# Tag Archives: Inquiry

## Functional Logic • Inquiry and Analogy • 4

Inquiry and Analogy • Aristotle’s “Apagogy” • Abductive Reasoning Peirce’s notion of abductive reasoning is derived from Aristotle’s treatment of it in the Prior Analytics.  Aristotle’s discussion begins with an example which may seem incidental but the question and its … Continue reading

## Functional Logic • Inquiry and Analogy • 3

Inquiry and Analogy • Comparison of the Analyses The next two Figures will be of use when we turn to comparing the three types of inference as they appear in the respective analyses of Aristotle and Peirce. Types of Reasoning … Continue reading

## Functional Logic • Inquiry and Analogy • 2

Inquiry and Analogy • Three Types of Reasoning Types of Reasoning in C.S. Peirce Peirce gives one of his earliest treatments of the three types of reasoning in his Harvard Lectures of 1865 “On the Logic of Science”.  There he … Continue reading

## Functional Logic • Inquiry and Analogy • 1

Inquiry and Analogy • Three Types of Reasoning Types of Reasoning in Aristotle Figure 1 gives a quick overview of traditional terminology I’ll have occasion to refer to as discussion proceeds. Resources Logic Syllabus Boolean Function Boolean-Valued Function Logical Conjunction … Continue reading

## Charles Sanders Peirce, George Spencer Brown, and Me • 16

Re: Conceptual Graphs • Gary Zhu GZ: I’m quite confused on why people are interested in Laws of Form. What is LOF trying to do? Is it just rewriting logic or is there something more fundamental. e.g. a universal algebraic … Continue reading

## Functional Logic • Inquiry and Analogy • Preliminaries

Functional Logic • Inquiry and Analogy This report discusses C.S. Peirce’s treatment of analogy, placing it in relation to his overall theory of inquiry.  We begin by introducing three basic types of reasoning Peirce adopted from classical logic.  In Peirce’s analysis … Continue reading

## The Difference That Makes A Difference That Peirce Makes • 33

Re: Ontolog Forum • William Frank William Frank asked a question about propositional attitudes and presuppositions. WF: Are there any formal languages, such as Common Logic, that adequately represent statements about propositions — statements from which, in natural reasoning, one can … Continue reading

## Theme One Program • Discussion 5

Re: Peirce List • Jerry Chandler JC: This post [Theme One Program • Motivation 1] is so muddled that I gave up on a meaningful scientific interpretation of it. Dear Jerry, Thanks for the response. I heartily agree with the … Continue reading

## Theme One Program • Discussion 4

I’ve been going back and looking again at the problems and questions which nudged me into the computational sphere as a way of building our human capacities for inquiry, learning, and reasoning. One critical issue, you might even say bifurcation … Continue reading

## Conceptual Barriers • 4

Re: Conceptual Barriers • (1) • (2) • (3) Re: Peirce List • John Sowa • Gary Richmond • Robert Marty Dear Robert, I believe you have pointed to the crux of the matter. When I arrived on the campus … Continue reading