Ask Meno Questions

Re: Richard Hake • Experiment by Argentinian Neuroscientists Suggests “Socratic” (i.e. “Platonic”) Dialogue Is An Educational Failure

I would not have imagined it possible to read Plato’s Meno quite so literally as those inquirers did — but now I do not have to imagine it, and so, in a way, I have learned something.

But taken more liberally than literally, Plato’s dialogue raises important questions about the nature of learning and teaching, of communication and creativity, and ultimately about the nature of inquiry itself.

What does it mean to learn?  to teach?  What does it mean to gain information?  to transfer it from a place where it is to a place where it isn’t?  What are the conditions for the possibility of all those things — learning and teaching, acquiring and transferring information?

After all this time, those questions remain open …

cc: Academia.edu

Posted in Anamnesis, Dialogue, Education, Epistemology, Innate Ideas, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Inquiry Into Inquiry, Intelligent Systems, Learning, Meno, Philosophy, Plato, Socrates, Teaching | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 6 Comments

Pragmatics, Enthymeme, Rhetoric, Semiotics

Re: Peirce ListKirsti Määttänen

Aristotle’s approach to rhetoric is one of the bridges to Peirce’s pragmatism.  It treats forms of argument that “consider the audience”, in effect, that take the nature and condition of the interpreter into account, and it deals with enthymemes, syllogisms some of whose premisses are “held in mind”, implicit in the state of belief or knowledge base of the interpreter.

Here are two threads of previous discussion in which the subjects of enthymeme and Aristotle’s Rhetoric came up:

Posted in Aristotle, C.S. Peirce, Enthymeme, Pragmatics, Pragmatism, Rhetoric, Semiotics, Syllogism | Tagged , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

The Power of Peirce’s Thought • 3

Re: Stephen Rose

There are reasons why I felt compelled to stand back from the picture that others were painting — of opposing personal styles in the creative process and also in the wider intellectual landscape — and to seek a Peircean perspective on the tensions that were being portrayed between the contrasting alternatives.  I broke off with words that were roughly to this effect:

  • Beyond the pale of Peirce the great majority of discussions in that vein tend to bedevil themselves interminably with a style of dichotomous thinking that Peirce taught us ways to transcend.

On third thought, “transcend” is not exactly the right word, as I’d never want to suggest that the tensions are not real, or that it pays to resolve them too prematurely.  Still, it is hardly ever the case that the lost chord is lost forever.

Posted in C.S. Peirce, Dewey, Inquiry, Peirce, References, Triadic Relations, Triadicity, Uncertainty | Tagged , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

The Power of Peirce’s Thought • 2

Re: Kirsti Määttänen

You give a good description of the encounter with uncertainty, that unsettled state of mind that irks a person to inquire after new grounds of belief.  Viewed in biological perspective, it is only natural that evolution associates the affects it does with states of doubt.  Animal fear befits the animal that does not know which way to turn in a situation of peril — and what situation is not potentially a situation of peril if a creature does not know what it ought to do next?

But one of the marks of a more evolved creature is a greater tolerance for uncertainty, a greater capacity for reflection on doubtful situations, not necessarily in the middle of the fray — that can be paralyzing — but in the cool of the afterthoughts that a creature can turn to good use in trying to anticipate similar situations in the future.

That greater capacity for reflection on one’s ongoing situation requires a greater ability to generate alternative descriptions and courses of action.  That amounts to a capacity for creating or constructing a larger conceptual “search space” than the one assumed at the start — in the idiom, “thinking outside the box”.

Posted in C.S. Peirce, Dewey, Inquiry, Peirce, References, Triadic Relations, Triadicity, Uncertainty | Tagged , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

The Power of Peirce’s Thought • 1

I often wonder that more people do not avail themselves of the power of Peirce’s thought.  “What are they afraid of?” I ask myself.  I find myself asking it that way because there really does seem to be a persistent obstruction or a positive refusal to take that extra step up to the level of 3-adic thinking.

In pursuing that question I have found a few sources that seem to help with the answer.  First and foremost would have to be Dewey’s Quest for Certainty.  The next source that comes to mind would be the work of Sorrentino and Roney on individual differences in orientations to uncertainty.

  • Dewey, John (1929), The Quest for Certainty : A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action, Minton, Balch, and Company, New York, NY.  Reprinted, pp. 1–254 in John Dewey, The Later Works, 1925–1953, Volume 4 : 1929, Jo Ann Boydston (ed.), Harriet Furst Simon (text. ed.), Stephen Toulmin (intro.), Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville, IL, 1984.
  • Sorrentino, Richard M., and Roney, Christopher J.R. (2000), The Uncertain Mind : Individual Differences in Facing the Unknown, (Essays in Social Psychology, Miles Hewstone (ed.)), Taylor and Francis, Philadelphia, PA.  Preview.
Posted in C.S. Peirce, Dewey, Inquiry, Peirce, References, Triadic Relations, Triadicity, Uncertainty | Tagged , , , , , , , | 2 Comments

Nominalism and Essentialism are the Scylla and Charybdis that Pragmatism Must Navigate Its Middle Way Between

Cf: Peirce List Discussion

Earlier this summer, Ayşe Mermutlu posted a notice of Nathan Houser’s review of Paul Forster’s Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism to the Facebook page of the Charles S. Peirce Society and a brief discussion ensued.

My initial comment was this —

  • Nominalism and Essentialism are the Scylla and Charybdis that Pragmatism must navigate its middle way between.

On being asked what I meant by “essentialism”, I explained it as follows —

  • This is idea that all phenomena are explained by absolute (monadic, non-relative, or ontological) essences inhering in objects, as opposed to any notion that some phenomena can be explained only in terms of relations among objects. For instance, in semiotics, essentialism leads to the idea that signhood is a permanent essence inhering in something, as a matter of its ontology, as opposed to a role that something performs within the setting of a sign relation.

On further interrogation, I added this —

  • If nominalism is the doctrine that generals are only names and only individuals have objective existence, then essentialism is the doctrine that all names (logical terms) refer to properties of individuals. So a term like “father” is only a relative term relative to the perspective of a non-omniscient being who cannot see what individuals are destined to be fathers and what not.

I think it fair to say that most of the Peirce crew is handy enough when it comes to steering clear of nominalism’s rock-monster, but not so well-drilled in navigating safely by essentialism’s whirly places. At any rate, I keep seeing a drift in that direction pulling the good ship Pragmatism into the eddy of a most likely futile sea battle, and I thought it incumbent on the duty of my watch to report what I see.

I shared the above thoughts in a post to the Peirce List.  Responding to comments by Aaron Massecar, I elaborated as follows —

  • That was more of summary response to a particular tendency in the reception of Peirce, as I have watched it over several decades, but most surprisingly in the last 10 years. There have been elements of recent discussions that brought the question back to mind, but I have a feeling it would be preferable to tackle the issue head on, from scratch.
  • It is not so much a problem with essences, per se, as with their placement in the world of objects. The concept of an essence is flexible enough that even relations of arbitrary arities can be said to have essences, but that is being flexible to the point of vacuity. What really matters is the arity, definition, and extension of the relation in question. Saying that a phenomenon exhibits “thirdness” is only the first step in describing it. What matters next, and for the remainder of the inquiry into it, is discovering what triadic relation describes it best.
Posted in C.S. Peirce, Essentialism, Nominalism, Peirce, Peirce List, Philosophy, Pragmatism | Tagged , , , , , , | 3 Comments

Two Ideals

Two ideals are struggling for supremacy in American life today: one the industrial ideal, dominating thru the supremacy of commercialism, which subordinates the worker to the product and the machine; the other, the ideal of democracy, the ideal of the educators, which places humanity above all machines, and demands that all activity shall be the expression of life. If this ideal of the educators cannot be carried over into the industrial field, then the ideal of industrialism will be carried over into the school. Those two ideals can no more continue to exist in American life than our nation could have continued half slave and half free. If the school cannot bring joy to the work of the world, the joy must go out of its own life, and work in the school as in the factory will become drudgery.

Margaret Haley • “Why Teachers Should Organize” (1901)

Diane Ravitch • “Advice from Margaret Haley, Leader of Teacher Unionism

Posted in Commerce, Democracy, Education, References, The Big Picture | Tagged , , , , | 1 Comment

These are the times that try men’s soles

You see, even though back then Barack was a Senator and a presidential candidate … to me, he was still the guy who’d picked me up for our dates in a car that was so rusted out, I could actually see the pavement going by through a hole in the passenger side door … he was the guy whose proudest possession was a coffee table he’d found in a dumpster, and whose only pair of decent shoes was half a size too small.

First Lady Michelle Obama • Charlotte NC • September 4, 2012

And understand this: If American workers are being denied their right to organize and collectively bargain when I’m in the White House, I’ll put on a comfortable pair of shoes myself, I’ll walk on that picket line with you as President of the United States of America. Because workers deserve to know that somebody is standing in their corner.

Senator Barack Obama • Spartanburg SC • November 3, 2007

Posted in Democracy, Governance, Politics, Rhetoric, Sources | Tagged , , , , | 1 Comment

Our Ship Of State❢ Behold Its Wake❢

O Speech Divine —
You touched our hearts,
You stirred our minds.

But when we brush the tears away
And turn our faces toward the day,
We beg of you but one thing just:

Look Homeward, Angel, Look Home —
Behold Its Wake, Our Ship Of State.

Posted in Anthem, Democracy, Economics, Education, Governance, Politics, The Big Picture, Verse | Tagged , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

C.S. Peirce • Logic of Number (MS 229)

Selections from C.S. Peirce, [Logic of Number] (MS 229)

I printed a paper on the Logic of Number in 1866, and it was not made up out of the first thoughts that came into my head about it, by any means, either.  But I was not satisfied with what I had done and studied over the matter a great deal until in 1882, or thereabouts, I printed another paper on the same subject, dealing with it in a wholly different way.  Still I was not satisfied, and after many years more study, I determined to write a book expounding the logic of algebra and geometry.  This I did in two years of solid work at my lonely country-place where I could and did labor day and night upon it uninterruptedly.  Messrs. Ginn accepted the book for publication;  but I was not satisfied with it and rewrote it entirely, putting another year’s labor into it.  I am not altogether satisfied yet;  but still, as far as the part relating to number goes, I think the theory of it is as well as I can do.

In the first place, it is necessary to understand the general nature of mathematics and its reasoning.  Mathematics, speaking broadly, is historically the earliest of the sciences.  Unless a collection of absurd medical prescriptions be counted for science, the earliest scientific treatise which has come down to us is on mathematics.  Pythagoras was a true mathematician, ages before there was any true physics or [psychology] or philosophy.  Astronomy became scientific very early;  but it used mathematics from the outset.

The morphologistic biologists tell us that the development of the individual is an epitome of the previous history of the development of the race.  Some great pedagogists make this principle the chief guide to a true system of education.  Even if this exaggerates its importance (as I humbly opine it does) yet there is something in it;  and Dr. Thomas Hill was no doubt right that the study of mathematics should antecede puberty.  A child is better fit by far to understand mathematics than anything else except mechanics;  and it is almost the only study which will remain a valuable accomplishment though life.

All other sciences without exception depend upon the principles of mathematics;  and mathematics borrows nothing from them but hints.

Mathematics also heads the list of sciences in the sense of being the most abstract.  It is more abstract than metaphysics or even than logic itself.  For mathematics is the only science which asserts nothing as a fact.  It does nothing but make hypotheses and deduce their consequences.  (See my article “The Regenerated Logic” in the Monist for October 1896, p. 23.)  That is the first thing which must be clearly apprehended in order to understand number.

My father’s definition “mathematics is the science which draws necessary conclusions” at least implies the truth.  Modern logic shows that all necessary inference is really mathematical; and no inference could be necessary if it related to anything more than a hypothesis.

But the best definition is “mathematics is the science of hypotheses,” or of precise hypotheses.  For one important part of the mathematician’s business is to frame his hypothesis and to generalize it.  The drawing of conclusions about it is not all.

Reference

  • Peirce, C.S., [Logic of Number — Le Fevre] (MS 229), published in Carolyn Eisele (ed., 1976), The New Elements of Mathematics by Charles S. Peirce, vol. 2, 592–595.
Posted in Abduction, Abstraction, C.S. Peirce, Deduction, Foundations of Mathematics, Logic, Mathematics, Peirce | Tagged , , , , , , , | 5 Comments