Category Archives: Peirce

Architectonics of Inquiry • 1

Posted on October 23, 2013 by Jon Awbrey

Re: R.J. Lipton • Teaching Helps Research Along these lines, if somewhat tangentially, are some questions that I’ve wondered about for many years. How do research and teaching interact, and how might they act to catalyze one another in the … Continue reading →

Posted in Artificial Intelligence, Automated Research Tools, C.S. Peirce, Discovery, Educational Systems Design, Educational Technology, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Inquiry Into Inquiry, Instruction, Peirce, Research Technology | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , | 3 Comments

Differential Analytic Turing Automata • Discussion 1

Posted on October 14, 2013 by Jon Awbrey

Re: R.J. Lipton and K.W. Regan • Proving Cook’s Theorem Synchronicity Rules❢ I just started reworking an old exposition of mine on Cook’s Theorem, where I borrowed the Parity Function example from Wilf (1986), Algorithms and Complexity, and translated it … Continue reading →

Posted in Algorithms, Boolean Functions, C.S. Peirce, Cactus Graphs, Computational Complexity, Differential Analytic Turing Automata, Differential Logic, Logic, Logical Graphs, Peirce, Propositional Calculus, Turing Machines | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , | 2 Comments

Definition and Determination • 10

Posted on October 7, 2013 by Jon Awbrey

The moment, then, that we pass from nothing and the vacuity of being to any content or sphere, we come at once to a composite content and sphere.  In fact, extension and comprehension — like space and time — are … Continue reading →

Posted in C.S. Peirce, Comprehension, Constraint, Definition, Determination, Extension, Form, Indication, Information = Comprehension × Extension, Inquiry, Intension, Logic, Logic of Science, Mathematics, Peirce, Semiotics, Sources | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 11 Comments

Definition and Determination • 9

Posted on September 12, 2013 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Cathy O’Neil • The Art of Definition In classical logical traditions the concepts of definition and determination are closely related and their bond acquires all the more force if you view the overarching concept of constraint from an information-theoretic … Continue reading →

Posted in C.S. Peirce, Definition, Determination, Inquiry, Logic, Mathematics, Peirce, Phenomenology, Semiotics | Tagged , , , , , , , , | 7 Comments

The Lambda Point • 1

Posted on August 1, 2013 by Jon Awbrey

A note on the title.  From long ago discussions with Harvey Davis, one of my math professors at Michigan State.  I remember telling him of my interest in the place where algebra, geometry, and logic meet, and he quipped, “Ah … Continue reading →

Posted in Algebra, Amphecks, Boolean Algebra, C.S. Peirce, Cactus Graphs, Geometry, Graph Theory, Lambda Point, Logic, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Minimal Negation Operators, Peirce, Propositional Calculus, Topology | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

How To Succeed In Proof Business Without Really Trying

Posted on July 15, 2013 by Jon Awbrey

Re: R.J. Lipton • Surely You Are Joking? Comment 1 Even at the mailroom entry point of propositional calculus, there is a qualitative difference between insight proofs and routine proofs.  Human beings can do either sort, as a rule, but … Continue reading →

Posted in Algorithms, Animata, Artificial Intelligence, Automatic Theorem Proving, Boolean Algebra, Boolean Functions, C.S. Peirce, Cactus Graphs, Computational Complexity, Graph Theory, Logic, Logical Graphs, Minimal Negation Operators, Model Theory, Peirce, Praeclarum Theorema, Proof Theory, Propositional Calculus, Visualization | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 7 Comments

What Is A Theorem That A Human May Prove It?

Posted on June 19, 2013 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Gil Kalai • Why Is Mathematics Possible? • Tim Gowers’ Take On The Matter Comment 1 To the extent that mathematics has to do with reasoning about possible existence, or inference from pure hypothesis, a line of thinking going … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, Analogy, Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Conjecture, Deduction, Epistemology, Hypothesis, Induction, Inquiry, Logic, Logic of Science, Mathematics, Peirce, Proof Theory, Retroduction, Theorem Proving, Warren S. McCulloch | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 2 Comments

C.S. Peirce • The Proper Treatment of Hypotheses

Posted on June 19, 2013 by Jon Awbrey

Selection from C.S. Peirce, “Hume On Miracles” (1901), CP 6.522–547 530.   Now the testing of a hypothesis is usually more or less costly. Not infrequently the whole life’s labor of a number of able men is required to disprove a … Continue reading →

Posted in Abduction, Hypothesis, Inquiry, Logic of Science, Peirce, References, Retroduction, Sources | Tagged , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

Wherefore Aught?

Posted on June 1, 2013 by Jon Awbrey

Re: R.J. Lipton and K.W. Regan • Why Is There Something? Here is another one of those eternally recurring ideas echoed inimitably by C.S. Peirce in his sketch of a Cosmogonic Philosophy. It would suppose that in the beginning,—infinitely remote,—there was … Continue reading →

Posted in C.S. Peirce, Cosmogony, Evolution, Existence, Natural Law, Peirce, Philosophy, References, Sources | Tagged , , , , , , , , | 2 Comments

⚠ It’s A Trap ⚠

Posted on May 18, 2013 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Kenneth W. Regan • Graduate Student Traps The most common mathematical trap I run across has to do with Triadic Relation Irreducibility, as noted and treated by the polymath C.S. Peirce. This trap lies in the mistaken belief that every … Continue reading →

Posted in C.S. Peirce, Category Theory, Descartes, Error, Fallibility, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Mathematical Traps, Mathematics, Peirce, Pragmatism, Reductionism, Relation Theory, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Triadic Relations | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 5 Comments