Category Archives: Logic of Science

The Difference That Makes A Difference That Peirce Makes • 19

Posted on November 18, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List • John Sowa Peirce uses the word “formal” in a sense that gives it normative force.  It is this sense in which he defines logic as formal semiotic. But taking “formal” in a normative sense weighs against John … Continue reading →

Posted in C.S. Peirce, Descriptive Science, Fixation of Belief, Formal Systems, Information, Inquiry, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Logic of Science, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Normative Science, Pragmatic Maxim, Relation Theory, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Visualization | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

Pragmatic Traction • 7

Posted on November 8, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List • John Sowa It’s good to remember that observation, perception itself, has an abductive character in Peirce’s analysis and induction for him is more a final testing than initial conception stage.  Yes, it’s wheels upon wheels but … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, Action, C.S. Peirce, Control, Cybernetics, Deduction, Definition, Determination, Fixation of Belief, Induction, Inference, Information, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Learning, Learning Theory, Logic, Logic of Science, Mathematics, Metaphysics, Normative Science, Observation, Peirce, Peirce's Categories, Perception, Phenomenology, Philosophy, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Recursion, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Volition | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Pragmatic Traction • 6

Posted on October 15, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List Discussion • GF • JFS When it comes to the relative contributions of phenomenology and mathematics to logic, I always find myself returning to the picture I drew once before from Peirce’s Syllabus, on the relationship of phenomenology and … Continue reading →

Posted in C.S. Peirce, Control, Cybernetics, Definition, Determination, Fixation of Belief, Information, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Logic, Logic of Science, Mathematics, Metaphysics, Normative Science, Peirce, Peirce's Categories, Phenomenology, Philosophy, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Volition | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 2 Comments

Pragmatic Traction • 5

Posted on September 28, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

☯   TAO   ☯ Trials And Outcomes Expression | Impression Effectors | Receptors Exertion | Reaction Conduct | Bearing Control | Observe Effect | Detect Poke | Peek Note | Note Pat | Apt | Tap Pragmatism makes thinking … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, C.S. Peirce, Control, Cybernetics, Deduction, Error, Error-Controlled Regulation, Feedback, Fixation of Belief, Hypothesis, Induction, Inference, Information, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Knowledge, Knowledge Representation, Learning, Learning Theory, Likelihood, Logic, Logic of Science, Logical Graphs, Peirce, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Pragmatic Information, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Scientific Inquiry, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Statistical Inference, Statistics, Uncertainty, Volition | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Pragmatic Traction • 4

Posted on September 27, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Oliver Maclaren • Statistics Without True Models Or Hypothesis Testing I once wrote a “pure empiricist” sequential learning program that took this sort of approach to the data in its input stream. Here is the manual, that will give … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, C.S. Peirce, Control, Cybernetics, Deduction, Error, Error-Controlled Regulation, Feedback, Fixation of Belief, Hypothesis, Induction, Inference, Information, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Knowledge, Knowledge Representation, Learning, Learning Theory, Likelihood, Logic, Logic of Science, Logical Graphs, Peirce, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Pragmatic Information, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Scientific Inquiry, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Statistical Inference, Statistics, Uncertainty | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Pragmatic Traction • 3

Posted on September 25, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Deborah G. Mayo • Revisiting Popper’s Demarcation of Science I think Peirce would say that any struggle to pass from the irritation of doubt toward the settlement of belief is a form of inquiry — it’s just that some … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, C.S. Peirce, Control, Cybernetics, Deborah G. Mayo, Deduction, Error, Error-Controlled Regulation, Feedback, Fixation of Belief, Hypothesis, Induction, Inference, Information, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Knowledge, Knowledge Representation, Learning, Learning Theory, Likelihood, Logic, Logic of Science, Peirce, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Pragmatic Information, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Scientific Inquiry, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Statistical Inference, Statistics, Uncertainty | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Pragmatic Traction • 2

Posted on September 16, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: FB | Ecology of Systems Thinking • Richard Saunders I’m about to be diverted for a couple of weeks but this is an ever-ongoing question so I know I’ll be coming back to it again.  The short shrift goes … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, C.S. Peirce, Control, Cybernetics, Deborah G. Mayo, Deduction, Error, Error-Controlled Regulation, Feedback, Fixation of Belief, Hypothesis, Induction, Inference, Information, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Knowledge, Knowledge Representation, Learning, Learning Theory, Likelihood, Logic, Logic of Science, Peirce, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Pragmatic Information, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Scientific Inquiry, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Statistical Inference, Statistics, Uncertainty | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Pragmatic Traction • 1

Posted on September 14, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Deborah G. Mayo • Peircean Induction and the Error-Correcting Thesis C.S. Peirce’s pragmatic maxim marks the place where the tire of theory meets the test track of experience — it tells us how general ideas are impacted by practical … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, C.S. Peirce, Control, Cybernetics, Deborah G. Mayo, Deduction, Error, Error-Controlled Regulation, Feedback, Fixation of Belief, Hypothesis, Induction, Inference, Information, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Knowledge, Knowledge Representation, Learning, Learning Theory, Likelihood, Logic, Logic of Science, Peirce, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Pragmatic Information, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Scientific Inquiry, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Statistical Inference, Statistics, Uncertainty | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

{ Information = Comprehension × Extension } • Discussion 6

Posted on July 2, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List • JA • JFS • JA What interests me about Peirce’s first articulation of the “laws of information” in his early lectures on the “Logic of Science” is how the primal twins of Inquiry and Semiotics nestle … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, Belief Fixation, C.S. Peirce, Comprehension, Deduction, Extension, Hypothesis, Icon Index Symbol, Induction, Inference, Information, Information = Comprehension × Extension, Inquiry, Intension, Logic, Logic of Science, Peirce, Peirce's Categories, Pragmatism, Scientific Method, Semiotic Information, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 9 Comments

{ Information = Comprehension × Extension } • Discussion 5

Posted on July 2, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List • John Sowa What you say goes to the heart of a problem I saw in Natural Propositions, whether it was Peirce’s account or Stjernfelt’s analysis I did not have time to decide as the schedule of … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, Belief Fixation, C.S. Peirce, Comprehension, Deduction, Extension, Hypothesis, Icon Index Symbol, Induction, Inference, Information, Information = Comprehension × Extension, Inquiry, Intension, Logic, Logic of Science, Peirce, Peirce's Categories, Pragmatism, Scientific Method, Semiotic Information, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 9 Comments