Precursors Of Category Theory • 2

Thanks to art, instead of seeing one world only, our own, we see that world multiply itself and we have at our disposal as many worlds as there are original artists …

☙ Marcel Proust

Precursors Of Category Theory

When it comes to looking for the continuities of the category concept across different systems and systematizers, we don’t expect to find their kinship in the names or numbers of categories, since those are legion and their divisions deployed on widely different planes of abstraction, but in their common function.

Aristotle

Things are equivocally named, when they have the name only in common, the definition (or statement of essence) corresponding with the name being different.  For instance, while a man and a portrait can properly both be called animals (ζωον), these are equivocally named.  For they have the name only in common, the definitions (or statements of essence) corresponding with the name being different.  For if you are asked to define what the being an animal means in the case of the man and the portrait, you give in either case a definition appropriate to that case alone.

Things are univocally named, when not only they bear the same name but the name means the same in each case — has the same definition corresponding.  Thus a man and an ox are called animals.  The name is the same in both cases;  so also the statement of essence.  For if you are asked what is meant by their both of them being called animals, you give that particular name in both cases the same definition.

— Aristotle, Categories, 1.1a1–12.

Translator’s Note.  “Ζωον in Greek had two meanings, that is to say, living creature, and, secondly, a figure or image in painting, embroidery, sculpture.  We have no ambiguous noun.  However, we use the word ‘living’ of portraits to mean ‘true to life’.”

In the logic of Aristotle categories are adjuncts to reasoning designed to resolve ambiguities and thus to prepare equivocal signs, otherwise recalcitrant to being ruled by logic, for the application of logical laws.  The example of ζωον illustrates the fact that we don’t need categories to make generalizations so much as we need them to control generalizations, to reign in abstractions and analogies that are stretched too far.

References

  • Aristotle, “The Categories”, Harold P. Cooke (trans.), pp. 1–109 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.
  • Karpeles, Eric (2008), Paintings in Proust, Thames and Hudson, London, UK.
Posted in Abstraction, Ackermann, Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Carnap, Category Theory, Hilbert, Kant, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Mathematics, Peirce, Peirce's Categories, Relation Theory, Saunders Mac Lane, Sign Relations, Type Theory | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 6 Comments

Precursors Of Category Theory • 1

A few years back I began a sketch on the Precursors of Category Theory, aiming to trace the continuities of the category concept from Aristotle, thorough Kant and Peirce, Hilbert and Ackermann, to contemporary mathematical use.  Perhaps a few will find these notes of use in the current context.

Precursors Of Category Theory

Preamble

Now the discovery of ideas as general as these is chiefly the willingness to make a brash or speculative abstraction, in this case supported by the pleasure of purloining words from the philosophers:  “Category” from Aristotle and Kant, “Functor” from Carnap (Logische Syntax der Sprache), and “natural transformation” from then current informal parlance.

— Saunders Mac Lane, Categories for the Working Mathematician, 29–30.

Posted in Abstraction, Ackermann, Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Carnap, Category Theory, Hilbert, Kant, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Mathematics, Peirce, Peirce's Categories, Relation Theory, Saunders Mac Lane, Sign Relations, Type Theory | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 10 Comments

Alpha Now, Omega Later • 7

Re: R.J. Lipton and K.W. Regan • Theorems From Physics?

In a way, the relation between “physics space” and “information space” is one of the topics I address in my work on inquiry driven systems.  Here is a pertinent place in medias res, from which point one may happily sample both backwards and forwards:

Prospects for Inquiry Driven Systems • Unabridgements

Part of my task in the projected work is to make a bridge, in theory and practice, from simple physical systems to the more complex systems, also physical but in which new orders of features have become salient, that begin to exhibit what is recognized as intelligence.  At the moment it seems that a good way to do this is to anchor the knowledge component of intelligent systems in the tangent and co-tangent spaces that are founded on the base space of a dynamic manifold.  This means finding a place for knowledge representations in the residual part of the initial factorization.  This leads to a consideration of the questions:  What makes the difference between these supposedly different factors of the total manifold?  What properties mark the distinction as commonly intended?

From a naturalistic perspective everything falls equally under the prospective heading of physis, signifying nothing more than the first inklings of natural process, though not everything is necessarily best explained in detail by those fragments of natural law which are currently known to us.  So it falls to any science that pretends to draw a distinction between the more and the less basic physics to describe it within nature and without trying to get around nature.  In this context the question may now be rephrased:  What natural terms distinguish every system’s basic processes from the kinds of coping processes that support and crown the intelligent system’s personal copy of the world?  What protocols attach to the sorting and binding of these two different books of nature?  What colophon can impress the reader with a need to read them?  What instinct can motivate a basis for needing to know?

Previous Discussion

Posted in C.S. Peirce, Differential Logic, Dynamical Systems, Equational Inference, Laws of Form, Logic, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Propositional Calculus, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Spencer Brown | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , | 4 Comments

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 3

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson

A more complete excerpt and the translator’s notes are very helpful here.

A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss ;  for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability :  e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.  A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted.1  That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.

An enthymeme is a syllogism from probabilities or signs ;  and a sign can be taken in three ways — in just as many ways as there are of taking the middle term in the several figures :  either as in the first figure or as in the second or as in the third.

  • E.g., the proof that a woman is pregnant because she has milk is by the first figure ;  for the middle term is ‘having milk’.  A stands for ‘pregnant’, B for ‘having milk’, and C for ‘woman’.
  • The proof that the wise are good because Pittacus was good is by the third figure.  A stands for ‘good’, B for ‘the wise’, and C for Pittacus.  Then it is true to predicate both A and B of C ;  only we do not state the latter, because we know it, whereas we formally assume the former.
  • The proof that a woman is pregnant because she is sallow is intended to be by the middle figure ;  for since sallowness is a characteristic of woman in pregnancy, and is associated with this particular woman, they suppose that she is proved to be pregnant.  A stands for ‘sallowness’, B for ‘being pregnant’, C for ‘woman’.

If only one premiss is stated, we get only a sign ;  but if the other premiss is assumed as well, we get a syllogism,2 e.g., that Pittacus is high-minded, because those who love honour are high-minded, and Pittacus loves honour ;  or again that the wise are good, because Pittacus is good and also wise.

In this way syllogisms can be effected ;  but whereas a syllogism in the first figure cannot be refuted if it is true, since it is universal, a syllogism in the last figure can be refuted even if the conclusion is true, because the syllogism is neither universal nor relevant to our purpose.3  For if Pittacus is good, it is not necessary for this reason that all other wise men are good.  A syllogism in the middle figure is always and in every way refutable, since we never get a syllogism with the terms in this relation4 ;  for it does not necessarily follow, if a pregnant woman is sallow, and this woman is sallow, that she is pregnant.  Thus truth can be found in all signs, but they differ in the ways which have been described.

We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index (τεκµηριον)5 (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes6 as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’.  For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics 2.27, 70a3–70b6).

Translator’s Notes

  1. If referable to one phenomenon only, a sign has objective necessity ;  if to more than one, its value is a matter of opinion.
  2. Strictly an enthymeme.
  3. If the signs of an enthymeme in the first figure are true, the conclusion is inevitable.  Aristotle does not mean that the conclusion is universal, but that the universality of the major premiss implies the validity of the minor and conclusion.  The example (<all> those who have honour, etc.) quoted for the third figure contains no universal premiss or sign, and fails to establish a universal conclusion.
  4. i.e. when both premisses are affirmative.
  5. Signs may be classified as irrefutable (1st figure) and refutable (2nd and 3rd figures), and the name ‘index’ may be attached to their middle terms, either in all figures or (more probably) only in the first, where the middle is distinctively middle.
  6. Alternatively the name ‘sign’ may be restricted to the 2nd and 3rd figures, and may be replaced by ‘index’ in the first.

Reference

  • Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

Posted in Analogy, Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Icon Index Symbol, Induction, Inquiry, Likelihood, Likely Story, Likeness, Logic, Mathematics, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 2

Re: Peirce List • Phyllis Chiasson

I’m still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle’s account relates to Peirce’s usage, though I’m pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle’s usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some sort of distinction here, using a term “tekmerion” which gets translated as “index” to make the following remark later on in that chapter.

We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index [τεκµηριον] (for the name ‘index’ is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes as ‘signs’, and that which is drawn from the middle as an ‘index’.  For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70b1–6).

Reference

  • Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

Posted in Analogy, Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Icon Index Symbol, Induction, Inquiry, Likelihood, Likely Story, Likeness, Logic, Mathematics, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability • 1

Re: Peirce List • Benjamin Udell • Michael Shapiro

Here’s a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense —

A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss;  for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability:  e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate.  A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted.  That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something’s having happened or being.  (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 2.27.70a3–10).

Reference

  • Aristotle, “Prior Analytics”, Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.

Resource

Posted in Analogy, Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Icon Index Symbol, Induction, Inquiry, Likelihood, Likely Story, Likeness, Logic, Mathematics, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 2 Comments

Alpha Now, Omega Later • 6

Re: Alpha Now, Omega Later • Theorems From Physics? • Isomorphism Is Where It’s At

In the late 1970s a number of problems in combinatorics and graph theory that I really wanted to know the answers to had driven me to the desperate measures of trying to write a theorem-proving program to help with the work.  Being familiar with the conceptual efficiencies of Peirce’s logical graphs and inspired by George Spencer Brown’s more recent resurrection of Peirce’s ideas, I naturally turned to those resources for the initial implements of my computational prospecting. The succession of computers and programming languages that I quested with over the years taught me a lot about the things that work and the things that do not. Dissolving for now to the present scene, I will use the next few posts to outline, as succinctly as I can, the basic constructs that developed through that line of inquiry.

Minimal Negation Operators and Painted Cacti

Let \mathbb{B} = \{ 0, 1 \}.

The objects of penultimate interest are the boolean functions f : \mathbb{B}^n \to \mathbb{B} for n \in \mathbb{N}.

A minimal negation operator \nu_k for k \in \mathbb{N} is a boolean function \nu_k : \mathbb{B}^k \to \mathbb{B} defined as follows:

  • \nu_0 = 0.
  • \nu_k (x_1, \ldots, x_k) = 1 if and only if exactly one of the arguments x_j equals 0.

The first few of these operators are already enough to generate all boolean functions f : \mathbb{B}^n \to \mathbb{B} via functional composition but the rest of the family is worth keeping around for many practical purposes.

In most contexts \nu (x_1, \ldots, x_k) may be written for \nu_k (x_1, \ldots, x_k) since the number of arguments determines the rank of the operator.  In some contexts even the letter \nu may be omitted, writing just the argument list (x_1, \ldots, x_k), in which case it helps to use a distinctive typeface for the list delimiters, as \texttt{(} x_1 \texttt{,} \ldots \texttt{,} x_k \texttt{)}.

A logical conjunction of k arguments can be expressed in terms of minimal negation operators as \nu_{k+1} (x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_{k-1}, x_k, 0) and this is conveniently abbreviated as a concatenation of arguments x_1 x_2 \ldots x_{k-1} x_k.

See the following article for more information.

To be continued …

Posted in C.S. Peirce, Differential Logic, Dynamical Systems, Equational Inference, Laws of Form, Logic, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Propositional Calculus, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Spencer Brown | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , | 5 Comments

Alpha Now, Omega Later • 5

Re: R.J. Lipton and K.W. Regan • Isomorphism Is Where It’s At

  • “Are there more good cases of isomorphism to study?”

Just off the top of my head, a couple of examples come to mind.

Sign Relations.  In computational settings, a sign relation L is a triadic relation of the form L \subseteq O \times S \times I, where O is a set of formal objects under consideration and S and I are two formal languages used to denote those objects.  It is common practice to cut one’s teeth on the special case S = I before moving on to more solid diets.

Cactus Graphs.  In particular, a variant of cactus graphs known (by me, anyway) as painted and rooted cacti (PARCs) affords us with a very efficient graphical syntax for propositional calculus.

I’ll post a few links in the next couple of comments.

Posted in C.S. Peirce, Differential Logic, Dynamical Systems, Equational Inference, Laws of Form, Logic, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Propositional Calculus, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Spencer Brown | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , | 6 Comments

Alpha Now, Omega Later • 4

Re: Cristopher Moore on Theorems From Physics?

It is critically important to distinguish between the objective landscape, the boolean functions as mathematical objects, and the syntactic landscape, the particular formal language we are using as a propositional calculus to denote and compute with those objects.  If we do hill-climbing, we must keep our feet on the objective territory, however much we rely on syntactic maps to narrate the travelogue.  (Many will be thinking of manifolds here.)  The object domain has a fixed structure but the conceptual clarity and computational efficiency of propositional calculi can very likely be improved indefinitely.

Posted in C.S. Peirce, Differential Logic, Dynamical Systems, Equational Inference, Laws of Form, Logic, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Propositional Calculus, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Spencer Brown | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , | 6 Comments

Alpha Now, Omega Later • 3

Re: R.J. Lipton and K.W. Regan • Theorems From Physics?

Bits of Synchronicity …

What kind of information process is scientific inquiry?

What kinds of information process are involved in the various types of inference — abductive, deductive, inductive — that go to make up scientific inquiry?

What kinds of information process are computation and proof?

Many types of deductive inference, including many kinds of computation and proof, don’t really change our state of information so much as increase the clarity of that information.  Do we have any way to quantify clarity in the way we define measures of information?

Posted in C.S. Peirce, Differential Logic, Dynamical Systems, Equational Inference, Laws of Form, Logic, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Propositional Calculus, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Spencer Brown | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , | 6 Comments