Readers of Peirce know that the concept of community is integral to his treatment of inquiry, interpretation, knowledge, reality, and truth. The following statement is a nice résumé of all the main points.
Peirce, C.S. (1868), “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities”, Journal of Speculative Philosophy 2 (1868), 140–157. Reprinted (Collected Papers 5.264–317), (Writings 2, 211–242), (Essential Peirce 1, 28–55). Online.
More casual or selective readers may take Peirce for a pioneer in the sociology of knowledge and jump to the conclusion that his social theory is tantamount to a “coherence theory” or a “consensus theory” of truth. But a leap like that underestimates the gulf between actual finite communities and what is actually a regulative ideal, a community without definite limits capable of an indefinite increase of knowledge. The relation between the two is like that between an empirical sample and a theoretical population of unknown extent.