Category Archives: Probability

Pragmatic Traction • 3

Posted on September 25, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Deborah G. Mayo • Revisiting Popper’s Demarcation of Science I think Peirce would say that any struggle to pass from the irritation of doubt toward the settlement of belief is a form of inquiry — it’s just that some … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, C.S. Peirce, Control, Cybernetics, Deborah G. Mayo, Deduction, Error, Error-Controlled Regulation, Feedback, Fixation of Belief, Hypothesis, Induction, Inference, Information, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Knowledge, Knowledge Representation, Learning, Learning Theory, Likelihood, Logic, Logic of Science, Peirce, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Pragmatic Information, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Scientific Inquiry, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Statistical Inference, Statistics, Uncertainty | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Pragmatic Traction • 2

Posted on September 16, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: FB | Ecology of Systems Thinking • Richard Saunders I’m about to be diverted for a couple of weeks but this is an ever-ongoing question so I know I’ll be coming back to it again.  The short shrift goes … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, C.S. Peirce, Control, Cybernetics, Deborah G. Mayo, Deduction, Error, Error-Controlled Regulation, Feedback, Fixation of Belief, Hypothesis, Induction, Inference, Information, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Knowledge, Knowledge Representation, Learning, Learning Theory, Likelihood, Logic, Logic of Science, Peirce, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Pragmatic Information, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Scientific Inquiry, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Statistical Inference, Statistics, Uncertainty | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Pragmatic Traction • 1

Posted on September 14, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Deborah G. Mayo • Peircean Induction and the Error-Correcting Thesis C.S. Peirce’s pragmatic maxim marks the place where the tire of theory meets the test track of experience — it tells us how general ideas are impacted by practical … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, C.S. Peirce, Control, Cybernetics, Deborah G. Mayo, Deduction, Error, Error-Controlled Regulation, Feedback, Fixation of Belief, Hypothesis, Induction, Inference, Information, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Knowledge, Knowledge Representation, Learning, Learning Theory, Likelihood, Logic, Logic of Science, Peirce, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Pragmatic Information, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Scientific Inquiry, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Statistical Inference, Statistics, Uncertainty | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Problems In Philosophy • 4

Posted on February 9, 2016 by Jon Awbrey

Re: R.J. Lipton and K.W. Regan • Did Euclid Really Mean ‘Random’? These are the forms of time, which imitates eternity and revolves according to a law of number. Plato • Timaeus • 38 A Benjamin Jowett (trans.) It is … Continue reading →

Posted in Aristotle, Computation, Computer Science, Euclid, Genericity, Geometry, Iconicity, Likelihood, Likely Story, Likeness, Mathematics, Number Theory, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mathematics, Plato, Probability, Socrates | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 3 Comments

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability : 3

Posted on December 12, 2013 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List Discussion • Phyllis Chiasson A more complete excerpt and the translator’s notes are very helpful here. A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss ;  for that which … Continue reading →

Posted in Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Enthymeme, Icon Index Symbol, Logic, Peirce, Peirce List, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability : 2

Posted on December 11, 2013 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List Discussion • Phyllis Chiasson I’m still a bit fuzzy on how Aristotle’s account relates to Peirce’s usage, though I’m pretty sure Peirce must have taken Aristotle’s usage into account, but it does seem that Aristotle drew some … Continue reading →

Posted in Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Icon Index Symbol, Logic, Peirce, Peirce List, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Icon, Likeness, Likely Story, Likelihood, Probability : 1

Posted on December 11, 2013 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List Discussion • Benjamin Udell • Michael Shapiro Here’s a likely locus classicus for “icon” in its logical sense: A probability (εικος) is not the same as a sign (σηµειον).  The former is a generally accepted premiss;  for … Continue reading →

Posted in Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Icon Index Symbol, Logic, Peirce, Peirce List, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

Triadic Relations, Intentions, Fuzzy Subsets • Discussion 3

Posted on December 9, 2012 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List Discussion • Gary Moore • Stefan Berwing I intend to get back to this subject as soon as possible but the dire political situation in my home state is once again eating up a lot of my … Continue reading →

Posted in C.S. Peirce, Fuzzy Logic, Fuzzy Sets, Intentional Contexts, Intentional Objects, Intentionality, Intentions, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Lotfi Zadeh, Mathematics, Peirce, Probability, Relation Theory, Semiotics, Triadic Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment