Peirce’s 1870 “Logic of Relatives” • Selection 4

Here is the next part of §3. Application of the Algebraic Signs to Logic.

Peirce’s 1870 “Logic of Relatives” • Selection 4

The Signs for Addition

The sign of addition is taken by Boole so that

x + y

denotes everything denoted by x, and, besides, everything denoted by y.

Thus

\mathrm{m} + \mathrm{w}

denotes all men, and, besides, all women.

This signification for this sign is needed for connecting the notation of logic with that of the theory of probabilities.  But if there is anything which is denoted by both terms of the sum, the latter no longer stands for any logical term on account of its implying that the objects denoted by one term are to be taken besides the objects denoted by the other.

For example,

\mathrm{f} + \mathrm{u}

means all Frenchmen besides all violinists, and, therefore, considered as a logical term, implies that all French violinists are besides themselves.

For this reason alone, in a paper which is published in the Proceedings of the Academy for March 17, 1867, I preferred to take as the regular addition of logic a non-invertible process, such that

\mathrm{m} ~+\!\!,~ \mathrm{b}

stands for all men and black things, without any implication that the black things are to be taken besides the men;  and the study of the logic of relatives has supplied me with other weighty reasons for the same determination.

Since the publication of that paper, I have found that Mr. W. Stanley Jevons, in a tract called Pure Logic, or the Logic of Quality [1864], had anticipated me in substituting the same operation for Boole’s addition, although he rejects Boole’s operation entirely and writes the new one with a  +  sign while withholding from it the name of addition.

It is plain that both the regular non-invertible addition and the invertible addition satisfy the absolute conditions.  But the notation has other recommendations.  The conception of taking together involved in these processes is strongly analogous to that of summation, the sum of 2 and 5, for example, being the number of a collection which consists of a collection of two and a collection of five.  Any logical equation or inequality in which no operation but addition is involved may be converted into a numerical equation or inequality by substituting the numbers of the several terms for the terms themselves — provided all the terms summed are mutually exclusive.

Addition being taken in this sense, nothing is to be denoted by zero, for then

x ~+\!\!,~ 0 ~=~ x

whatever is denoted by x;  and this is the definition of zero.  This interpretation is given by Boole, and is very neat, on account of the resemblance between the ordinary conception of zero and that of nothing, and because we shall thus have

[0] ~=~ 0.

(Peirce, CP 3.67)

A wealth of issues arises here I hope to take up in greater depth at a later point, but for the moment I shall be able to mention only the barest sample of them in passing.

The two papers preceding this one in CP 3 are Peirce’s papers of March and September 1867 in the Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, titled “On an Improvement in Boole’s Calculus of Logic” and “Upon the Logic of Mathematics”, respectively.  Among other things, these two papers provide us with further clues about the motivating considerations which brought Peirce to introduce the “number of a term” function, signified here by square brackets.  I have already quoted from the “Logic of Mathematics” paper in a related connection.  Here are the links to those excerpts:

In setting up a correspondence between “letters” and “numbers”, Peirce constructs a structure-preserving map from a logical domain to a numerical domain.  That he does this deliberately is evidenced by the care that he takes with the conditions under which the chosen aspects of structure are preserved, along with his recognition of the critical fact that zeroes are preserved by the mapping.

Incidentally, Peirce appears to have an inkling of the problems that would later be caused by using the plus sign for inclusive disjunction, but his advice was overridden by the dialects of applied logic which developed in various communities, retarding the exchange of information among engineering, mathematical, and philosophical specialties all throughout the subsequent century.

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Peirce’s 1870 “Logic of Relatives” • Selection 3

We move on to the next part of §3. Application of the Algebraic Signs to Logic.

Peirce’s 1870 “Logic of Relatives” • Selection 3

The Signs of Inclusion, Equality, Etc.

I shall follow Boole in taking the sign of equality to signify identity.  Thus, if \mathrm{v} denotes the Vice-President of the United States, and \mathrm{p} the President of the Senate of the United States,

\mathrm{v} = \mathrm{p}

means that every Vice-President of the United States is President of the Senate, and every President of the United States Senate is Vice-President.

The sign “less than” is to be so taken that

\mathrm{f} < \mathrm{m}

means that every Frenchman is a man, but there are men besides Frenchmen.  Drobisch has used this sign in the same sense.  It will follow from these significations of  =  and  <  that the sign  -\!\!\!<  (or \leqq, “as small as”) will mean “is”.  Thus,

\mathrm{f} ~-\!\!\!< \mathrm{m}

means “every Frenchman is a man”, without saying whether there are any other men or not.  So,

\mathit{m} ~-\!\!\!< \mathit{l}

will mean that every mother of anything is a lover of the same thing;  although this interpretation in some degree anticipates a convention to be made further on.  These significations of  =  and  <  plainly conform to the indispensable conditions.  Upon the transitive character of these relations the syllogism depends, for by virtue of it, from

\mathrm{f} ~-\!\!\!< \mathrm{m}
and \mathrm{m} ~-\!\!\!< \mathrm{a}
we can infer that \mathrm{f} ~-\!\!\!< \mathrm{a}

that is, from every Frenchman being a man and every man being an animal, that every Frenchman is an animal.

But not only do the significations of  =  and  <  here adopted fulfill all absolute requirements, but they have the supererogatory virtue of being very nearly the same as the common significations.  Equality is, in fact, nothing but the identity of two numbers;  numbers that are equal are those which are predicable of the same collections, just as terms that are identical are those which are predicable of the same classes.

So, to write 5 < 7 is to say that 5 is part of 7, just as to write \mathrm{f} < \mathrm{m} is to say that Frenchmen are part of men.  Indeed, if \mathrm{f} < \mathrm{m}, then the number of Frenchmen is less than the number of men, and if \mathrm{v} = \mathrm{p}, then the number of Vice-Presidents is equal to the number of Presidents of the Senate;  so that the numbers may always be substituted for the terms themselves, in case no signs of operation occur in the equations or inequalities.

(Peirce, CP 3.66)

The quantifier mapping from terms to numbers that Peirce signifies by means of the square bracket notation [t] has one of its principal uses in providing a basis for the computation of frequencies, probabilities, and all the other statistical measures constructed from them, and thus in affording a “principle of correspondence” between probability theory and its limiting case in the forms of logic.

This brings us once again to the relativity of contingency and necessity, as one way of approaching necessity is through the avenue of probability, describing necessity as a probability of 1, but the whole apparatus of probability theory only figures in if it is cast against the backdrop of probability space axioms, the reference class of distributions, and the sample space that we cannot help but abduce on the scene of observations.  Aye, there’s the snake eyes.  And with them we can see that there is always an irreducible quantum of facticity to all our necessities.  More plainly spoken, it takes a fairly complex conceptual infrastructure just to begin speaking of probabilities, and this setting can only be set up by means of abductive, fallible, hypothetical, and inherently risky mental acts.

Pragmatic thinking is the logic of abduction, which is another way of saying it addresses the question:  What may be hoped?  We have to face the possibility it may be just as impossible to speak of absolute identity with any hope of making practical philosophical sense as it is to speak of absolute simultaneity with any hope of making operational physical sense.

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Peirce’s 1870 “Logic of Relatives” • Selection 2

We continue with §3. Application of the Algebraic Signs to Logic.

Peirce’s 1870 “Logic of Relatives” • Selection 2

Numbers Corresponding to Letters

I propose to use the term “universe” to denote that class of individuals about which alone the whole discourse is understood to run.  The universe, therefore, in this sense, as in Mr. De Morgan’s, is different on different occasions.  In this sense, moreover, discourse may run upon something which is not a subjective part of the universe;  for instance, upon the qualities or collections of the individuals it contains.

I propose to assign to all logical terms, numbers;  to an absolute term, the number of individuals it denotes;  to a relative term, the average number of things so related to one individual.  Thus in a universe of perfect men (\mathrm{men}), the number of “tooth of” would be 32.  The number of a relative with two correlates would be the average number of things so related to a pair of individuals;  and so on for relatives of higher numbers of correlates.  I propose to denote the number of a logical term by enclosing the term in square brackets, thus, [t].

(Peirce, CP 3.65)

Peirce’s remarks at CP 3.65 are so replete with remarkable ideas, some of them so taken for granted in mathematical discourse as usually to escape explicit mention, others so suggestive of things to come in a future remote from his time of writing, and yet so smoothly slipped into the stream of thought that it’s all too easy to overlook their significance — that all I can do to highlight their impact is to dress them up in different words, whose main advantage is being more jarring to the mind’s sensibilities.

  • Peirce’s mapping of letters to numbers, or logical terms to mathematical quantities, is the very core of what quantification theory is all about, definitely more to the point than the mere “innovation” of using distinctive symbols for the so-called quantifiers.
  • The mapping of logical terms to numerical measures, to express it in current language, would probably be recognizable as some kind of morphism or functor from a logical domain to a quantitative co-domain.
  • Notice that Peirce follows the mathematician’s usual practice, then and now, of making the status of being an individual or a universal relative to a discourse in progress.
  • It is worth noting that Peirce takes the plural denotation of terms for granted, or what’s the number of a term for, if it could not vary apart from being one or nil?
  • I also observe that Peirce takes the individual objects of a particular universe of discourse in a generative way, as opposed to a totalizing way, and thus these contingent individuals afford us with a basis for talking freely about collections, constructions, properties, qualities, subsets, and higher types built on them.

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Peirce’s 1870 “Logic of Relatives” • Selection 1

We pick up the text at §3. Application of the Algebraic Signs to Logic.

Peirce’s 1870 “Logic of Relatives” • Selection 1

Use of the Letters

The letters of the alphabet will denote logical signs.

Now logical terms are of three grand classes.

The first embraces those whose logical form involves only the conception of quality, and which therefore represent a thing simply as “a ──”.  These discriminate objects in the most rudimentary way, which does not involve any consciousness of discrimination.  They regard an object as it is in itself as such (quale);  for example, as horse, tree, or man.  These are absolute terms.

The second class embraces terms whose logical form involves the conception of relation, and which require the addition of another term to complete the denotation.  These discriminate objects with a distinct consciousness of discrimination.  They regard an object as over against another, that is as relative; as father of, lover of, or servant of.  These are simple relative terms.

The third class embraces terms whose logical form involves the conception of bringing things into relation, and which require the addition of more than one term to complete the denotation.  They discriminate not only with consciousness of discrimination, but with consciousness of its origin.  They regard an object as medium or third between two others, that is as conjugative;  as giver of ── to ──, or buyer of ── for ── from ──.  These may be termed conjugative terms.

The conjugative term involves the conception of third, the relative that of second or other, the absolute term simply considers an object.  No fourth class of terms exists involving the conception of fourth, because when that of third is introduced, since it involves the conception of bringing objects into relation, all higher numbers are given at once, inasmuch as the conception of bringing objects into relation is independent of the number of members of the relationship.  Whether this reason for the fact that there is no fourth class of terms fundamentally different from the third is satisfactory of not, the fact itself is made perfectly evident by the study of the logic of relatives.

(Peirce, CP 3.63)

One thing that strikes me about the above passage is a pattern of argument I can recognize as invoking a closure principle.  This is a figure of reasoning Peirce uses in three other places:  his discussion of continuous predicates, his definition of a sign relation, and his formulation of the pragmatic maxim itself.

One might also call attention to the following two statements:

Now logical terms are of three grand classes.

No fourth class of terms exists involving the conception of fourth, because when that of third is introduced, since it involves the conception of bringing objects into relation, all higher numbers are given at once, inasmuch as the conception of bringing objects into relation is independent of the number of members of the relationship.

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Peirce’s 1870 “Logic of Relatives” • Preliminaries

In the beginning was the three-pointed star,
One smile of light across the empty face;
One bough of bone across the rooting air,
The substance forked that marrowed the first sun;
And, burning ciphers on the round of space,
Heaven and hell mixed as they spun.

Dylan Thomas • In The Beginning

I need to return to my study of Peirce’s 1870 Logic of Relatives, and I thought it might be more pleasant to do that on my blog than to hermit away on the wiki where I last left off.

Peirce’s 1870 “Logic of Relatives” • Part 1

Peirce’s text employs lower case letters for logical terms of general reference and upper case letters for logical terms of individual reference.  General terms fall into types, namely, absolute terms, dyadic relative terms, and higher adic relative terms, and Peirce employs different typefaces to distinguish these.  The following Tables indicate the typefaces used in the text below for Peirce’s examples of general terms.

Absolute Terms (Monadic Relatives)

Simple Relative Terms (Dyadic Relatives)

Conjugative Terms (Higher Adic Relatives)

Individual terms are taken to denote individual entities falling under a general term.  Peirce uses upper case Roman letters for individual terms, for example, the individual horses \mathrm{H}, \mathrm{H}^{\prime}, \mathrm{H}^{\prime\prime} falling under the general term \mathrm{h} for horse.

The path to understanding Peirce’s system and its wider implications for logic can be smoothed by paraphrasing his notations in a variety of contemporary mathematical formalisms, while preserving the semantics as much as possible.  Remaining faithful to Peirce’s orthography while adding parallel sets of stylistic conventions will, however, demand close attention to typography-in-context.  Current style sheets for mathematical texts specify italics for mathematical variables, with upper case letters for sets and lower case letters for individuals.  So we need to keep an eye out for the difference between the individual \mathrm{X} of the genus \mathrm{x} and the element x of the set X as we pass between the two styles of text.

References

  • Peirce, C.S. (1870), “Description of a Notation for the Logic of Relatives, Resulting from an Amplification of the Conceptions of Boole’s Calculus of Logic”, Memoirs of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 9, 317–378, 26 January 1870.  Reprinted, Collected Papers (CP 3.45–149), Chronological Edition (CE 2, 359–429).  Online (1) (2) (3).
  • Peirce, C.S., Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, vols. 1–6, Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (eds.), vols. 7–8, Arthur W. Burks (ed.), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1931–1935, 1958.  Cited as (CP volume.paragraph).
  • Peirce, C.S., Writings of Charles S. Peirce : A Chronological Edition, Peirce Edition Project (eds.), Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN, 1981–.  Cited as (CE volume, page).

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All Process, No Paradox • 6

Re: R.J. Lipton • Anti-Social Networks
Re: Lou Kauffman • Iterants, Imaginaries, Matrices

Comments I made elsewhere about computer science and (anti-)social networks have a connection with the work in progress on this thread, so it may steal a march to append them here.

Comment 1

I have been interested for a long time now in using graphs to do logic.  For that you need more than positive links — negative relations are more generative than positive relations.  The logical situation is analogous to social networks where people can “unlike” or “¬like” other people, or website networks where the information at one node may contradict the information at another node.  In my pursuits it turns out that particular species of graph-theoretic “cacti” are much more useful than the garden variety trees and unsigned graphs.

Comment 2

For what it’s worth, here is my exposition of “painted cacti” and their application to propositional calculus.

A painted cactus is a rooted cactus with any number of symbols from a finite alphabet attached to each node.  In their ordinary logical interpretations these symbols (“paints”) stand for boolean variables.

Triangles are interesting in computational contexts because they arise in case-breakdown expressions.  In one of the common interpretations of cactus graphs, a rooted triangular lobe says the values of the two non-root nodes are logically inequivalent.

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Posted in Algorithms, Amphecks, Boolean Algebra, Boolean Functions, C.S. Peirce, Cactus Graphs, Cybernetics, Differential Logic, Graph Theory, Laws of Form, Logic, Logical Graphs, Lou Kauffman, Mathematics, Minimal Negation Operators, Painted Cacti, Paradox, Peirce, Process Thinking, Propositional Calculus, Spencer Brown, Systems, Time | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 10 Comments

All Process, No Paradox • 5

In the midst of this strife, whereat the halls of Ilúvatar shook and a tremor ran out into the silences yet unmoved, Ilúvatar arose a third time, and his face was terrible to behold.  Then he raised up both his hands, and in one chord, deeper than the Abyss, higher than the Firmament, piercing as the light of the eye of Ilúvatar, the Music ceased.

Tolkien • Ainulindalë

Re: Objects, Models, Theories • (1) • (2)
Re: Peirce List (1) (2) • Helmut Raulien (1) (2)

For continuity’s sake — as I try to recover my train of thought from the spin-offs of the solstice roundhouse — I’m recycling my replies to a comment by Helmut Raulien on the Peirce List which raised a host of questions about Peirce’s categories, logic, and semiotics in the light of Spencer Brown’s Laws of Form.

Comment 1

George Spencer Brown’s Laws of Form tends to be loved XOR hated by most folks, with few coming down in between.  I ran across the book early in my undergrad years, shortly after encountering C.S. Peirce, so I recognized the way it revived Peirce’s logical graphs, emphasizing the entitative interpretation of the abstract formal calculus immanent in Peirce’s “Alpha” graphs.  It took me a decade to gain a modicum of clarity about all that “imaginary truth value” and “re-entry” folderol.  I’ll say some things about that later on.

Comment 2

I mulled the matter over for a fair spell of days and nights and decided it wouldn’t be good to jump into the middle of the muddle about re-entry and imaginary truth values right off the bat, that it would be better in the long run to get a solid grip on what is going on with the propositional level of Peirce’s logical graphs and how Spencer Brown’s elaborations can be seen to manifest the same spirit of reasoning, if they are read the right way.  Toward that end I’ll append a list of resources to break the ice on this approach.

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Posted in Animata, C.S. Peirce, Category Theory, Cybernetics, Differential Logic, Laws of Form, Logic, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Paradox, Peirce, Process, Semiotics, Spencer Brown, Systems Theory, Tertium Quid, Time, Tolkien | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 9 Comments

All Process, No Paradox • 4

Thus began the Days of the Bliss of Valinor;
and thus began also the Count of Time.

Tolkien • Quenta Silmarillion

While looking for something else on the web, I ran across an old note I had written in reply to an inquiry on the Conceptual Graphs List, and it seemed to express one of the points of the present thesis in a fairly clear fashion, so here’s the part I found fit to revive.

Time Representation

A point of view arising from fundamental physical considerations makes the concept of Process more fundamental than the concept of Time, since references to a time parameter are simply references to a process taken as standard, in other words, a clock.

We can always develop another “naive physics”, natural language “tense logic”, or implicit psychological theory of time, and maybe that’s all we need in particular settings, but if we push for a deeper logical analysis of timed processes themselves then we need a logical framework capable of dealing with relations between systems which undergo changes in their properties, as described by logical statements.

That is the impulse motivating Differential Logic.  As it turns out, Peirce’s way of doing logic, especially in graphical form, is naturally adapted to dealing with change and difference in logical form.

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All Process, No Paradox • 3

Consider what effects that might conceivably
have practical bearings you conceive the
objects of your conception to have.  Then,
your conception of those effects is the
whole of your conception of the object.

Charles S. Peirce • “Issues of Pragmaticism”

Re: Peirce List • Paul Eduardo

A riddle is a description of something, typically in metaphorical, oblique, and very partial terms, from which the respondent must abduce the identity of the thing described.  One of the interesting things about Gollum’s riddle is the pragmatic way he describes the object of his conception in terms of its effects on the contents of a whole universe of discourse.  If we weren’t at hazard for being devoured ourselves, we’d be at leisure to sit down and work out a logical analysis of those effects.  There are a few fine points we’d have to settle, like when he says this thing devours all things — Does it devour itself or other things only?

I meant to write more, but it’s later than I thought it would be by now …

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All Process, No Paradox • 2

These are the forms of time, which imitates eternity and revolves according to a law of number.

Plato • Timaeus

Re: Lou Kauffman • Iterants, Imaginaries, Matrices

As serendipity would have it, Lou Kauffman, who knows a lot about the lines of inquiry Charles Sanders Peirce and George Spencer Brown pursued into graphical syntaxes for logic, just last month opened a blog and his very first post touched on perennial questions of logic and time — Logos and Chronos — puzzling the wits of everyone who has thought about them for as long as anyone can remember.  Just locally and recently these questions have arisen in the following contexts:

Kauffman’s treatment of logic, paradox, time, and imaginary truth values led me to make the following comments I think are very close to what I’d been struggling to say before.

Let me get some notational matters out of the way before continuing.

I use \mathbb{B} for a generic 2-point set, usually \{ 0, 1 \} and typically but not always interpreted for logic so that 0 = \mathrm{false} and 1 = \mathrm{true}.  I use “teletype” parentheses \texttt{(} \ldots \texttt{)} for negation, so that \texttt{(} x \texttt{)} = \lnot x for x ~\text{in}~ \mathbb{B}.  Later on I’ll be using teletype format lists \texttt{(} x_1 \texttt{,} \ldots \texttt{,} x_k \texttt{)} for minimal negation operators.

As long as we’re reading x as a boolean variable (x \in \mathbb{B}) the equation x = \texttt{(} x \texttt{)} is not paradoxical but simply false.  As an algebraic structure \mathbb{B} can be extended in many ways but it remains a separate question what sort of application, if any, such extensions might have to the normative science of logic.

On the other hand, the assignment statement x := \texttt{(} x \texttt{)} makes perfect sense in computational contexts.  The effect of the assignment operation on the value of the variable x is commonly expressed in time series notation as x' = \texttt{(} x \texttt{)} and the same change is expressed even more succinctly by defining \mathrm{d}x = x' - x and writing \mathrm{d}x = 1.

Now suppose we are observing the time evolution of a system X with a boolean state variable x : X \to \mathbb{B} and what we observe is the following time series.

\begin{array}{c|c}  t & x \\  \hline  0 & 0 \\  1 & 1 \\  2 & 0 \\  3 & 1 \\  4 & 0 \\  5 & 1 \\  6 & 0 \\  7 & 1 \\  8 & 0 \\  9 & 1 \\  \ldots & \ldots  \end{array}

Computing the first differences we get:

\begin{array}{c|cc}  t & x & \mathrm{d}x \\  \hline  0 & 0 & 1 \\  1 & 1 & 1 \\  2 & 0 & 1 \\  3 & 1 & 1 \\  4 & 0 & 1 \\  5 & 1 & 1 \\  6 & 0 & 1 \\  7 & 1 & 1 \\  8 & 0 & 1 \\  9 & 1 & 1 \\  \ldots & \ldots & \ldots  \end{array}

Computing the second differences we get:

\begin{array}{c|cccc}  t & x & \mathrm{d}x & \mathrm{d}^2 x & \ldots \\  \hline  0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & \ldots \\  1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & \ldots \\  2 & 0 & 1 & 0 & \ldots \\  3 & 1 & 1 & 0 & \ldots \\  4 & 0 & 1 & 0 & \ldots \\  5 & 1 & 1 & 0 & \ldots \\  6 & 0 & 1 & 0 & \ldots \\  7 & 1 & 1 & 0 & \ldots \\  8 & 0 & 1 & 0 & \ldots \\  9 & 1 & 1 & 0 & \ldots \\  \ldots & \ldots & \ldots & \ldots & \ldots  \end{array}

This leads to thinking of the system X as having an extended state (x, \mathrm{d}x, \mathrm{d}^2 x, \ldots, \mathrm{d}^k x), and this additional language gives us the facility of describing state transitions in terms of the various orders of differences.  For example, the rule x' = \texttt{(} x \texttt{)} can now be expressed by the rule \mathrm{d}x = 1.

The following article has a few more examples along these lines.

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Posted in Animata, Boolean Functions, C.S. Peirce, Cybernetics, Differential Logic, Discrete Dynamics, Laws of Form, Logic, Logical Graphs, Lou Kauffman, Mathematics, Paradox, Peirce, Plato, Process, Spencer Brown, Timaeus, Time | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 11 Comments