Theme One Program • Motivation 4

From Zipf’s Law and the category of “things that vary inversely to frequency” I got my first brush with the idea that keeping track of usage frequencies is part and parcel of building efficient codes.

In its first application the environment the Learner had to learn was the usage behavior of its user, as given by finite sequences of characters from a finite alphabet which might as well be called words and as given by finite sequences of those words which might as well be called phrases or sentences.  In other words, Job One for the Learner was the job of constructing a user model.

In that frame of mind we are not seeking anything so grand as a Universal Induction Algorithm but simply looking for any approach that gives us a leg up, complexity wise, in Interactive Real Time.

Resource

cc: Cybernetics • Ontolog Forum (1) (2) • Systems Science (1) (2)
cc: Peirce List (12-12) (18-02) (18-03) (20-09) (20-10) (21-10)
cc: FB | Theme One Program • Laws of Form (1) (2)

Posted in Algorithms, Animata, Artificial Intelligence, Boolean Functions, C.S. Peirce, Cactus Graphs, Computation, Computational Complexity, Cybernetics, Data Structures, Differential Logic, Form, Formal Languages, Graph Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Intelligent Systems, Laws of Form, Learning, Logic, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Minimal Negation Operators, Painted Cacti, Peirce, Pragmatics, Programming, Propositional Calculus, Propositional Equation Reasoning Systems, Reasoning, Semantics, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Spencer Brown, Syntax, Visualization | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 2 Comments

Theme One Program • Motivation 3

Sometime around 1970 John B. Eulenberg came from Stanford to direct Michigan State’s Artificial Language Lab, where I would come to spend many interesting hours hanging out all through the 70s and 80s.  Along with its research program the lab did a lot of work on augmentative communication technology for limited mobility users and the observations I made there prompted the first inklings of my Learner program.

Early in that period I visited John’s course in mathematical linguistics, which featured Laws of Form among its readings, along with the more standard fare of Wall, Chomsky, Jackendoff, and the Unified Science volume by Charles Morris which credited Peirce with pioneering the pragmatic theory of signs.  I learned about Zipf’s Law relating the lengths of codes to their usage frequencies and I named the earliest avatar of my Learner program XyPh, partly after Zipf and playing on the xylem and phloem of its tree data structures.

Resource

cc: Cybernetics • Ontolog Forum (1) (2) • Systems Science (1) (2)
cc: Peirce List (12-12) (18-02) (18-03) (20-09) (20-10) (21-10)
cc: FB | Theme One Program • Laws of Form (1) (2)

Posted in Algorithms, Animata, Artificial Intelligence, Boolean Functions, C.S. Peirce, Cactus Graphs, Computation, Computational Complexity, Cybernetics, Data Structures, Differential Logic, Form, Formal Languages, Graph Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Intelligent Systems, Laws of Form, Learning, Logic, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Minimal Negation Operators, Painted Cacti, Peirce, Pragmatics, Programming, Propositional Calculus, Propositional Equation Reasoning Systems, Reasoning, Semantics, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Spencer Brown, Syntax, Visualization | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 2 Comments

Theme One Program • Motivation 2

A side-effect of working on the Theme One program over the course of a decade was the measure of insight it gave me into the reasons why empiricists and rationalists have so much trouble understanding each other, even when those two styles of thinking inhabit the very same soul.

The way it came about was this.  The code from which the program is currently assembled initially came from two distinct programs, ones I developed in alternate years, at first only during the summers.

In the Learner program I sought to implement a Humean empiricist style of learning algorithm for the adaptive uptake of coded sequences of occurrences in the environment, say, as codified in a formal language.  I knew all the theorems from formal language theory telling how limited any such strategy must ultimately be in terms of its generative capacity, but I wanted to explore the boundaries of that capacity in concrete computational terms.

In the Modeler program I aimed to implement a variant of Peirce’s graphical syntax for propositional logic, making use of graph-theoretic extensions I had developed over the previous decade.

As I mentioned, work on those two projects proceeded in a parallel series of fits and starts through interwoven summers for a number of years, until one day it dawned on me how the Learner, one of whose aliases was Index, could be put to work helping with sundry substitution tasks the Modeler needed to carry out.

So I began integrating the functions of the Learner and the Modeler, at first still working on the two component modules in an alternating manner, but devoting a portion of effort to amalgamating their principal data structures, bringing them into convergence with each other, and unifying them over a common basis.

Another round of seasons and many changes of mind and programming style, I arrived at a unified graph-theoretic data structure, strung like a wire through the far‑flung pearls of my programmed wit.  But the pearls I polished in alternate years maintained their shine along axes of polarization whose grains remained skew in regard to each other.  To put it more plainly, the strategies I imagined were the smartest tricks to pull from the standpoint of optimizing the program’s performance on the Learning task I found the next year were the dumbest moves to pull from the standpoint of its performance on the Reasoning task.  I gradually came to appreciate that trade-off as a discovery

Resource

cc: Cybernetics • Ontolog Forum (1) (2) • Systems Science (1) (2)
cc: Peirce List (12-12) (18-02) (18-03) (20-09) (20-10) (21-10)
cc: FB | Theme One Program • Laws of Form (1) (2)

Posted in Algorithms, Animata, Artificial Intelligence, Boolean Functions, C.S. Peirce, Cactus Graphs, Computation, Computational Complexity, Cybernetics, Data Structures, Differential Logic, Form, Formal Languages, Graph Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Intelligent Systems, Laws of Form, Learning, Logic, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Minimal Negation Operators, Painted Cacti, Peirce, Pragmatics, Programming, Propositional Calculus, Propositional Equation Reasoning Systems, Reasoning, Semantics, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Spencer Brown, Syntax, Visualization | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 2 Comments

Theme One Program • Motivation 1

The main idea behind the Theme One program is the efficient use of graph-theoretic data structures for the tasks of “learning” and “reasoning”.

I am thinking of learning in the sense of learning about an environment, in essence, gaining information about the nature of an environment and being able to apply the information acquired to a specific purpose.

Under the heading of reasoning I am simply lumping together all the ordinary sorts of practical activities which would probably occur to most people under that name.

There is a natural relation between the tasks.  Learning the character of an environment leads to the recognition of laws which govern the environment and making full use of that recognition requires the ability to reason logically about those laws in abstract terms.

Resource

cc: Cybernetics • Ontolog Forum (1) (2) • Systems Science (1) (2)
cc: Peirce List (12-12) (18-02) (18-03) (20-09) (20-10) (21-10)
cc: FB | Theme One Program • Laws of Form (1) (2)

Posted in Algorithms, Animata, Artificial Intelligence, Boolean Functions, C.S. Peirce, Cactus Graphs, Computation, Computational Complexity, Cybernetics, Data Structures, Differential Logic, Form, Formal Languages, Graph Theory, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Intelligent Systems, Laws of Form, Learning, Logic, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Minimal Negation Operators, Painted Cacti, Peirce, Pragmatics, Programming, Propositional Calculus, Propositional Equation Reasoning Systems, Reasoning, Semantics, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Spencer Brown, Syntax, Visualization | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 3 Comments

Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Relations • 1

To understand how signs work in Peirce’s theory of triadic sign relations, also known as “semiotics”, we have to understand, in order of increasing generality, sign relations, triadic relations, and relations in general, all as conceived in Peirce’s logic of relative terms and the corresponding mathematics of relations.

Toward that understanding, here are versions of articles I long ago contributed to Wikipedia and have more lately developed at a number of other places.

cc: Ontolog ForumPeirce List

Posted in C.S. Peirce, Icon Index Symbol, Knowledge Representation, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Mathematics, Ontology, Peirce, Pragmatism, Relation Theory, Semiosis, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Triadic Relations, Triadicity | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 16 Comments

Theme One • A Program Of Inquiry 15

An unexpected benefit of cleaning out our basement and putting our belongings in storage was finding a trove of work I thought I’d lost, in a stash of 3½ inch floppies, no less.  I uploaded a sample to a couple of folders on Google Drive.

The first contains a minimal set of files for running the program.
The second contains the example files mentioned in the User Guide.

Apologies in advance for Theme One being a bare prototype, a “test of concept” sort of program.  The user interface is pre-mouse and very finicky but I, its mother, was able to nurse it along far enough to learn a lot from it and many are lessons of still timely pertinence to our perennial issues.

cc: Ontolog Forum • Peirce List (1) (2) (3) (4)

Posted in Algorithms, Animata, Artificial Intelligence, Boolean Functions, C.S. Peirce, Cactus Graphs, Cognition, Computation, Constraint Satisfaction Problems, Data Structures, Differential Logic, Equational Inference, Formal Languages, Graph Theory, Inquiry Driven Systems, Laws of Form, Learning Theory, Logic, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Minimal Negation Operators, Painted Cacti, Peirce, Propositional Calculus, Semiotics, Spencer Brown, Visualization | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 8 Comments

Theme One • A Program Of Inquiry 14

As an alternative to piling generalities on generalities, not that there’s anything wrong with that, it also helps to look at issues as they arise in concrete applications.

One of the most concrete applications I ever attempted was the program I worked on all through the 1980s designed to integrate a basic form of inductive (data‑driven) learning with a fundamental form of deductive (concept‑driven) reasoning.  Having recently begun a fresh attempt to essay all that on my blog I think it might serve our ends to share it here.

cc: Ontolog Forum

Posted in Algorithms, Animata, Artificial Intelligence, Boolean Functions, C.S. Peirce, Cactus Graphs, Cognition, Computation, Constraint Satisfaction Problems, Data Structures, Differential Logic, Equational Inference, Formal Languages, Graph Theory, Inquiry Driven Systems, Laws of Form, Learning Theory, Logic, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Minimal Negation Operators, Painted Cacti, Peirce, Propositional Calculus, Semiotics, Spencer Brown, Visualization | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 8 Comments

Definition and Determination • 17

Re: Ontolog ForumRichard McCullough

RM:  We clearly have some differences in the “definition” of “definition”.

I suppose it all depends on the sorts of things one wants to define, something we might call the context of application.  I am not as much focused on using an ontology as a large online lexicon as I am on the task of acquiring scientific knowledge, so the sorts of things I need to define are complex systems of relationships, the formal or mathematical models we use as intermediate objects to deal with phenomena and the realities producing those phenomena.

Objects like that, intermediate and ultimate, typically have such high levels of complexity we are forced to approach them in stages, often beginning with “toy worlds” in the classic AI fashion.  Those are the sorts of definitions I am after.  We could call them specifications if it helps to use another word.

Resources

cc: Ontolog Forum

Posted in C.S. Peirce, Comprehension, Constraint, Definition, Determination, Extension, Form, Geometry, Graph Theory, Group Theory, Indication, Information = Comprehension × Extension, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Intension, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Peirce, Relation Theory, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Topology | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 5 Comments

Definition and Determination • 16

Re: Ontolog ForumRichard McCullough

RM:  What is your view of definitions?

A recurring question, always worth some thought, so I added my earlier comment to a long-running series on my blog concerned with Definition and Determination.

Those two concepts are closely related, almost synonyms in their etymologies, both of them having to do with setting bounds on variation.  And that brings to mind, a cybernetic mind at least, the overarching concept of constraint, which figures heavily in information theory, systems theory, and engineering applications of both.

As it happens, I have been working for as long as I can remember on a project now flying under the banner of “Inquiry Driven Systems” and in the early 90s I returned to grad school in a systems engineering program as a way of focusing more resolutely on the systems aspects of that project.

Here’s a budget of excerpts on Definition and Determination I collected around that time, mostly from C.S. Peirce, since his pragmatic paradigm for thinking about information, inquiry, logic, and signs forms the platform for my efforts, plus a few bits from sources before and after him.

cc: Ontolog Forum

Posted in C.S. Peirce, Comprehension, Constraint, Definition, Determination, Extension, Form, Geometry, Graph Theory, Group Theory, Indication, Information = Comprehension × Extension, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Intension, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Peirce, Relation Theory, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Topology | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 5 Comments

Definition and Determination • 15

Re: Ontolog ForumRichard McCullough

In some early math course I learned a fourfold scheme of Primitives (undefined terms), Definitions, Axioms, and Inference Rules.  But later excursions tended to run the axioms and definitions together, speaking for example of mathematical objects like geometries, graphs, groups, topologies, etc. ad infinitum as defined by so many axioms.  And later still I learned correspondences between axioms and inference rules that blurred even that line, making the distinction appear more a matter of application and interpretation than set in stone.

In any case, the pervasive theme running through all the variations remains (1) whether the formal system inaugurated by the ritual of choice is a system of consequence or not, (2) whether and how well it determines a category of mathematical objects and, (3) if you bear an applied mind, whether those objects serve the end of understanding that reality which does not cease to press on us.

Resource

cc: Ontolog Forum

Posted in C.S. Peirce, Comprehension, Constraint, Definition, Determination, Extension, Form, Geometry, Graph Theory, Group Theory, Indication, Information = Comprehension × Extension, Inquiry, Inquiry Driven Systems, Intension, Logic, Logic of Relatives, Logical Graphs, Mathematics, Peirce, Relation Theory, Semiotics, Sign Relations, Topology | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 6 Comments