In the Way of Inquiry • Reconciling Accounts

The Reader may share with the Author a feeling of discontent at this point, attempting to reconcile the formal intentions of this inquiry with the cardinal contentions of experience.  Let me try to express the difficulty in the form of a question:

What is the bond between form and content in experience, between the abstract formal categories and the concrete material contents residing in experience?

I have no more than a tentative way of approaching the question.  I take there to be a primitive category of “form‑in‑experience” — I don’t have a handy name for it yet but it looks to have a flexible nature which from the standpoint of a given agent easily passes from the “structure of experience” to the “experience of structure”.

My personal definition of mathematical understanding has long been expressed in the chiasmatic figure of speech:  “the form of experience and the experience of form”.  This is not the place to argue for the virtues of this concept, but I thought it would clarify a few points to share it here.

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This entry was posted in Animata, C.S. Peirce, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Inquiry Into Inquiry, Intelligent Systems, Semiotics and tagged , , , , , , . Bookmark the permalink.

1 Response to In the Way of Inquiry • Reconciling Accounts

  1. Ravi Arapurakal says:

    This addresses the quoted question above:

    “What is the nature of the bond between form and content in experience, between the abstract formal categories and the concrete material contents that exist in experience?”

    “I take there to be a primitive category of ‘form-in-experience’ that presently lacks a compact name but that from the standpoint of a given agent often passes from the ‘structure of experience’ to the ‘experience of structure’.”

    When we categorize the subject, form and object clearly, form interprets object for subject.

    There are (a) subject — our common sentience function, (b) object — the common source of sensorily accessible sentience input, and (c) interface — local clusters of accumulating cognitive representations of likewise accumulating local sensory inputs from this common source.

    The last, (c) serve each of us as the local interpretive interface between (a) and (b).

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