Re: Peirce List • Edwina Taborsky
Dear Edwina,
Analytic frameworks, our various theories of categories, sets, sorts, and types, have their uses but they tend to become à priori, autonomous, top-down, and top-heavy unless they are supported by a robust population of concrete examples arising in practical experience, one of the things the maxim of pragmatism advises us to remember. That is why Peirce’s tackling of information and inquiry is even-handed with respect to their extensional and intensional sides. And it’s why we need to pay attention when anomalies accumulate and the population of presenting cases rebels against the dictates of Procrustean predicates. Times like that tell us we may need to reconceive our customary conceptual frameworks.
As it happens, I’ve been thinking a lot lately about a particular class of sign sequences, namely, proofs in propositional calculus regarded as cases of sign process, or semiosis. Naturally I’ve been thinking of delving more deeply into Robert Marty’s work on paths through the lattice of sign classes but so far I’m still in the early stages of that venture.
For what they’re worth, here are my blog posts so far on Proof As Semiosis.
Resources
cc: Cybernetics • Ontolog Forum • Peirce List • Structural Modeling • Systems Science
as 
and the 
as 
That gave us a text string in teletype parentheses and proposition letters, formatted two ways below.
tells us to ascend the first edge, the next 
from the string checks with the letter 
from the string checks with the letter 
on the string entitles us to descend an edge and reading another 
for the logical negation 
for the logical conjunction of propositions 
enables writing the theorem in the following in-line and lispish ways.
Inquiry Into Inquiry 