Category Archives: Logic of Science

Note.  This is a placeholder, to be developed later. Figure 2 shows the implication ordering of logical terms in the form of a lattice diagram. Figure 2. Disjunctive Term u, Taken as Subject Reference Peirce, C.S. (1866), “The Logic of … Continue reading →

Let’s stay with Peirce’s example of abductive inference a little longer and try to clear up the more troublesome confusions tending to arise. Figure 1 shows the implication ordering of logical terms in the form of a lattice diagram. Figure … Continue reading →

Many things still puzzle me about Peirce’s account at this point.  I indicated a few of them by means of question marks at several places in the last two Figures.  There is nothing for it but returning to the text … Continue reading →

Peirce identifies inference with a process he describes as symbolization.  Let us consider what that might imply. I am going, next, to show that inference is symbolization and that the puzzle of the validity of scientific inference lies merely in … Continue reading →

Let’s examine Peirce’s second example of a disjunctive term — neat, swine, sheep, deer — within the style of lattice framework we used before. Hence if we find out that neat are herbivorous, swine are herbivorous, sheep are herbivorous, and … Continue reading →

At this point in his inventory of scientific reasoning, Peirce is relating the nature of inference, information, and inquiry to the character of the signs mediating the process in question, a process he is presently describing as symbolization. In the interest … Continue reading →

We have now seen how the mind is forced by the very nature of inference itself to make use of induction and hypothesis. But the question arises how these conclusions come to receive their justification by the event.  Why are … Continue reading →

A similar line of thought may be gone through in reference to hypothesis.  In this case we must start with the consideration of the term: spherical, bright, fragrant, juicy, tropical fruit. Such a term, formed by the sum of the comprehensions … Continue reading →

Accordingly, if we are engaged in symbolizing and we come to such a proposition as “Neat, swine, sheep, and deer are herbivorous”, we know firstly that the disjunctive term may be replaced by a true symbol.  But suppose we know … Continue reading →