Category Archives: Sign Relations

{ Information = Comprehension × Extension } • Selection 2

For this purpose, I must call your attention to the differences there are in the manner in which different representations stand for their objects. In the first place there are likenesses or copies — such as statues, pictures, emblems, hieroglyphics, … Continue reading

Posted in Abduction, Belief Fixation, C.S. Peirce, Comprehension, Deduction, Extension, Hypothesis, Icon Index Symbol, Induction, Inference, Information, Information = Comprehension × Extension, Inquiry, Intension, Logic, Logic of Science, Peirce, Peirce's Categories, Pragmatism, Scientific Method, Semiotic Information, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 13 Comments

{ Information = Comprehension × Extension } • Selection 1

Let us now return to the information.  The information of a term is the measure of its superfluous comprehension.  That is to say that the proper office of the comprehension is to determine the extension of the term.  For instance, … Continue reading

Posted in Abduction, Belief Fixation, C.S. Peirce, Comprehension, Deduction, Extension, Hypothesis, Icon Index Symbol, Induction, Inference, Information, Information = Comprehension × Extension, Inquiry, Intension, Logic, Logic of Science, Peirce, Peirce's Categories, Pragmatism, Scientific Method, Semiotic Information, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 16 Comments

{ Information = Comprehension × Extension }

Another angle from which to approach the incidence of signs and inquiry is by way of Charles S. Peirce’s “laws of information” and the corresponding theory of information he developed from the time of his lectures on the “Logic of Science” at … Continue reading

Posted in Abduction, Belief Fixation, C.S. Peirce, Comprehension, Deduction, Extension, Hypothesis, Icon Index Symbol, Induction, Inference, Information, Information = Comprehension × Extension, Inquiry, Intension, Logic, Logic of Science, Peirce, Peirce's Categories, Pragmatism, Scientific Method, Semiotic Information, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 17 Comments

Types of Reasoning in C.S. Peirce and Aristotle • 2

Re: Peirce List Discussion • Ben Udell • Gary Richmond Present business has kept me from following much of the recent discussion on Peirce’s three types of reasoning, but we have been down this road before and so old tunes … Continue reading

Posted in Abduction, Analogy, Argument, Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Constraint, Deduction, Determination, Diagrammatic Reasoning, Diagrams, Differential Logic, Functional Logic, Hypothesis, Indication, Induction, Inference, Information, Inquiry, Logic, Logic of Science, Mathematics, Peirce, Peirce List, Philosophy, Probable Reasoning, Propositional Calculus, Propositions, Reasoning, Retroduction, Semiotic Information, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Syllogism | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 2 Comments

Types of Reasoning in C.S. Peirce and Aristotle • 1

Re: Peirce List Discussion In one of his earliest treatments of the three types of reasoning, from his Harvard Lectures “On the Logic of Science” (1865), Peirce gives an example that illustrates how one and the same proposition might be … Continue reading

Posted in Abduction, Analogy, Argument, Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Constraint, Deduction, Determination, Diagrammatic Reasoning, Diagrams, Differential Logic, Functional Logic, Hypothesis, Indication, Induction, Inference, Information, Inquiry, Logic, Logic of Science, Mathematics, Peirce, Peirce List, Philosophy, Probable Reasoning, Propositional Calculus, Propositions, Reasoning, Retroduction, Semiotic Information, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Syllogism | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

Readings On Determination • Discussion 3

Re: Readings On Determination • 1 I keep coming back to Peirce’s early lectures on the logic of science because we see there the first inklings of his prospective theory of information, one of those ideas whose time was ripe … Continue reading

Posted in C.S. Peirce, Comprehension, Constraint, Definition, Determination, Differential Logic, Extension, Form, Indication, Information = Comprehension × Extension, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Intension, Leibniz, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Mathematics, Peirce, Prigogine, Relation Theory, Relational Programming, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 6 Comments

Readings On Determination • 1

Re: Peirce List (1) (2) The concepts of definition and determination converge in their concern for setting bounds to the point where they coincide at a certain level of abstraction.  One avenue of approach to determination may then begin from a consideration … Continue reading

Posted in C.S. Peirce, Comprehension, Constraint, Definition, Determination, Differential Logic, Extension, Form, Indication, Information = Comprehension × Extension, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Intension, Leibniz, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Mathematics, Peirce, Prigogine, Relation Theory, Relational Programming, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 8 Comments

Readings On Determination • Discussion 2

Re: Peirce List (1) (2) Re: Jeffrey Downard (1) (2) (3) Having been through this same discussion on many previous occasions I’ll try to sum up the more persistent confusions never ceasing to bedevil the subject.  Most of these arise from … Continue reading

Posted in C.S. Peirce, Comprehension, Constraint, Definition, Determination, Differential Logic, Extension, Form, Indication, Information = Comprehension × Extension, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Intension, Leibniz, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Mathematics, Peirce, Prigogine, Relation Theory, Relational Programming, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 6 Comments

Readings On Determination • Discussion 1

Re: Peirce List (1) (2) What I’m really after here has to do with the way a certain concept of determination figures into Peirce’s better definitions of a sign relation — “better” meaning definitions strong enough to bear the load … Continue reading

Posted in C.S. Peirce, Comprehension, Constraint, Definition, Determination, Differential Logic, Extension, Form, Indication, Information = Comprehension × Extension, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Intension, Leibniz, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Mathematics, Peirce, Prigogine, Relation Theory, Relational Programming, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 6 Comments

Readings On Determination

This is an anchor post for a set of readings on determination, focusing on the census of senses Peirce employed in his pragmatic approach to information, inquiry, science, and signs with a pinch of readings from other writers for historical … Continue reading

Posted in C.S. Peirce, Comprehension, Constraint, Definition, Determination, Differential Logic, Extension, Form, Indication, Information = Comprehension × Extension, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Intension, Leibniz, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Mathematics, Peirce, Prigogine, Relation Theory, Relational Programming, Semiotics, Sign Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 13 Comments