Relation Theory • 2

Relation TheoryPreliminaries

Two definitions of the relation concept are common in the literature.  Although it is usually clear in context which definition is being used at a given time, it tends to become less clear as contexts collide, or as discussion moves from one context to another.

The same sort of ambiguity arose in the development of the function concept and it may save a measure of effort to follow the pattern of resolution that worked itself out there.

When we speak of a function f : X \to Y we are thinking of a mathematical object whose articulation requires three pieces of data, specifying the set X, the set Y, and a particular subset of their cartesian product {X \times Y}.  So far so good.

Let us write f = (\mathrm{obj_1}f, \mathrm{obj_2}f, \mathrm{obj_{12}}f) to express what has been said so far.

When it comes to parsing the notation {}^{\backprime\backprime} f : X \to Y {}^{\prime\prime}, everyone takes the part {}^{\backprime\backprime} X \to Y {}^{\prime\prime} as indicating the type of the function, in effect defining \mathrm{type}(f) as the pair (\mathrm{obj_1}f, \mathrm{obj_2}f), but {}^{\backprime\backprime} f {}^{\prime\prime} is used equivocally to denote both the triple (\mathrm{obj_1}f, \mathrm{obj_2}f, \mathrm{obj_{12}}f) and the subset \mathrm{obj_{12}}f forming one part of it.

One way to resolve the ambiguity is to formalize a distinction between the function f = (\mathrm{obj_1}f, \mathrm{obj_2}f, \mathrm{obj_{12}}f) and its graph, defining \mathrm{graph}(f) = \mathrm{obj_{12}}f.

Another tactic treats the whole notation {}^{\backprime\backprime} f : X \to Y {}^{\prime\prime} as a name for the triple, letting {}^{\backprime\backprime} f {}^{\prime\prime} denote \mathrm{graph}(f).

In categorical and computational contexts, at least initially, the type is regarded as an essential attribute or integral part of the function itself.  In other contexts we may wish to use a more abstract concept of function, treating a function as a mathematical object capable of being viewed under many different types.

Following the pattern of the functional case, let the notation {}^{\backprime\backprime} L \subseteq X \times Y {}^{\prime\prime} bring to mind a mathematical object specified by three pieces of data, the set X, the set Y, and a particular subset of their cartesian product {X \times Y}.  As before we have two choices, either let L be the triple (X, Y, \mathrm{graph}(L)) or let {}^{\backprime\backprime} L {}^{\prime\prime} denote \mathrm{graph}(L) and choose another name for the triple.

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Relation Theory • 1

Here’s an introduction to Relation Theory geared to applications and taking a moderately general view at least as far as finite numbers of relational domains are concerned (k-adic or k-ary relations).

Relation Theory

This article treats relations from the perspective of combinatorics, in other words, as a subject matter in discrete mathematics, with special attention to finite structures and concrete set‑theoretic constructions, many of which arise quite naturally in applications.  This approach to relation theory, or the theory of relations, is distinguished from, though closely related to, its study from the perspectives of abstract algebra on the one hand and formal logic on the other.

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Zeroth Law Of Semiotics • Discussion 1

Re: Zeroth Law Of Semiotics • Comment 2
Re: Laws of FormJohn Mingers

JM:
Hmmm
Sounds terribly like analytic philosophy to me.
There are not real philosophical problems, it’s all just a matter of misuse of words.
Have you seen the world out there — there really are problems that philosophy ought to try and help with!!!

Dear John,

If I have a philosophy it would be pragmatism.  A pragmatist — or pragmatician as I sometimes prefer — is more like a type of reflective practitioner, one who applies the pragmatic maxim to clarify ideas, all the better to apply ideas to pressing realities.

Pragmatic Maxim
The pragmatic maxim is a guideline for the practice of inquiry formulated by Charles Sanders Peirce.  Serving as a normative recommendation or regulative principle in the normative science of logic, its function is to guide the conduct of thought toward the achievement of its aims, advising the addressee on an optimal way of “attaining clearness of apprehension”.

In pragmatic ways of thinking, semiotics is a discipline of critical reflection charged with sorting out the respective roles of signs, ideas, and objects (including objects in the sense of aims, ends, goals, objectives, and purposes) in the activities of communication, learning, and reasoning.

That is what I’m about here.

Regards,

Jon

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All Liar, No Paradox • Discussion 2

Re: Laws of FormJames BoweryJohn Mingers

Dear James, John, et al.

The questions arising in the present discussion take us back to the question of what we are using logical values like \textsc{true} and \textsc{false} for, which takes us back to the question of what we are using our logical systems for.

One of the things we use logical values like \textsc{true} and \textsc{false} for is to mark the sides of a distinction we have drawn, or noticed, or maybe just think we see in a logical universe of discourse or space X.

This leads us to speak of logical functions f : X \to \mathbb{B}, where \mathbb{B} is the so-called boolean domain \mathbb{B} = \{ \textsc{false}, \textsc{true} \}.  But we are really using \mathbb{B} only “up to isomorphism”, as they say in the trade, meaning we are using it as a generic 2-point set and any other 1-bit set will do as well, like \mathbb{B} = \{ 0, 1 \} or \mathbb{B} = \{ \textsc{white}, \textsc{blue} \}, my favorite colors for painting the areas of a venn diagram.

A function like f : X \to \mathbb{B} = \{ 0, 1 \} is called a “characteristic function” in set theory since it characterizes a subset S of X where the value of f is 1.  But I like the language they use in statistics, where f : X \to \mathbb{B} is called an “indicator function” since it indicates a subset of X where f evaluates to 1.

The indicator function of a subset S of X is notated as f_S : X \to \mathbb{B} and defined as the function f_S : X \to \mathbb{B} where f_S (x) = 1 if and only if x \in S.  I like this because it links up nicely with the sense of indication in the calculus of indications.

The indication in question is the subset S of X indicated by the function f_S : X \to \mathbb{B}.  Other names for it are the “fiber” or “pre-image“ of 1.  It is computed by way of the “inverse function” f_S^{-1} in the rather ugly but pre-eminently useful way as S = f_S^{-1}(1).

Regards,

Jon

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All Liar, No Paradox • Discussion 1

Re: Laws of FormJohn Mingers

JM:
Several people have referred recently to the idea that Laws of Form, and particularly Chapter 11 with imaginary logical values, provides an answer to the problems Russell found in Principia Mathematica leading to the Theory of Logical Types, which essentially banned self-referential forms.

I am interested in this and wondered if anyone had done any work on it, or seen any work on it, which actually formulates self-referential forms such as “This sentence if false” into LoF notation?

If so I would be interested to work on it.

Dear John,

The problem with Russell, well, one of the problems with Russell, is not his having or wanting a theory of types but his lacking a theory of signs, a semiotics, which, being afflicted with the isms of logicism, nominalism, syntacticism, and their ilk, the need and utility of which he lacked the sense to know.  That is one of the reasons why I take up Spencer Brown’s calculus of indications and his Laws of Form within the sign-theoretic environment of Peirce’s theory of triadic sign relations.  I’ve written a few things about how the simpler so-called paradoxes look in that framework so I’ll post a sample of those later.

Regards,

Jon

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Logical Graphs, Iconicity, Interpretation • Discussion 2

Re: Logical Graphs, Iconicity, Interpretation • 2
Re: Laws of FormJohn Mingers

JM:
The quote you have given does not match the standard Peircean trichotomy
of icon, index, symbol.  See this quote from [CP 4.447 …]

Dear John,

I hesitate to call any sketch Peirce gave of the big three sign types a “standard Peircean trichotomy of icon, index, symbol”.  Several considerations give me pause on this point.

  • Peirce gave so many instructive and useful characterizations of the main sign types over the years I’d be hard-pressed to declare any one text definitive.  It is not that we have a hermeneutic circle where every text is granted equal weight, only that it takes more analysis to define the terms as yet undefined and to sort all terms involved in order of their mutual and sole dependencies.
  • A cursory inspection of Peirce’s sign types, from major to minor, shows we rarely if ever have true k-tomies, in the sense of mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories.  True, we often speak of dichotomies and trichotomies in loose terms, but now and again loose speech has led to sinking ontologies.

Oops … more to say but need to break for midday sustenance …

Regards,

Jon

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The Difference That Makes A Difference That Peirce Makes • 33

Re: Ontolog ForumWilliam Frank

William Frank asked a question about propositional attitudes and presuppositions.

WF:
Are there any formal languages, such as Common Logic, that adequately represent statements about propositions — statements from which, in natural reasoning, one can draw conclusions about the elements of the embedded proposition?

Dear William,

Propositional attitudes and presuppositions were hot topics in the ’80s —
scanning an old bib I see:

  • Salmon, N.U., and Soames, S. (eds., 1988), Propositions and Attitudes,
    Oxford University Press, New York, NY.

And everyone was reading:

But the roots of the problem go way back, and of course it can’t be rooted out till
more people read and comprehend and apply Peirce’s theory of triadic sign relations.

At this point in time, however, the gravitational pull of Russell’s Planet and its inconstant satellite Quine continue to weigh against any real progress being made.

But even Russell almost, barely, just not completely broke orbit at one of those critical branch points of intellectual history — it appears it was only Wittgenstein who pulled him back from the brink of 3-adicity and back to the 2-folds of dyadic relations.

I discussed all these issues in some detail in the old Standard Upper Ontology (SUO) group and its kin.  Here’s a few pertinent fragments I archived at my current haunts:

Regards,

Jon

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Theme One Program • Discussion 6

Re: Peirce ListJerry Chandler

JC:
This post [Theme One Program • Motivation 1] is so muddled
that I gave up on a meaningful scientific interpretation of it.

Dear Jerry,

Thanks for the response.

I heartily agree with the sentiment we need to pay more attention to
Mathematical And Scientific Substance (MASS) and boggle our brains
less about Purity Of Orthodox Faith (POOF).

That is what I hope to do here, on the one hand giving a realistic account of real‑world problems I encountered through the years and along the way describing how the logic of science and the tools of mathematics, especially as articulated by C.S. Peirce and tested in computational experiment, helped to address them or at least to clarify my understanding of their nature.

But that first post is only a preamble, so I hope you’ll stay tuned …

Regards,

Jon

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Theme One Program • Discussion 5

I’ve been going back and looking again at the problems and questions which nudged me into the computational sphere as a way of building our human capacities for inquiry, learning, and reasoning.

One critical issue, you might even say bifurcation point, came up again on the Peirce List almost a decade ago in discussing the so-called “Symbol Grounding Problem”, a problem I thought had long been laid to rest, at least, among readers of Peirce, who ought to have no trouble grasping how the problem dissolves as soon as placed in the medium of Peirce’s sign relations.

Here is how the ghost of a problem returned to haunt us on that occasion …

All of which led me to recall the problems I worked on all through the ’80s …

I spent one of my parallel lives in the 1980s earning a Master’s degree in psychology, concentrating on the quantitative-statistical branch with courses in systems theory, simulation, and mathematical models, plus a healthy diet of courses and seminars in cognitive science and counseling psychology.  Instead of the usual thesis I submitted a computer program which integrated a module for multi-level sequential learning with a module for propositional constraint satisfaction, the latter based on an extension of Peirce’s logical graphs.

All the hottest topics of artificial intelligence and cognitive science from those days enjoy no end of periodic revivals, and though it brings me a twinge of nostalgia to see those old chestnuts being fired up again, those problems now seem to me as problems existing only for a peculiar tradition of thought, a tradition ever occupied with chasing will o’ th’ wisps Peirce dispersed long before the chase began.

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Logical Graphs, Iconicity, Interpretation • Discussion 1

Re: Logical Graphs, Iconicity, Interpretation • 1
Re: Laws of FormJohn Mingers

JM:
I’m impressed that you have read Ricoeur — my impression is that Americans don’t have much time for Continental philosophy (a huge generalisation of course).

Have you looked at Habermas?  He uses Peirce’s work as well as hermeneutics (mainly Gadamer) and critical theory to come up with what he calls a theory of communicative action.  He also called it “universal pragmatics” at one time as a nod to both Chomsky and semiotics.

Dear John,

That observation from Ricoeur’s Conflict of Interpretations comes from a time when Susan Awbrey and I were exploring the synergies of action research, critical thinking, classical and post-modern hermeneutics, and C.S. Peirce’s triadic relational semiotics.  We benefited greatly from our study of Gadamer, Habermas, Ricoeur and a little more from Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard, aided by the panoramic surveys of Richard J. Bernstein.  All that led to a paper we gave at a conference on Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, subsequently published as “Interpretation as Action : The Risk of Inquiry” (doc) (pdf).

I found Ricoeur’s comment fitting in the present connection because it speaks to the way identical modulations of a medium may convey different messages to different cultures and contexts of communication.  Conversely, conveying the same message to different cultures and contexts of communication may require different modulations of the same medium.

That is precisely the situation we observe in the Table from Episode 1, for ease of reference repeated below.  The objects to be conveyed are the 16 boolean functions on 2 variables, whose venn diagrams appear in Column 1.  And we have the two cultures of interpreters, Entitative and Existential, whose graphical and parenthetical forms of expression for the boolean functions are shown in Column 2 and Column 3, respectively.

\text{Boolean Functions and Logical Graphs on Two Variables}

Boolean Functions and Logical Graphs on Two Variables

References

  • Awbrey, J.L., and Awbrey, S.M. (Autumn 1995), “Interpretation as Action : The Risk of Inquiry”, Inquiry : Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 15(1), 40–52.  ArchiveJournal.  Online (doc) (pdf).
  • Awbrey, J.L., and Awbrey, S.M. (June 1992), “Interpretation as Action : The Risk of Inquiry”, The Eleventh International Human Science Research Conference, Oakland University, Rochester, Michigan.

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