This is an anchor post for a set of readings on determination, focusing on the census of senses Peirce employed in his pragmatic approach to information, inquiry, science, and signs with a pinch of readings from other writers for historical and contemporary context.
I will start with a set of readings I collected some twenty years ago. Once that groundwork is laid down, there is a set of ideas coming from the relational programming paradigm in computer science I think would mesh nicely with Peirce’s theory of information and could be extended to cover the triadic relations of his semiotics.
Resource
cc: Peirce List
Inquiry Into Inquiry 
I’ll be especially interested in following this. As I’m always hungering for spoilers, how do you see this fitting in with non-monotonic reasoning systems in CS &/or AI?
That’s a very mixed bag. I followed that literature many years ago until one of the most prolix streams started spouting nonsense. As I recall, not always a good bet, my criticism had to do with the fact that few of them grasped how often deductive knowledge bases crash into the ceiling rather than the floor. I will leave that as a teaser so as not to spoil too much.
If it was easy, it wouldn’t be worth doing.
What I’m really after here has to do with the way that a certain concept of determination figures into Peirce’s better definitions of a sign relation — “better” meaning the definitions that are strong enough to bear the load of a consequential theory.
That is a very old business with me, and there are developments of it that are still unfinished, but lately I have noticed a number of related issues that are not as clear as they need to be.
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