Tag Archives: Aristotle

Continuity, Generality, Infinity, Law, Synechism • 1

The concept of continuity Peirce highlights in his synechism is a logical principle somewhat more general than the concepts of either mathematical or physical continua. Peirce’s concept of continuity is better understood as a concept of lawful regularity or parametric … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Cardinality, Constraint, Continua, Continuity, Discreteness, Discretion, Epistemology, Generality, Infinity, Knowledge, Logic, Logic of Science, Mathematical Models, Mathematics, Natural Law, Physics, Quanta, Quantum Mechanics, Synechism, Topology | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 10 Comments

Character, Action, Discretion

Character is revealed by action. ~~ Aristotle Action is discrete. ~~ Planck ———————————————————- The better part of valour is discretion. ~~ Shakespeare

Posted in Action, Anthem, Arete, Aristotle, Character, Discretion, Planck, Shakespeare, Syllogism, Valor, Valour, Virtue | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Doubt, Uncertainty, Dispersion, Entropy • 1

Re: Peirce List • Stephen Rose Just a note to anchor a series of recurring thoughts that come to mind in relation to a Peirce List discussion of entropy etc., but I won’t have much to say on the bio-chemico-physico-thermo-dynamic … Continue reading →

Posted in Animata, Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Cybernetics, Differential Logic, Dispersion, Doubt, Entropy, Information, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Inquiry Into Inquiry, Peirce, Semiotic Information, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Uncertainty | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Precursors Of Category Theory • 3

Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law. Immanuel Kant (1785) Precursors Of Category Theory Peirce Cued by Kant’s idea on the function of concepts in … Continue reading →

Posted in Abstraction, Ackermann, Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Carnap, Category Theory, Hilbert, Kant, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Mathematics, Peirce, Peirce's Categories, Relation Theory, Saunders Mac Lane, Sign Relations, Type Theory | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 8 Comments

Precursors Of Category Theory • 2

Thanks to art, instead of seeing one world only, our own, we see that world multiply itself and we have at our disposal as many worlds as there are original artists … ☙ Marcel Proust Precursors Of Category Theory When … Continue reading →

Posted in Abstraction, Ackermann, Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Carnap, Category Theory, Hilbert, Kant, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Mathematics, Peirce, Peirce's Categories, Relation Theory, Saunders Mac Lane, Sign Relations, Type Theory | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 6 Comments

Precursors Of Category Theory • 1

A few years back I began a sketch on the Precursors of Category Theory, aiming to trace the continuities of the category concept from Aristotle, thorough Kant and Peirce, Hilbert and Ackermann, to contemporary mathematical use.  Perhaps a few will … Continue reading →

Posted in Abstraction, Ackermann, Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Carnap, Category Theory, Hilbert, Kant, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Mathematics, Peirce, Peirce's Categories, Relation Theory, Saunders Mac Lane, Sign Relations, Type Theory | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 10 Comments

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 3

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson A more complete excerpt and the translator’s notes are very helpful here. A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss ;  for that which people … Continue reading →

Posted in Analogy, Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Icon Index Symbol, Induction, Inquiry, Likelihood, Likely Story, Likeness, Logic, Mathematics, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson I’m still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle’s account relates to Peirce’s usage, though I’m pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle’s usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort … Continue reading →

Posted in Analogy, Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Icon Index Symbol, Induction, Inquiry, Likelihood, Likely Story, Likeness, Logic, Mathematics, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1

Re: Peirce List • Benjamin Udell • Michael Shapiro Here’s a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense — A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss;  for … Continue reading →

Posted in Analogy, Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Icon Index Symbol, Induction, Inquiry, Likelihood, Likely Story, Likeness, Logic, Mathematics, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 2 Comments

“What we’ve got here is (a) failure to communicate” • 6

Excerpt from Warren S. McCulloch, “What Is a Number, that a Man May Know It, and a Man, that He May Know a Number?” (1960) Please remember that we are not now concerned with the physics and chemistry, the anatomy … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, Amphecks, Aristotle, Automata, Boolean Algebra, Boolean Functions, C.S. Peirce, Combinatorics, Deduction, Duns Scotus, Induction, Leibniz, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Mathematics, Neural Models, Ockham, Peirce, Propositional Logic, Psychons, Relation Theory, Sources, Triadic Relations, Warren S. McCulloch, William James | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment