Category Archives: C.S. Peirce

Slip Slidin’ Away

Posted on April 11, 2013 by Jon Awbrey

And you give me the choice between a description that is sure but that teaches me nothing and hypotheses that claim to teach me but that are not sure. — Albert Camus • The Myth of Sisyphus Re: R.J. Lipton … Continue reading →

Posted in Albert Camus, C.S. Peirce, Change, Differential Logic, Infinity, Lewis Carroll, Logic, Mathematics, Meno, Modus Ponens, Motion, Paradox, Phenomenology, Sisyphus, Syllogism, Time, Zeno | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 3 Comments

Indicator Functions • 1

Posted on March 13, 2013 by Jon Awbrey

Re: R.J. Lipton and K.W. Regan • Who Invented Boolean Functions? One of the things it helps to understand about 19th Century mathematicians, and those who built the bridge to the 20th, is that they were capable of high abstraction … Continue reading →

Posted in Abstraction, Boole, Boolean Functions, C.S. Peirce, Category Theory, Characteristic Functions, Euler, Indicator Functions, John Venn, Logic, Mathematics, Peirce, Propositional Calculus, Set Theory, Venn Diagrams, Visualization | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

I Wonder, Wonder Who

Posted on February 25, 2013 by Jon Awbrey

Re: R.J. Lipton and K.W. Regan • Who Invented Boolean Functions? The question recalls recent discussions of discovery and invention in the mathematical field, bringing back to mind questions I’ve wondered about for as long as I can remember. Speaking … Continue reading →

Posted in Anamnesis, Aristotle, Boole, Boolean Functions, C.S. Peirce, Discovery, Invention, Learning, Logic, Mathematics, Meno, Model Theory, Peirce, Plato, Propositional Calculus, Recollection, Semiotics, Socrates, Teaching | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Theme One • A Program Of Inquiry 4

Posted on February 14, 2013 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Next Polymath Project • What, When, Where? Here’s a bit of data on the Theme One Program I worked on all through the 1980s.  My aim was to develop fundamental algorithms and data structures to support an integrated learning … Continue reading →

Posted in Artificial Intelligence, C.S. Peirce, Cognition, Computation, Constraint Satisfaction Problems, Cybernetics, Formal Languages, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Intelligent Systems, Learning Theory, Logic, Peirce, Semiotics | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 8 Comments

The Difference That Makes A Difference That Peirce Makes • 1

Posted on February 7, 2013 by Jon Awbrey

Being one who does not view Peirce’s work as a flickering foreshadowing of analytic philosophy, logical whatevism, or anything else you want to call it, but leans more to thinking of the latter philosophies as fumbling fallbacks losing what ground … Continue reading →

Posted in C.S. Peirce, Inquiry, Logic, Mathematics, Philosophy, Pragmatism, Science, Scientific Method, Semiotics | Tagged , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

Duality Indicating Unity • 1

Posted on January 31, 2013 by Jon Awbrey

Re: R.J. Lipton • Mathematical Tricks A formal duality points to a higher unity — a calculus of forms whose expressions can be read in two different ways by switching the meanings assigned to a pair of primitive terms. I … Continue reading →

Posted in Abstraction, C.S. Peirce, Duality, Form, Indication, Interpretation, Peirce, Unity | Tagged , , , , , , , | 19 Comments

Propositions As Types Analogy • 1

Posted on January 29, 2013 by Jon Awbrey

Re: R.J. Lipton • Mathematical Tricks One of my favorite mathematical tricks — it almost seems too tricky to be true — is the Propositions As Types Analogy. And I see hints the 2‑part analogy can be extended to a … Continue reading →

Posted in Animata, C.S. Peirce, Combinator Calculus, Combinatory Logic, Curry–Howard Isomorphism, Graph Theory, Lambda Calculus, Logic, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Proof Theory, Propositions As Types Analogy, Type Theory | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , | 3 Comments

Triadic Relation Irreducibility • 2

Posted on January 18, 2013 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List • Matt Faunce • Jon Awbrey • Jon Awbrey Though my present object has more to do with the logical and mathematical aspects of triadic relations than it does with their psychological embodiments, the following exchange on … Continue reading →

Posted in C.S. Peirce, Category Theory, Inquiry, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Mathematics, Peirce, Pragmatism, Relation Theory, Semiosis, Semiotics, Sign Relational Manifolds, Sign Relations, Teridentity, Thirdness, Triadic Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

Triadic Relation Irreducibility • 1

Posted on January 17, 2013 by Jon Awbrey

The core insight of Peirce’s conceptual system is the recognition that triadic relations are sui generis, constituting a class by themselves.  Understanding the properties of triadic relations and the consequences of their irreducibility is critical to understanding Peirce’s thought and work.  … Continue reading →

Posted in C.S. Peirce, Category Theory, Inquiry, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Mathematics, Peirce, Pragmatism, Relation Theory, Semiosis, Semiotics, Sign Relational Manifolds, Sign Relations, Teridentity, Thirdness, Triadic Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 11 Comments

Tenacity, Authority, Plausibility, Inquiry

Posted on January 15, 2013 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peter Cameron • Mathematics and Logic My favorite polymathematician, Charles Sanders Peirce, gave a fourfold classification of what he called “methods of fixing belief”, or “settling opinion”, most notably and seminally in his paper, “The Fixation of Belief” (1877).  … Continue reading →

Posted in Authority, Belief, Belief Fixation, C.S. Peirce, Fixation of Belief, Inquiry, Logic, Method, Philosophy of Science, Plausibility, Science, Scientific Inquiry, Scientific Method, Tenacity, Uncertainty | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 4 Comments