Inquiry Into Inquiry

Re: Peirce List • Edwina Taborsky

A note on a couple of recurring themes may be useful at this point.

1. Peirce’s “metaphorical argument” for transforming discussion of interpretive agents, whether individuals or communities, to discussion of interpretant signs is as follows.

There’s additional discussion of this passage at the following locations.

• Inquiry Driven Systems • C’est Moi
• Information = Comprehension × Extension • Selection 18

2. When we employ mathematical models to describe any domain of phenomena, we are always proceeding hypothetically and tentatively, and the modality of all mathematics, in its own right, is the possible.  That is because mathematical existence is existence in the modest sense of “whatever’s not inconsistent”.  In the idiom, “It’s would-be’s all the way down.”  In effect the ordinary scales of modality are flattened down to one mode, to wit, Be ♭.  It is not until we take the risk of acting on our abduced model that we encounter genuine brute force Secondness.

References

• Peirce, C.S. (1902), “Parts of Carnegie Application” (L 75), in Carolyn Eisele (ed., 1976), The New Elements of Mathematics by Charles S. Peirce, vol. 4, 13–73.  Online.
• Peirce, C.S., Writings of Charles S. Peirce : A Chronological Edition, Peirce Edition Project (eds.), Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN, 1981–.  Cited as (CE volume, page).

Resources

• Semeiotic
• Logic Syllabus
• Sign Relations
• Triadic Relations
• Relation Theory

cc: Cybernetics • Ontolog • Peirce List (1) (2) • Structural Modeling • Systems Science

Re: Sign Relations • Definition
Re: Ontolog Forum • Alex Shkotin (1) (2)

Regarding Peirce’s definition of a sign linked above, Alex Shkotin writes:

Dear Alex,

Thanks for your comment.  It points to a problem lurking in the wings through all these discussions, so let’s nudge it on stage and throw a better light on it.

I remember my first formal logic prof in college being rather adamant about the difference between a logical formula, which supposedly bore its “logical form” on its sleeve — I recall the very figure he used — and any of its diverse and sundry natural language paraphrases.  As time wore on I would reconfigure many of the lessons impressed on me in those days, but that one has stuck, I’m guessing because it goes without saying in mathematical and scientific practice.

This treble clef, to vary the figure — forms as objects, formulas as signs, and paraphrases as interpretant signs — is the key to a fundamental theme.

A very wide field of discussion opens up at this point.  To begin we have the logical jump from forms to formulas and the semiotic drift from formulas to paraphrases.  Further on we’ll encounter a range of tensions between formal and informal contexts of inquiry.

Susan Awbrey and I discussed a related set of issues in our “Conceptual Barriers” paper.  Here is how we set up our treatment of three problematics.

• Problematic 1 is the tension that arises along a dimension of increasing formalization in our mental models of the world, between what we may call the ‘informal context’ of real-world practice and the ‘formal context’ of specialized study.
• Problematic 2 is the difficulty in communication that is created by differing mental models of the world, in other words, by the tendency among groups of specialists to form internally coherent but externally disparate systems of mental images.
• Problematic 3 is a special type of communication difficulty that commonly arises between the ‘Two Cultures’ of the scientific and the humanistic disciplines.  A significant part of the problem derives from the differential emphasis that each group places on its use of symbolic and conceptual systems, limiting itself to either the denotative or the connotative planes of variation, but seldom integrating the two.

Please excuse the sweeping preamble.  It wasn’t meant to sweep your observations under the rug — it’s just so many discussions here and there on the web in recent days are reminding me of the larger designs beyond my more mundane focus on brass tacks matters.  I’ll bring this all back to bear on the everyday life of signs the next chance I get.

References

• Awbrey, S.M., and Awbrey, J.L. (2001), “Conceptual Barriers to Creating Integrative Universities”, Organization : The Interdisciplinary Journal of Organization, Theory, and Society 8(2), Sage Publications, London, UK, pp. 269–284.  Abstract.  Online.
• Peirce, C.S. (1902), “Parts of Carnegie Application” (L 75), in Carolyn Eisele (ed., 1976), The New Elements of Mathematics by Charles S. Peirce, vol. 4, 13–73.  Online.

Resources

• Semeiotic
• Logic Syllabus
• Sign Relations
• Triadic Relations
• Relation Theory

cc: Cybernetics • Ontolog • Peirce List (1) (2) • Structural Modeling • Systems Science

There is a close relationship between the pragmatic theory of signs and the pragmatic theory of inquiry.  In fact, the correspondence between the two studies exhibits so many congruences and parallels it is often best to treat them as integral parts of one and the same subject.  In a very real sense, inquiry is the process by which sign relations come to be established and continue to evolve.  In other words, inquiry, “thinking” in its best sense, “is a term denoting the various ways in which things acquire significance” (John Dewey).  Thus, there is an active and intricate form of cooperation that needs to be appreciated and maintained between these converging modes of investigation.  Its proper character is best understood by realizing that the theory of inquiry is adapted to study the developmental aspects of sign relations, a subject which the theory of signs is specialized to treat from structural and comparative points of view.

References

• Charles S. Peirce (1902), “Parts of Carnegie Application” (L 75), in Carolyn Eisele (ed., 1976), The New Elements of Mathematics by Charles S. Peirce, vol. 4, 13–73.  Online.
• Awbrey, J.L., and Awbrey, S.M. (1995), “Interpretation as Action : The Risk of Inquiry”, Inquiry : Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 15(1), pp. 40–52.  Archive.  Journal.  Online.

Resources

• Inquiry
• Semeiotic
• Logic Syllabus
• Sign Relations
• Triadic Relations
• Relation Theory

Document History

Portions of the above article were adapted from the following sources under the GNU Free Documentation License, under other applicable licenses, or by permission of the copyright holders.

• Sign Relation • OEIS Wiki
• Sign Relation • InterSciWiki
• Sign Relation • MyWikiBiz
• Sign Relation • Wikiversity
• Sign Relation • Wikipedia

cc: Cybernetics • Ontolog • Peirce List (1) (2) • Structural Modeling • Systems Science

Re: Cybernetics • Bernard C.E. Scott
Re: Sign Relations • Definition

Regarding Peirce’s definition of a sign given in the previous post, Bernard Scott writes:

It is very helpful [to] distinguish Peirce’s formal semiotic (his logic) from psychological, and by extension, ‘biosemiotic’ understandings of ‘sign’.

Dear Bernard,

You raise a very important point.  It is critical to distinguish the abstract theory from its concrete applications.  The power of a great theory lies in the diversity of its applications.  But that very power comes with a warning, as the diversity it generates can be the source of dispute and dissension among its appliers and interpreters.

We all know the parable of the seven sightless sages and the polymorphous pachyderm they ponder, so I don’t need to spend a lot of words on the moral of that story here.  But it may be useful to say more about the major misunderstandings occasioned by, the schisms, sects, and splinter groups spawned by Peirce’s extremely general and powerful theory of triadic sign relations.  I’ll attend to that when I next get a chance.

Reference

• Charles S. Peirce (1902), “Parts of Carnegie Application” (L 75), in Carolyn Eisele (ed., 1976), The New Elements of Mathematics by Charles S. Peirce, vol. 4, 13–73.  Online.

Resources

• Semeiotic
• Logic Syllabus
• Sign Relations
• Triadic Relations
• Relation Theory

cc: Cybernetics • Ontolog • Peirce List (1) (2) • Structural Modeling • Systems Science

One of Peirce’s clearest and most complete definitions of a sign is one he gives in the context of providing a definition for logic, and so it is informative to view it in that setting.

Logic will here be defined as formal semiotic.  A definition of a sign will be given which no more refers to human thought than does the definition of a line as the place which a particle occupies, part by part, during a lapse of time.  Namely, a sign is something, A, which brings something, B, its interpretant sign determined or created by it, into the same sort of correspondence with something, C, its object, as that in which itself stands to C.  It is from this definition, together with a definition of “formal”, that I deduce mathematically the principles of logic.  I also make a historical review of all the definitions and conceptions of logic, and show, not merely that my definition is no novelty, but that my non-psychological conception of logic has virtually been quite generally held, though not generally recognized.  (C.S. Peirce, NEM 4, 20–21).

In the general discussion of diverse theories of signs, the question frequently arises whether signhood is an absolute, essential, indelible, or ontological property of a thing, or whether it is a relational, interpretive, and mutable role a thing can be said to have only within a particular context of relationships.

Peirce’s definition of a sign defines it in relation to its object and its interpretant sign, and thus defines signhood in relative terms, by means of a predicate with three places.  In this definition, signhood is a role in a triadic relation, a role a thing bears or plays in a given context of relationships — it is not an absolute, non-relative property of a thing-in-itself, a status it maintains independently of all relationships to other things.

Some of the terms Peirce uses in his definition of a sign may need to be elaborated for the contemporary reader.

• Correspondence.  From the way Peirce uses this term throughout his work it is clear he means what he elsewhere calls a “triple correspondence”, in short, just another way of referring to the whole triadic sign relation itself.  In particular, his use of this term should not be taken to imply a dyadic correspondence, as in the varieties of “mirror image” correspondence between realities and representations bandied about in contemporary controversies about “correspondence theories of truth”.

• Determination.  Peirce’s concept of determination is broader in several ways than the sense of the word referring to strictly deterministic causal-temporal processes.  First, and especially in this context, he uses a more general concept of determination, what is known as formal or informational determination, as we use in geometry when we say “two points determine a line”, rather than the more special cases of causal or temporal determinisms.  Second, he characteristically allows for the broader concept of determination in measure, that is, an order of determinism admitting a full spectrum of more and less determined relationships.

• Non-psychological.  Peirce’s “non-psychological conception of logic” must be distinguished from any variety of anti-psychologism.  He was quite interested in matters of psychology and had much of import to say about them.  But logic and psychology operate on different planes of study even when they happen to view the same data, as logic is a normative science where psychology is a descriptive science.  Thus they have distinct aims, methods, and rationales.

Reference

• Charles S. Peirce (1902), “Parts of Carnegie Application” (L 75), in Carolyn Eisele (ed., 1976), The New Elements of Mathematics by Charles S. Peirce, vol. 4, 13–73.  Online.

Resources

• Semeiotic
• Logic Syllabus
• Sign Relations
• Triadic Relations
• Relation Theory

Document History

Portions of the above article were adapted from the following sources under the GNU Free Documentation License, under other applicable licenses, or by permission of the copyright holders.

• Sign Relation • OEIS Wiki
• Sign Relation • InterSciWiki
• Sign Relation • MyWikiBiz
• Sign Relation • PlanetMath
• Sign Relation • Wikiversity
• Sign Relation • Wikipedia

cc: Cybernetics • Ontolog • Peirce List (1) (2) • Structural Modeling • Systems Science

To everything there is a season,
A time for every purpose under heaven:
A time for building castles in the stratosphere,
A time to mind the anti-gravs that keep us here.

Re: Systems Science • Rob Young
Cf: Conceptual Barriers to Creating Integrative Universities

RY:

The aspiration to a form of knowledge ‘wisdom’ resonated with me, and, not withstanding the ‘university’ context (connotative?) the article was couched in, every time I read the word ‘university’, I mentally substituted it with ‘systems movement’ and the resonance was there.

Dear Rob,

Thanks for your comments and questions.  They took me back to the decade before the turn of the millennium when there was a general trend of thought to embrace chaos and complexity, seeking the order and simplicity on the other side.  (Oliver Wendell Holmes, but it appears in doubt whether Sr. or Jr.)

One thing I’ve learned in the mean time is just how poorly grounded and maintained are many of the abstract concepts and theories we need for grappling with the complexities of communication, computation, experimental information, and scientific inquiry.  So I’ve been doing what I can to reinforce the concrete bases and stabilize the working platforms of what otherwise tend to become empty à priori haunts.

I’ll have to be getting back to that.  For now I’ll just link to a few readings your remarks brought to mind.  The “Conceptual Barriers” paper from 2001 is the journal upgrade of a conference presentation from 1999, “Organizations of Learning or Learning Organizations : The Challenge of Creating Integrative Universities for the Next Century”.

Your reflex of jumping from universities to systems in general is very much on the mark.  Our work was motivated in large part by the movement toward Learning Organizations, that is, organizations able to apply organizational research to their own organizational development.  To put a fine point on it, all we are saying is, “Shouldn’t a University, as an Organization of Learning, also be a Learning Organization?”

Well, I had a lot more to relate at this point, but our dishwasher just went on the fritz, so I’ll leave it for now with a few links to Susan’s earlier work along these lines and try to get back to it later …

• Scott, David K., and Awbrey, Susan M. (1993), “Transforming Scholarship”, Change : The Magazine of Higher Learning, 25(4), 38–43. Online (1) (2).
• Papers by Susan Awbrey and David Scott • University of Massachusetts, Amherst.

Reference

• Awbrey, S.M., and Awbrey, J.L. (2001), “Conceptual Barriers to Creating Integrative Universities”, Organization : The Interdisciplinary Journal of Organization, Theory, and Society 8(2), Sage Publications, London, UK, pp. 269–284. Abstract. Online.

cc: Cybernetics • Ontolog Forum • Peirce List • Structural Modeling • Systems Science

Thus, if a sunflower, in turning towards the sun, becomes by that very act fully capable, without further condition, of reproducing a sunflower which turns in precisely corresponding ways toward the sun, and of doing so with the same reproductive power, the sunflower would become a Representamen of the sun.

— C.S. Peirce, Collected Papers, CP 2.274

Re: Cybernetic Communications • Klaus Krippendorff
Re: Ecology of Systems Thinking • Richard Saunders

I’m working at reviewing and revising some pieces I’ve rewritten two score times over the last … lost count of years … and that bit from Peirce is one of my favorite epigraphs for the work ahead.  But I take it as an allegorical figure whose purpose is to illustrate a certain form of relation, and not to be taken too literally.  So I’m sympathetic to the reactions of several readers who find it clangs a bit if taken at face value.  I think there are clues in the passage, the hypothetical subjunctive construction, the unnatural qualification, “without further condition”, etc., telling us Peirce did not intend it as a truth of botany.  But taken rightly it does point to the shape of a proper definition to come.  So I’ll be getting to that …

Resources

• Semeiotic
• Logic Syllabus
• Sign Relations
• Triadic Relations
• Relation Theory

cc: Cybernetics • Ontolog • Peirce List (1) (2) • Structural Modeling • Systems Science