peirce, Comprehension, Deduction, Extension, Hypothesis, Icon Index Symbol, Induction, Inference, Information, Information = Comprehension × Extension, Inquiry, Intension, Logic, Logic of Science, Peirce, Peirce's Categories, Pragmatism, Scientific Method, Semiotic Information, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 8 Comments

{ Information = Comprehension × Extension } • Discussion 2

Posted on June 28, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List • John Sowa JFS: A more fundamental term is proposition, which is informally defined as the “meaning” of a sentence.  That meaning is usually analyzed as comprehension (also known as intension) and extension. The easier-on-the-eyes blog copy of my … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, Belief Fixation, C.S. Peirce, Comprehension, Deduction, Extension, Hypothesis, Icon Index Symbol, Induction, Inference, Information, Information = Comprehension × Extension, Inquiry, Intension, Logic, Logic of Science, Peirce, Peirce's Categories, Pragmatism, Scientific Method, Semiotic Information, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 8 Comments

{ Information = Comprehension × Extension } • Discussion 1

Posted on June 26, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

A puzzle in Peirce I have puzzled over for as long as I can remember involves the relationship between his theory of signs, marking the characters of icons, indices, and symbols, and his theory of inquiry, bearing the three inferences … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, Belief Fixation, C.S. Peirce, Comprehension, Deduction, Extension, Hypothesis, Icon Index Symbol, Induction, Inference, Information, Information = Comprehension × Extension, Inquiry, Intension, Logic, Logic of Science, Peirce, Peirce's Categories, Pragmatism, Scientific Method, Semiotic Information, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 10 Comments

Triadic Forms of Constraint, Determination, Interaction • 3

Posted on April 24, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

In the beginning was the three-pointed star, One smile of light across the empty face; One bough of bone across the rooting air, The substance forked that marrowed the first sun; And, burning ciphers on the round of space, Heaven … Continue reading →

Posted in C.S. Peirce, Constraint, Determination, Discovery, Dyadic Relations, Fixation of Belief, Inference, Information, Inquiry, Intentional Objects, Intentionality, Law of Nature, Logic, Logic of Science, Objects Objectives Objectivity, Peirce, Philosophy, Pragmata, Pragmatism, Scientific Inquiry, Semeiosis, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Triadicity | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Triadic Forms of Constraint, Determination, Interaction • 2

Posted on April 23, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List Discussion • Gary Richmond Here’s one way of stating what I call a constraint: The set is constrained to a subset of the set Here’s one way of stating a triadic constraint: The set is a subset … Continue reading →

Posted in C.S. Peirce, Constraint, Determination, Discovery, Dyadic Relations, Fixation of Belief, Inference, Information, Inquiry, Intentional Objects, Intentionality, Law of Nature, Logic, Logic of Science, Objects Objectives Objectivity, Peirce, Philosophy, Pragmata, Pragmatism, Scientific Inquiry, Semeiosis, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Triadicity | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Triadic Forms of Constraint, Determination, Interaction • 1

Posted on April 23, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List Discussion • JA • GR • JA • JBD There are many places where Peirce uses the word object in the full pragmatic sense, so much so that it demands a very selective attention not to remark … Continue reading →

Posted in C.S. Peirce, Constraint, Determination, Discovery, Dyadic Relations, Fixation of Belief, Inference, Information, Inquiry, Intentional Objects, Intentionality, Law of Nature, Logic, Logic of Science, Objects Objectives Objectivity, Peirce, Philosophy, Pragmata, Pragmatism, Scientific Inquiry, Semeiosis, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Triadicity | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

The object of reasoning is to find out …

Posted on April 20, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

No longer wondered what I would do in life but defined my object. — C.S. Peirce (1861), “My Life, written for the Class-Book”, (CE 1, 3) The object of reasoning is to find out, from the consideration of what we already … Continue reading →

Posted in C.S. Peirce, Determination, Dyadic Relations, Fixation of Belief, Inference, Information, Inquiry, Intention, Intentional Contexts, Intentional Objects, Intentionality, Logic, Logic of Science, Objects Objectives Objectivity, Pragmata, Pragmatism, Purpose, Reasoning, Scientific Inquiry, Semiosis, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Triadicity | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

Pragmatic Truth • Discussion 12

Posted on March 28, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List Discussion • JFS • JFS • JAS • GF • JAS • GF I realize that iconolatry — just one of many forms of dyadic reductionism — runs too deep at present for most folks to appreciate this, … Continue reading →

Posted in Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Coherence, Concordance, Congruence, Consensus, Convergence, Correspondence, Dewey, Fixation of Belief, Information, Inquiry, John Dewey, Kant, Logic, Logic of Science, Method, Peirce, Philosophy, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Truth, Truth Theory, William James | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 5 Comments

Pragmatic Truth • Discussion 11

Posted on March 28, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List Discussion • CG • JA • CG • JA • CG • JA • CG One of the points I’ve been trying to make all along is that a person doesn’t normally need to make a working … Continue reading →

Posted in Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Coherence, Concordance, Congruence, Consensus, Convergence, Correspondence, Dewey, Fixation of Belief, Information, Inquiry, John Dewey, Kant, Logic, Logic of Science, Method, Peirce, Philosophy, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Truth, Truth Theory, William James | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 5 Comments