Semiotics, Semiosis, Sign Relations • Discussion 18

Re: FB | Medieval Logic • Edward Buckner (1) (2)

Edward Buckner raised a few questions about the sign relations implicit in Aristotle’s treatise “On Interpretation”, prompting the following thoughts on my part.

On Pragmata

The object of a sign is any object of discussion or thought.  It is relational not ontological.  This is the beginning of pragmatic semiotics.

On Homoiomata

The likeness theory of reference has the same problem as the correspondence theory of truth, namely, the concepts of likeness and correspondence used in those theories both refer to dyadic relations and dyadic relations are not adequate to the task of accounting for the complex of activities composing the intellect, for example, inquiry, learning, reasoning, speech, thought, in short, Information Development/Exchange Activities.

In actuality, Aristotle comes closer to recognizing the triadic relation of Objects, Signs, and Ideas than the majority of later writers before Peirce.  Here is the figure Susan Awbrey and I cut in our first hack at the matter.

The Sign Relation in Aristotle

Figure 1.  The Sign Relation in Aristotle

Resources

cc: Category Theory • Cybernetics (1) (2)Ontolog Forum • Peirce List (1) (2) (3) (4)
cc: FB | SemeioticsLaws of FormStructural ModelingSystems Science

This entry was posted in C.S. Peirce, Category Theory, Logic, Relation Theory, Semiosis, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Triadic Relations and tagged , , , , , , , . Bookmark the permalink.

3 Responses to Semiotics, Semiosis, Sign Relations • Discussion 18

  1. Pingback: Survey of Semiotics, Semiosis, Sign Relations • 1 | Inquiry Into Inquiry

  2. Pingback: Survey of Semiotics, Semiosis, Sign Relations • 2 | Inquiry Into Inquiry

  3. Pingback: Survey of Semiotics, Semiosis, Sign Relations • 3 | Inquiry Into Inquiry

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