Tag Archives: Philosophy

Pragmatic Traction • 7

Posted on November 8, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List • John Sowa It’s good to remember that observation, perception itself, has an abductive character in Peirce’s analysis and induction for him is more a final testing than initial conception stage.  Yes, it’s wheels upon wheels but … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, Action, C.S. Peirce, Control, Cybernetics, Deduction, Definition, Determination, Fixation of Belief, Induction, Inference, Information, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Learning, Learning Theory, Logic, Logic of Science, Mathematics, Metaphysics, Normative Science, Observation, Peirce, Peirce's Categories, Perception, Phenomenology, Philosophy, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Recursion, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Volition | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Pragmatic Traction • 6

Posted on October 15, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List Discussion • GF • JFS When it comes to the relative contributions of phenomenology and mathematics to logic, I always find myself returning to the picture I drew once before from Peirce’s Syllabus, on the relationship of phenomenology and … Continue reading →

Posted in C.S. Peirce, Control, Cybernetics, Definition, Determination, Fixation of Belief, Information, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Logic, Logic of Science, Mathematics, Metaphysics, Normative Science, Peirce, Peirce's Categories, Phenomenology, Philosophy, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Volition | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 2 Comments

Pragmatic Traction • 5

Posted on September 28, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

☯   TAO   ☯ Trials And Outcomes Expression | Impression Effectors | Receptors Exertion | Reaction Conduct | Bearing Control | Observe Effect | Detect Poke | Peek Note | Note Pat | Apt | Tap Pragmatism makes thinking … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, C.S. Peirce, Control, Cybernetics, Deduction, Error, Error-Controlled Regulation, Feedback, Fixation of Belief, Hypothesis, Induction, Inference, Information, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Knowledge, Knowledge Representation, Learning, Learning Theory, Likelihood, Logic, Logic of Science, Logical Graphs, Peirce, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Pragmatic Information, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Scientific Inquiry, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Statistical Inference, Statistics, Uncertainty, Volition | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Pragmatic Traction • 4

Posted on September 27, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Oliver Maclaren • Statistics Without True Models Or Hypothesis Testing I once wrote a “pure empiricist” sequential learning program that took this sort of approach to the data in its input stream. Here is the manual, that will give … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, C.S. Peirce, Control, Cybernetics, Deduction, Error, Error-Controlled Regulation, Feedback, Fixation of Belief, Hypothesis, Induction, Inference, Information, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Knowledge, Knowledge Representation, Learning, Learning Theory, Likelihood, Logic, Logic of Science, Logical Graphs, Peirce, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Pragmatic Information, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Scientific Inquiry, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Statistical Inference, Statistics, Uncertainty | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Pragmatic Traction • 3

Posted on September 25, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Deborah G. Mayo • Revisiting Popper’s Demarcation of Science I think Peirce would say that any struggle to pass from the irritation of doubt toward the settlement of belief is a form of inquiry — it’s just that some … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, C.S. Peirce, Control, Cybernetics, Deborah G. Mayo, Deduction, Error, Error-Controlled Regulation, Feedback, Fixation of Belief, Hypothesis, Induction, Inference, Information, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Knowledge, Knowledge Representation, Learning, Learning Theory, Likelihood, Logic, Logic of Science, Peirce, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Pragmatic Information, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Scientific Inquiry, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Statistical Inference, Statistics, Uncertainty | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Pragmatic Traction • 2

Posted on September 16, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: FB | Ecology of Systems Thinking • Richard Saunders I’m about to be diverted for a couple of weeks but this is an ever-ongoing question so I know I’ll be coming back to it again.  The short shrift goes … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, C.S. Peirce, Control, Cybernetics, Deborah G. Mayo, Deduction, Error, Error-Controlled Regulation, Feedback, Fixation of Belief, Hypothesis, Induction, Inference, Information, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Knowledge, Knowledge Representation, Learning, Learning Theory, Likelihood, Logic, Logic of Science, Peirce, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Pragmatic Information, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Scientific Inquiry, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Statistical Inference, Statistics, Uncertainty | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Pragmatic Traction • 1

Posted on September 14, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Deborah G. Mayo • Peircean Induction and the Error-Correcting Thesis C.S. Peirce’s pragmatic maxim marks the place where the tire of theory meets the test track of experience — it tells us how general ideas are impacted by practical … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, C.S. Peirce, Control, Cybernetics, Deborah G. Mayo, Deduction, Error, Error-Controlled Regulation, Feedback, Fixation of Belief, Hypothesis, Induction, Inference, Information, Information Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Knowledge, Knowledge Representation, Learning, Learning Theory, Likelihood, Logic, Logic of Science, Peirce, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Pragmatic Information, Pragmatic Maxim, Pragmatism, Probability, Probable Reasoning, Scientific Inquiry, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Statistical Inference, Statistics, Uncertainty | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

The Difference That Makes A Difference That Peirce Makes • 17

Posted on June 26, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List • JA • GF • JFS • JLRC • JA • JFS • GF A rather amusing, if slightly ominous illustration of the point I am trying to make here has just popped up in the daily … Continue reading →

Posted in Automata, C.S. Peirce, Category Theory, Chomsky, Complementarity, Dewey, Formal Languages, Inquiry, Laws of Form, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Logic of Science, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Peirce, Philosophy, Physics, Pragmatism, Quantum Mechanics, Relation Theory, Relativity, Science, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Spencer Brown | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

The Difference That Makes A Difference That Peirce Makes • 16

Posted on June 25, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List • JA • JFS JFS: For those of us who are trying to convince modern students to study Peirce, we need to become bilingual.  We need to show how his terminology and notations map to and from … Continue reading →

Posted in Automata, C.S. Peirce, Category Theory, Chomsky, Complementarity, Dewey, Formal Languages, Inquiry, Laws of Form, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Logic of Science, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Peirce, Philosophy, Physics, Pragmatism, Quantum Mechanics, Relation Theory, Relativity, Science, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Spencer Brown | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

The Difference That Makes A Difference That Peirce Makes • 15

Posted on June 24, 2017 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce List • JA • GF One could hardly dispute the importance of logical implication relations like   Their set-theoretic analogues are subset relations like which are almost the canonical way of expressing constraint, determination, information, and so on.  … Continue reading →

Posted in Animata, Automata, C.S. Peirce, Category Theory, Chomsky, Dewey, Formal Languages, Inquiry, Laws of Form, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Logic of Science, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Philosophy, Physics, Pragmatism, Quantum Mechanics, Relation Theory, Relativity, Science, Scientific Method, Semiotics, Spencer Brown, Visualization | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment