Cybernetics • Regulation In Biological Systems • Selection 2

Posted on November 15, 2019 by Jon Awbrey

Regulation In Biological Systems

Survival

10/4.   What has just been said is well enough known.  It enables us, however, to join these facts on to the ideas developed in this book and to show the connexion exactly.

For consider what is meant, in general, by “survival”.  Suppose a mouse is trying to escape from a cat, so that the survival of the mouse is in question.  As a dynamic system, the mouse can be in a variety of states;  thus it can be in various postures, its head can be turned this way or that, its temperature can have various values, it may have two ears or one.  These different states may occur during its attempt to escape and it may still be said to have survived.  On the other hand if the mouse changes to the state in which it is in four separated pieces, or has lost its head, or has become a solution of amino-acids circulating in the cat’s blood then we do not consider its arrival at one of these states as corresponding to “survival”.

The concept of “survival” can thus be translated into perfectly rigorous terms, similar to those used throughout the book.  The various states (M for Mouse) that the mouse may be in initially and that it may pass into after the affair with the cat is a set M_1, M_2, \ldots, M_k, \ldots, M_n.  We decide that, for various reasons of what is practical and convenient, we shall restrict the words “living mouse” to mean the mouse in one of the states in some subset of these possibilities, in M_1 to M_k say.  If now some operation C (for cat) acts on the mouse in state M_i, and C(M_i) gives, say, M_2, then we may say that M has “survived” the operation of C, for M_2 is in the set M_1, \ldots, M_k.

If now a particular mouse is very skilled and always survives the operation C, then all the states C(M_1), C(M_2), \ldots, C(M_k), are contained in the set M_1, \ldots, M_k.  We now see that this representation of survival is identical with that of the “stability” of a set (S.5/5).  Thus the concepts of “survival” and “stability” can be brought into an exact relationship;  and facts and theorems about either can be used with the other, provided the exactness is sustained.

The states M are often defined in terms of variables.  The states M_1, \ldots, M_k, that correspond to the living organism are then those states in which certain essential variables are kept within assigned (“physiological”) limits.

Reference

  • Ashby, W.R. (1956), An Introduction to Cybernetics, Chapman and Hall, London, UK.  Republished by Methuen and Company, London, UK, 1964.  Online.

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Cybernetics • Regulation In Biological Systems • Selection 1

Posted on November 14, 2019 by Jon Awbrey

Regulation In Biological Systems

10/3.   The foundation.   Let us start at the beginning.  The most basic facts in biology are that this earth is now two thousand million years old, and that the biologist studies mostly that which exists today.  From these two facts follow a well-known deduction, which I would like to restate in our terms.

We saw in S.4/23 that if a dynamic system is large and composed of parts with much repetition, and if it contains any property that is autocatalytic, i.e. whose occurrence at one point increases the probability that it will occur again at another point, then such a system is, so far as that property is concerned, essentially unstable in its absence.  This earth contained carbon and other necessary elements, and it is a fact that many combinations of carbon, nitrogen, and a few others are self-reproducing.  It follows that though the state of “being lifeless” is almost a state of equilibrium, yet this equilibrium is unstable (S.5/6), a single deviation from it being sufficient to start a trajectory that deviates more and more from the “lifeless” state.  What we see today in the biological world are these “autocatalytic” processes showing all the peculiarities that have been imposed on them by two thousand million years of elimination of those forms that cannot survive.

The organisms we see today are deeply marked by the selective action of two thousand million years’ attrition.  Any form in any way defective in its power of survival has been eliminated;  and today the features of almost every form bear the marks of being adapted to ensure survival rather than any other possible outcome.  Eyes, roots, cilia, shells and claws are so fashioned as to maximise the chance of survival.  And when we study the brain we are again studying a means to survival.

Reference

  • Ashby, W.R. (1956), An Introduction to Cybernetics, Chapman and Hall, London, UK.  Republished by Methuen and Company, London, UK, 1964.  Online.

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Pragmatic Truth • Discussion 18

Posted on November 14, 2019 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Pragmatic Truth • Discussion • (14) • (16) • (17)
Re: Peirce List • Tom Gollier

We do not live in axiom systems.  We do not live encased in languages, formal or natural.  There is no reason to think we will ever have exact and exhaustive theories of what’s out there, and the truth, as we know, is “out there”.  Peirce understood there are more truths in mathematics than are dreamt of in logic — and Gödel’s realism should have put the last nail in the coffin of logicism — but some ways of thinking just never get a clue.

That brings us to the question —

  • What are formalisms and all their embodiments in brains and computers good for?

For that I’ll turn to cybernetics …

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Pragmatic Truth • Discussion 17

Posted on November 13, 2019 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Pragmatic Theory Of Truth • (14) • (16)
Re: Peirce List • Tom Gollier

I meant to write more last time but got waylaid by an onslaught of weather and progress on this topic is likely to be glacial for now.  But I have been mulling over Tom Gollier’s comments all the while and the best I can do so far by way of getting our minds on the same page is simply to assemble our words on this one.

JA:
There are many conceptions of truth — linguistic, model-theoretic, proof-theoretic — for the moment I’m focused on cybernetics, systems, and experimental sciences and this is where the pragmatic conception of truth fits what we naturally do in those sciences remarkably well.
The main thing in those activities is the relationship among symbol systems, the world, and our actions, whether in thought, among ourselves, or between ourselves and the world.
So the notion of truth we want here is predicated on three dimensions:  the patch of the world we are dealing with in a given application, the systems of signs we are using to describe that domain, and the transformations of signs we find of good service in bearing information about that piece of the world.
TG:
First, assuming that “symbol systems” are more or less consistent and complete a priori structures of Thirdness and “the world” is existential Secondness, the question of “truth” seems to be just what “actions” will bridge the abyss between them.  “Thought” alone doesn’t, but thought “among ourselves” (the a priori method) might have a shot at it.  Scientific experimentation seems to be pretty good at it, but …
Secondly, assuming those systems of Thirdness are finite while the world of Secondness is both interconnected and infinite, any claim to truth must be made in the face of leaving something, a lot, out of it.

There is much about “the relationship among symbol systems, the world, and our actions, whether in thought, among ourselves, or between ourselves and the world” to mull over here.  (Suddenly I have a craving for cider …)

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Pragmatic Truth • Discussion 16

Posted on November 11, 2019 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Pragmatic Theory Of Truth • 14
Re: Peirce List • Tom Gollier

Staying focused on a set objective has never been my strong point so let me emblazon the following emblem by way of keeping my eyes on the prize.

For the moment I’m focused on cybernetics, systems, and experimental sciences and this is where the pragmatic conception of truth fits what we naturally do in those sciences remarkably well.

I’ve been planning to dig up a few choice texts to illustrate the links among cybernetic, pragmatic, and scientific thinking in general, but most of my books are still packed in boxes from our move last year, so I’ll consider myself moved to keep unpacking.

Right now though I’ve got to go shovel some snow …

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Pragmatic Truth • Discussion 15

Posted on November 10, 2019 by Jon Awbrey

The way of inquiry being blocked on Wikipedia, I saved the last version of Pragmatic Truth I worked on to several other wikis.  The current state of that article fork begins as follows:

Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

Pragmatic theory of truth refers to those accounts, definitions, and theories of the concept truth distinguishing the philosophies of pragmatism and pragmaticism.  The conception of truth in question varies along lines reflecting the influence of several thinkers, initially and notably, Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, but a number of common features can be identified.  The most characteristic features are (1) a reliance on the pragmatic maxim as a means of clarifying the meanings of difficult concepts, truth in particular, and (2) an emphasis on the fact that the product variously branded as belief, certainty, knowledge, or truth is the result of a process, namely, inquiry.

Document History

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Semiotics, Semiosis, Sign Relations • Discussion 5

Posted on November 9, 2019 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Semiotics, Semiosis, Sign Relations • (5) • (7)
Re: FB | Semeiotics • Gary Herstein

Continuing questions about “infinite semiosis” vs. “unbounded semiosis” prompt me to make another comment by way of bringing our focus to bear on the empirical context of semiosis and sign relations.

The semiotic question goes back to a line from Peirce and the uses later writers like Eco and Derrida made of it.  But the real issue is not about the cardinality or topology of any sub-posed continuum, “signiferous ether”, or semiotic medium so much as the empirical data streams we actually have, which are captured categorically and coded discretely as sequences of signs.

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Semiotics, Semiosis, Sign Relations • Discussion 4

Posted on November 7, 2019 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Semiotics, Semiosis, Sign Relations • Discussion 2

It’s a common mistake to confound infinite with unbounded.  A process can continue without end and still be “bounded in a nutshell”.  So a sign process can pass from sign to interpretant sign to next interpretant sign ad infinitum without ever leaving a finite set of signs.

The number of questions I got about that statement tells me I should have delineated the context in which it was set a little more fully.

A sign process in this context is simply a sequence of signs, of the sort we might observe in communicational, computational, or experimental settings.  For people who remember the more ancient arts of AI, cognitive science, and cybernetics, it may help to recall the orders of considerations arising in protocol analysis.

It goes with this territory to assume the formal equivalent of categorical perception.  This means we can set aside the subtleties of token haecceity — the nominal distinctiveness of every individual sign instance — along with the possibility of signs being sampled from a continuous medium.

In this setting we are left with two interpretations for infinite and bounded, depending on whether the sign domain has a quantitative measure defined on it, or not.  In the first case, bounded means the sequence never exceeds a finite bound in the relevant measure.  In the second case, bounded means the sequence never leaves a finite set.

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Pragmatic Truth • Discussion 14

Posted on November 6, 2019 by Jon Awbrey

Re: Cybernetic Communications • Stephen Paul King

There are many conceptions of truth — linguistic, model-theoretic, proof-theoretic — for the moment I’m focused on cybernetics, systems, and experimental sciences and this is where the pragmatic conception of truth fits what we naturally do in those sciences remarkably well.

The main thing in those activities is the relationship among symbol systems, the world, and our actions, whether in thought, among ourselves, or between ourselves and the world.  So the notion of truth we want here is predicated on three dimensions:  the patch of the world we are dealing with in a given application, the systems of signs we are using to describe that domain, and the transformations of signs we find of good service in bearing information about that piece of the world.

I’ll dig up some material on the pragmatic conception of truth …

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Pragmatic Truth • Discussion 13

Posted on November 3, 2019 by Jon Awbrey

Re: FB | Charles S. Peirce Society • John Corcoran

I looked at John Corcoran’s contribution on “Formalizing Pragmatic Truth” but did not see anything near enough what I’d recognize as a pragmatic theory of truth.

Pragmatic inquiry into a candidate concept of truth would begin by applying the pragmatic maxim to clarify the concept as far as possible and a pragmatic definition of truth, should any result, would find its place within Peirce’s theory of logic as formal semiotics, in other words, stated in terms of a formal theory of triadic sign relations.

Resources

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