Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy, Inquiry • 1

Here are several excursions I made into the subjects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction, and Analogy, comparing Peirce’s first formulations with those in Aristotle and focusing on the ways those patterns of inference fit into the Cycle of Inquiry.  Much of this work was done within the context of an AI/Systems Engineering project to develop computational tools for scientific inquiry, seeking applications to bridge the gap between qualitative and quantitative research methodologies.

cc: Peirce List (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

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i write in order to remember myself

just so i don’t forget

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C.S. Peirce • New Elements (Καινὰ Στοιχεῖα) • Comment 1

Re: Peirce List • (1)(2)
Re: C.S. Peirce • New Elements (Καινὰ Στοιχεῖα) • 1

Interest in the reading of Peirce’s “New Elements” appears to be flagging of late, so I thought I might spice things up by playing the Devil’s Advocate on a series of critical points.  I’ll draw these points both from Peirce’s text and from the various commentaries on it.  Heaven knows I’m not accustomed to finding fault with the Peircean canon — by way of reminding myself to mount a spirited opposition, then, I’ll mark the specific objections I make in this role with the tag DA.

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C.S. Peirce • New Elements (Καινὰ Στοιχεῖα) • 1

Selections from C.S. Peirce, “New Elements (Καινὰ Στοιχεῖα)”

Editors’ Headnote from The Essential Peirce, Volume 2

MS 517.  [First published in NEM 4:235–63.  This document was most probably written in early 1904, as a preface to an intended book on the foundations of mathematics.]  Peirce begins with a discussion of “the Euclidean style” he planned to follow in his book.  Euclid’s Elements presuppose an understanding of the logical structure of mathematics (geometry) that Peirce, in his “New Elements,” wants to explicate.  Having recently concluded that the scope of logic should be extended to include all of semiotics, Peirce now wants to work out the semiotic principles that he hopes will shed light on the most abstract science.  Building on the work in his 1903 “Syllabus,” Peirce deepens his semiotic theory by linking it with the mathematical conceptions of “degrees of degeneracy.”  Symbols are taken to be non-degenerate, genuine, signs, while indices are signs degenerate in the first degree and icons are degenerate in the second degree.  Symbols must always involve both indices and icons, and indices must always involve icons.  Peirce limits his attention to this trichotomy but carries his discussion deeply into epistemology and metaphysics, making such arresting claims as that “representations have power to cause real facts” and that “there can be no reality which has not the life of a symbol.”  Max Fisch described this paper as Peirce’s “best statement so far of his general theory of signs.”  (EP 2, 300).

Peirce Edition Project (eds., 1998), The Essential Peirce, Selected Philosophical Writings, Volume 2 (1893–1913), Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN.  Cited as EP 2.

Posted in C.S. Peirce, Foundations of Mathematics, Logic, Mathematics, Peirce, Semiotics | Tagged , , , , , | 3 Comments

Light in the Clearing

I will keep returning to my core values.
I will keep speaking from the center of my experience.

Disorder all around me? — What does it matter?

As long as there is order in my mind,
As long as my mind is in order,
I will start from there.

Jon Awbrey
7 August 2012

Posted in Anthem, Verse | Tagged , | 2 Comments

Higher Order Sign Relations • 1

When interpreters reflect on their use of signs they require an appropriate technical language in which to pursue their reflections.  They need signs referring to sign relations, signs referring to elements and components of sign relations, and signs referring to properties and classes of sign relations.  The orders of signs developing as reflection evolves can be organized under the heading of “higher order signs” and the reflective sign relations involving them can be referred to as “higher order sign relations”.

I’ve been working apace to format my old dissertation proposal on Inquiry Driven Systems for the web but I was reminded of this part when the subject of “signs about signs” came up recently on the Peirce List.

cc: Conceptual GraphsCyberneticsLaws of FormOntolog Forum
cc: FB | Inquiry Driven SystemsStructural ModelingSystems Science

Posted in C.S. Peirce, Higher Order Sign Relations, Inquiry, Inquiry Into Inquiry, Logic, Mathematics, Recursion, Reflection, Relation Theory, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Type Theory | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , | 8 Comments

Καινὰ Στοιχεῖα


Angelina Suite, Duggan Place, Stratford, Ontario, 15 July 2012, 5:24 am

Angelina Suite • Duggan Place • Stratford • Ontario • 15 July 2012 • 5:24 am

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Notes on the Foundations of Mathematics • 2

Selections from R.L. Wilder, Introduction to the Foundations of Mathematics

I.   The Axiomatic Method

Since the axiomatic method as it is now understood and practiced by mathematicians is the result of a long evolution in human thought, we shall precede our discussion of it by a brief description of some older uses of the term axiom.  The modern usage of the term represents a high degree of maturity, and a better understanding of it may be achieved by some acquaintance with the course of its evolution.

1.   Evolution of the Method

If the reader has at hand a copy of an elementary plane geometry, of a type frequently used in high schools, he may find two groupings of fundamental assumptions, one entitled “Axioms,” the other entitled “Postulates.”  The intent of this grouping may be explained by such accompanying remarks as:  “An axiom is a self-evident truth.”  “A postulate is a geometrical fact so simple and obvious that its validity may be assumed.”  The “axioms” themselves may contain such statements as:  “The whole is greater than any of its parts.”  “The whole is the sum of its parts.”  “Things equal to the same thing are equal to one another.”  “Equals added to equals yield equals.”  It will be noted that such geometric terms as “point” or “line” do not occur in these statements;  in some sense the axioms are intended to transcend geometry — to be “universal truths.”  In contrast, the “postulates” probably contain such statements as:  “Through two distinct points one and only one straight line can be drawn.”  “A line can be extended indefinitely.”  “If L is a line and P is a point not on L, then through P there can be drawn one and only one line parallel to L.”  (Some so-called “definitions” of terms usually precede these statements.)

This grouping into “axioms” and “postulates” has its roots in antiquity.  Thus we find in Aristotle (384–321 B.C.) the following viewpoint: †

“Every demonstrative science must start from indemonstrable principles;  otherwise, the steps of demonstration would be endless.  Of these indemonstrable principles some are (a) common to all sciences, others are (b) particular, or peculiar to the particular science;  (a) the common principles are the axioms, most commonly illustrated by the axiom that, if equals be subtracted from equals, the remainders are equal.  In (b) we have first the genus or subject-matter, the existence of which must be assumed.”

† As summarized by T.L. Heath, [The Thirteen Books of Euclid’s Elements, I, 119, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1908].  The reader is referred to this book for citations from Aristotle, Proclus, et al.

Reference

  • Wilder, Raymond L. (1952), Introduction to the Foundations of Mathematics, John Wiley and Sons, New York, NY.
Posted in C.S. Peirce, Foundations of Mathematics, Kaina Stoicheia, Logic, Mathematics, Semiotics | Tagged , , , , , | Leave a comment

Notes on the Foundations of Mathematics • 1

Re: Peirce List Discussions 2012 • (1) (2)(3)(4)
Cf: Previous Discussions 2005–2006 • (A)(B)(C)

I will have to be off and on the internet for the next month or so, and won’t be able to keep up with the formal activities on the List.  But I have been thinking a lot about the current state of discussion, along with the several bouts of past discussions on topics related to Peirce’s “Kaina Stoicheia” — I tend to call it that so as not to confuse it with the four volumes of The New Elements of Mathematics.

The editors of The Essential Peirce say Peirce’s “Kaina Stoicheia” was written “as a preface to an intended book on the foundations of mathematics”, but that much already requires our careful reflection in view of the way Peirce makes normative science, logic included, depend on the strife-born twins of mathematics and phenomenology.  With that in mind, “foundations of mathematics” is a loose enough term that what the editors say may well be true, in one sense or another, but that sense is likely to be radically other than the meaning of thinkers who would reduce mathematics to deductive logic alone.

At any rate, that is a topic for another discussion.

What I’m noticing in my reflections on past and present discussions of these topics is the evident lack of a common language when it comes to the foundation of mathematics, in whatever sense we might have in mind.  So I thought it might serve to collect a few notes on the subject from here and there among the canons and allied commentaries on foundations.

I am going to start with excerpts from the now-classic textbook by Raymond L. Wilder, Introduction to the Foundations of Mathematics.  This was my first formal introduction to the subject, used in the course that Frank Harary taught at the University of Michigan back in the 1970s.

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Approaching Peirce

I gradually grow accustomed to the distinct possibility that there will always be different readings, and even divergent interpretations of Peirce’s writings. Some of that appears to be a two- or three-cultures issue — the readings that befit aesthetic, cultural, and literary aims often part ways with the readings that work best for logical, mathematical, and scientific ends. Partly this is due to the fact that applications to the humanities are soon over-whelmed with the vastly greater complexities of their theatres of operation, and so must be satisfied with very impressionistic and highly sketchy surveys of their realms.

It hasn’t always been this way with me, but most of the time these days I approach Peirce’s work from the standpoint of a practical mathematician focused on applications to empirical sciences, as luck would determine it, to the Odyssean no man’s land between qualitative and quantitative methods. That is far from how I started out, and there were many crises of mind and mood occasioned by the transits of my transdisciplinarity, but that is how it came to be at the present moment.

At any rate, what I find in Peirce are not antiques but tools toward the future.

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