Ask Meno Questions • Discussion 2

Re: Victoria N. Alexander

I tend to favor that general way of speaking, having been brought up on classical cybernetics, optimal control, and systems theory, where we think of a system as passing through its state space, controlled by its objective to optimize a specific objective function defined on its space of states.  When it comes to choosing intuition-aiding names for the various components of systems and regions of state spaces, those details can be fit to the particular type of system in view.

In the case of creatures like ourselves, it is possible to regard our conscious contents as representing our body’s theory of what is likely to deserve our mind’s attention.  If that theory is a good one, then we may live to be conscious of another day.

Posted in C.S. Peirce, Cybernetics, Epistemology, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Intelligent Systems, Meno, Optimal Control, Peirce, Philosophy, Pragmatism, Semiotics, Systems Theory | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Ask Meno Questions • Discussion 1

Re: Victoria N. Alexander

I think you are stating several important insights.

The word object in pragmatism and pragmatic semiotics has a much wider range of meanings than the extremely reductive sense of a “compact physical object”.  Anyone wishing to explore the richness of its meaning could hardly do better than to sample the senses of the Greek pragma that imbue the Latin-derived object.

There is reason to think that the sense of the word object that means objective, purpose, target, intention, goal, end, aim, and so on is more fundamental than the more restrictive sense of a compact physical object.  That is in fact one of the most critical insights that comes down to us from long lines of physical theory and also from the traditions known as “process thinking”, suggesting that our concepts of physical objects are derivative in relation to our concepts of process, since they arise from our ability to discover “invariants under transformations”, that is, the formal constructs that are preserved by the operations or processes that transform the states of a system.

As a general rule, we should avoid language that confuses signs and objects.  In particular, referring to mental representations as “ideal objects” is just asking for trouble, and that on several counts, including the risk of confusing mental ideas with Platonic ideas.  Language like that brings all the confusions of conceptualism, nominalism, and psychologism down on our heads.

Given that Peirce’s critique of Cartesian philosophy is of a piece with the rest of his thought, it does not seem wise to backslide on this score and reinfect semiotics with the dualisms that Peirce was so persistent in rooting out.  For example, so far as the mind/body dualism goes, Peirce regarded the body as one of the first objects that a developing being would naturally “construct” from the flux of experience, that is, construe or conceptualize as an object from the impressions available in the stream of awareness.  There is a potential misunderstanding that needs to be avoided here.  It is not that noticing a dualism is a bad thing — where one is operative it cannot be denied.  The important thing is — by the time one notices a dualism, one has already become a third party, a mediator, a synthetic operator, and so one must recognize that more than two components are already in play.

Posted in C.S. Peirce, Descartes, Education, Epistemology, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Intelligent Systems, Learning, Meno, Peirce, Philosophy, Plato, Pragmatism, Semiotics, Socrates, Teaching, Triadicity | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

Ask Meno Questions • Chrysalis

Chrysalis

Memories of being held
      In closely knit spheres
And guided beyond the orbits
      Of childhood fears
Entrusted with a word
      That rustles in a breath
And warrants respect for
      The not yet beautiful

In Honor of My Parents’ Golden Wedding Anniversary
Jon Awbrey, Amherst, Massachusetts, March 21, 1996

“That is a chrysalis”, she said, when I showed her that funny-looking thing on the leaf. In that moment I, the thing, and the word were one. I learned a word, I wrapped it around a new-found thing, and I listened in wonder to my mother’s story of what it was and what it would be.

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Ask Meno Questions

Re: Richard Hake • Experiment by Argentinian Neuroscientists Suggests “Socratic” (i.e. “Platonic”) Dialogue Is An Educational Failure

I would not have imagined it possible to read Plato’s Meno quite so literally as those inquirers did — but now I do not have to imagine it, and so, in a way, I have learned something.

But taken more liberally than literally, Plato’s dialogue raises important questions about the nature of learning and teaching, of communication and creativity, and ultimately about the nature of inquiry itself.

What does it mean to learn?  to teach?  What does it mean to gain information?  to transfer it from a place where it is to a place where it isn’t?  What are the conditions for the possibility of all those things — learning and teaching, acquiring and transferring information?

After all this time, those questions remain open …

cc: Academia.edu

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Pragmatics, Enthymeme, Rhetoric, Semiotics

Re: Peirce List • Kirsti Määttänen

Aristotle’s approach to rhetoric is one of the bridges to Peirce’s pragmatism.  It treats forms of argument that “consider the audience”, in effect, that take the nature and condition of the interpreter into account, and it deals with enthymemes, syllogisms some of whose premisses are “held in mind”, implicit in the state of belief or knowledge base of the interpreter.

Here are two threads of previous discussion in which the subjects of enthymeme and Aristotle’s Rhetoric came up:

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The Power of Peirce’s Thought • 3

Re: Stephen Rose

There are reasons why I felt compelled to stand back from the picture that others were painting — of opposing personal styles in the creative process and also in the wider intellectual landscape — and to seek a Peircean perspective on the tensions that were being portrayed between the contrasting alternatives.  I broke off with words that were roughly to this effect:

  • Beyond the pale of Peirce the great majority of discussions in that vein tend to bedevil themselves interminably with a style of dichotomous thinking that Peirce taught us ways to transcend.

On third thought, “transcend” is not exactly the right word, as I’d never want to suggest that the tensions are not real, or that it pays to resolve them too prematurely.  Still, it is hardly ever the case that the lost chord is lost forever.

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The Power of Peirce’s Thought • 2

Re: Kirsti Määttänen

You give a good description of the encounter with uncertainty, that unsettled state of mind that irks a person to inquire after new grounds of belief.  Viewed in biological perspective, it is only natural that evolution associates the affects it does with states of doubt.  Animal fear befits the animal that does not know which way to turn in a situation of peril — and what situation is not potentially a situation of peril if a creature does not know what it ought to do next?

But one of the marks of a more evolved creature is a greater tolerance for uncertainty, a greater capacity for reflection on doubtful situations, not necessarily in the middle of the fray — that can be paralyzing — but in the cool of the afterthoughts that a creature can turn to good use in trying to anticipate similar situations in the future.

That greater capacity for reflection on one’s ongoing situation requires a greater ability to generate alternative descriptions and courses of action.  That amounts to a capacity for creating or constructing a larger conceptual “search space” than the one assumed at the start — in the idiom, “thinking outside the box”.

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The Power of Peirce’s Thought • 1

I often wonder that more people do not avail themselves of the power of Peirce’s thought.  “What are they afraid of?” I ask myself.  I find myself asking it that way because there really does seem to be a persistent obstruction or a positive refusal to take that extra step up to the level of 3-adic thinking.

In pursuing that question I have found a few sources that seem to help with the answer.  First and foremost would have to be Dewey’s Quest for Certainty.  The next source that comes to mind would be the work of Sorrentino and Roney on individual differences in orientations to uncertainty.

  • Dewey, John (1929), The Quest for Certainty : A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action, Minton, Balch, and Company, New York, NY.  Reprinted, pp. 1–254 in John Dewey, The Later Works, 1925–1953, Volume 4 : 1929, Jo Ann Boydston (ed.), Harriet Furst Simon (text. ed.), Stephen Toulmin (intro.), Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville, IL, 1984.
  • Sorrentino, Richard M., and Roney, Christopher J.R. (2000), The Uncertain Mind : Individual Differences in Facing the Unknown, (Essays in Social Psychology, Miles Hewstone (ed.)), Taylor and Francis, Philadelphia, PA.  Preview.
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Nominalism and Essentialism are the Scylla and Charybdis that Pragmatism Must Navigate Its Middle Way Between

Cf: Peirce List Discussion

Earlier this summer, Ayşe Mermutlu posted a notice of Nathan Houser’s review of Paul Forster’s Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism to the Facebook page of the Charles S. Peirce Society and a brief discussion ensued.

My initial comment was this —

  • Nominalism and Essentialism are the Scylla and Charybdis that Pragmatism must navigate its middle way between.

On being asked what I meant by “essentialism”, I explained it as follows —

  • This is idea that all phenomena are explained by absolute (monadic, non-relative, or ontological) essences inhering in objects, as opposed to any notion that some phenomena can be explained only in terms of relations among objects. For instance, in semiotics, essentialism leads to the idea that signhood is a permanent essence inhering in something, as a matter of its ontology, as opposed to a role that something performs within the setting of a sign relation.

On further interrogation, I added this —

  • If nominalism is the doctrine that generals are only names and only individuals have objective existence, then essentialism is the doctrine that all names (logical terms) refer to properties of individuals. So a term like “father” is only a relative term relative to the perspective of a non-omniscient being who cannot see what individuals are destined to be fathers and what not.

I think it fair to say that most of the Peirce crew is handy enough when it comes to steering clear of nominalism’s rock-monster, but not so well-drilled in navigating safely by essentialism’s whirly places. At any rate, I keep seeing a drift in that direction pulling the good ship Pragmatism into the eddy of a most likely futile sea battle, and I thought it incumbent on the duty of my watch to report what I see.

I shared the above thoughts in a post to the Peirce List.  Responding to comments by Aaron Massecar, I elaborated as follows —

  • That was more of summary response to a particular tendency in the reception of Peirce, as I have watched it over several decades, but most surprisingly in the last 10 years. There have been elements of recent discussions that brought the question back to mind, but I have a feeling it would be preferable to tackle the issue head on, from scratch.
  • It is not so much a problem with essences, per se, as with their placement in the world of objects. The concept of an essence is flexible enough that even relations of arbitrary arities can be said to have essences, but that is being flexible to the point of vacuity. What really matters is the arity, definition, and extension of the relation in question. Saying that a phenomenon exhibits “thirdness” is only the first step in describing it. What matters next, and for the remainder of the inquiry into it, is discovering what triadic relation describes it best.
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Two Ideals

Two ideals are struggling for supremacy in American life today: one the industrial ideal, dominating thru the supremacy of commercialism, which subordinates the worker to the product and the machine; the other, the ideal of democracy, the ideal of the educators, which places humanity above all machines, and demands that all activity shall be the expression of life. If this ideal of the educators cannot be carried over into the industrial field, then the ideal of industrialism will be carried over into the school. Those two ideals can no more continue to exist in American life than our nation could have continued half slave and half free. If the school cannot bring joy to the work of the world, the joy must go out of its own life, and work in the school as in the factory will become drudgery.

Margaret Haley • “Why Teachers Should Organize” (1901)

∗ Diane Ravitch • “Advice from Margaret Haley, Leader of Teacher Unionism”

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